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Part 1. I. Non-formal value-ethics and ethics of goods and purposes : 1. Goods and values ; 2. The relation of the values "good" and "evil" to the other values and goods ; 3. Purposes and values
II. Formalism and apriorism : A. The a priori and the formal in general ; B. The non-formal a priori in ethics : 1. Formal essential interconnections ; 2. Values and bearers of values ; 3. Higher and lower values ; 4. The a priori relations between heights of values and pure bearers of values ; 5. A priori relations of rank among value-modalities
III. Non-formal ethics and ethics of success
Part 2. IV.. Value-ethics and ethics of imperatives : 1. Unsatisfactory theories of the origin of the concept of value and the essence of moral facts ; 2. Value and the ought
V. Non-formal value-ethics and eudaemonism : 1. Value and pleasure ; 2. Feeling and feeling-states ; 3. The meaning of the thesis of the relativity and subjectivity of values ; 4. The relativity of values to man ; 5. The relativity of values to life ; 6. The historical relativity of ethical value-estimations and its dimensions ; 7. The so-called conscience subjectivity of moral values ; 8. The stratification of the emotional life ; 9. The interconnections between feeling-states and moral values ; 10. The idea of sanction and reprisal in relation to the connection between happiness and moral values
VI. Formalism and person : A. On the theoretical conception of the person in general ; B. The person in ethical contexts.
II. Formalism and apriorism : A. The a priori and the formal in general ; B. The non-formal a priori in ethics : 1. Formal essential interconnections ; 2. Values and bearers of values ; 3. Higher and lower values ; 4. The a priori relations between heights of values and pure bearers of values ; 5. A priori relations of rank among value-modalities
III. Non-formal ethics and ethics of success
Part 2. IV.. Value-ethics and ethics of imperatives : 1. Unsatisfactory theories of the origin of the concept of value and the essence of moral facts ; 2. Value and the ought
V. Non-formal value-ethics and eudaemonism : 1. Value and pleasure ; 2. Feeling and feeling-states ; 3. The meaning of the thesis of the relativity and subjectivity of values ; 4. The relativity of values to man ; 5. The relativity of values to life ; 6. The historical relativity of ethical value-estimations and its dimensions ; 7. The so-called conscience subjectivity of moral values ; 8. The stratification of the emotional life ; 9. The interconnections between feeling-states and moral values ; 10. The idea of sanction and reprisal in relation to the connection between happiness and moral values
VI. Formalism and person : A. On the theoretical conception of the person in general ; B. The person in ethical contexts.