Legal positivism in American jurisprudence / Anthony J. Sebok.
1998
K331 .S43 1998 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Legal positivism in American jurisprudence / Anthony J. Sebok.
Published
New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Call Number
K331 .S43 1998
ISBN
0521480418
Description
xiv, 327 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)38130794
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
1
Why Study Legal Positivism?
1
1.1Legal Positivism's Checkered Past
1
1.2Sympathy for the Devil: Legal Positivism and Creon
7
2
Positivism and Formalism
20
2.1Classical Legal Positivism and Classical Common Law Theory
20
2.2Classical Legal Positivism and Sociological Positivism
32
2.3Classical Legal Positivism and Legal Formalism
39
3
The Varieties of Formalism
48
3.1Does Legal Formalism Exist?
48
3.2Formalism and Antiformalism
57
3.3Holmes and Antiformalism
60
3.4Antiformalism and the Growth of Legal Realism
75
3.5The Antiformalist Critique of Langdell and Beale
83
4
Legal Process and the Shadow of Positivism
113
4.1The Reevaluation of Realism
113
4.2The Development of Reasoned Elaboration
120
4.3The Jurisprudential Foundations of Legal Process
129
4.4Reasoned Elaboration as Noncontinuous Discussion
138
4.5The Valorization of Adjudication
143
4.6How Could Hart and Sacks Have Agreed with Fuller?
160
4.7Institutional Settlement and Pluralism
169
5
The False Choice Between the Warren Court and Legal Process
179
5.1Wechsler and Neutral Principles
179
5.2Critical Reaction to Neutral Principles
183
5.3Saving Legal Process from Its Friends
199
5.4The Rise of Fundamental Rights
206
6
Fundamental Rights and the Problem of Insatiability
217
6.1A Working Definition of Fundamental Rights
217
6.2The Fundamental Rights Approach and Natural Law
222
6.3The Strange Fate of Weak Epistemic Natural Law
234
6.4Does the Fundamental Rights Theorist Have an Epistemic Theory of Law?
256
6.5The Insatiability of Justice and Monistic Practical Reason
259
7
New Legal Positivism and the Incorporation of Morality
267
7.1The Emergence of New Legal Positivism
267
7.2From Rules to Principles: Hart, Dworkin, and the Defense of Hart
269
7.3Nonincorporationism
277
7.4Incorporationism
287
7.5Incorporationism and the Problem of Insatiability
294
7.6Incorporationism and Identification
307
Index
319