I. Static games of complete information
1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium
2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium
II. Dynamic games of complete information
3. Extensive-form games
4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions
5. Repeated games
III. Static games of incomplete information
6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium
7. Bayesian games and mechanism design
IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information
8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection
9. Reputation effects
10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information
V. Advanced topics
11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance
12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games
13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium
14. Common knowledge and games
Index.