The independence and impartiality of ICSID arbitrators : current case law, alternative approaches, and improvement suggestions / by Maria Nicole Cleis.
2017
K3834 .C57 2017 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
The independence and impartiality of ICSID arbitrators : current case law, alternative approaches, and improvement suggestions / by Maria Nicole Cleis.
Published
Leiden ; Boston : Brill Nijhoff, [2017]
Call Number
K3834 .C57 2017
ISBN
9789004341470 (hardback)
9004341471 (hardback)
9789004341487 (e-book)
9004341471 (hardback)
9789004341487 (e-book)
Description
xii, 292 pages ; 25 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)981761714
Summary
The legitimacy of investor-State arbitration is a much-debated topic, with arbitrators? independence and impartiality being one of the core concerns. In 'The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID Arbitrators', Maria Nicole Cleis explores how unbiased decision-making is ensured under the ICSID Convention. Juxtaposing existing disqualification decisions in the ICSID system against corresponding requirements in related dispute settlement systems, the book convincingly argues that the current approach to disqualification requests against ICSID arbitrators is too exacting in light of the high stakes of investor-State disputes. The author?s nuanced analysis of the status quo is followed by novel suggestions for reforms (including a proposal for ICSID-specific guidelines on conflict of interest), making the book a valuable source of ideas on constructive paths forward.
Note
The legitimacy of investor-State arbitration is a much-debated topic, with arbitrators? independence and impartiality being one of the core concerns. In 'The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID Arbitrators', Maria Nicole Cleis explores how unbiased decision-making is ensured under the ICSID Convention. Juxtaposing existing disqualification decisions in the ICSID system against corresponding requirements in related dispute settlement systems, the book convincingly argues that the current approach to disqualification requests against ICSID arbitrators is too exacting in light of the high stakes of investor-State disputes. The author?s nuanced analysis of the status quo is followed by novel suggestions for reforms (including a proposal for ICSID-specific guidelines on conflict of interest), making the book a valuable source of ideas on constructive paths forward.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 257-271) and index.
Available in Other Form
Online version: Cleis, Maria Nicole. Independence and impartiality of ICSID arbitrators. Leiden : Brill Nijhoff, 2017 9789004341487 (DLC) 2017016714
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
x
List of Illustrations
x
List of Abbreviations
xi
Introduction
1
Structure of the Book
8
1.
Independence and Impartiality in the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules
12
1.
Legal Framework and Drafting History
12
1.1.
Requirement of Independence and Impartiality
12
1.2.
Disqualification of Arbitrators
15
1.3.
Arbitrators' Disclosure Obligation
19
2.
Delimiting Independence and Impartiality in a System of Party-appointments
20
2.1.
Notions of Independence and Impartiality
20
2.2.
Party-appointments and Independence and Impartiality
23
2.
Disqualification Decisions under the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules
31
1.
Formally Inconsistent Interpretations of the Disqualification Threshold
32
1.1.
Requirement of Strict Proof under Amco Asia
32
1.2.
Requirement of Reasonable Doubts under Vivendi and SGS
33
1.3.
Inconsistency of the Disqualification Threshold in Subsequent Decisions
35
A.
Challenge Decisions Applying the Amco Asia Standard
35
B.
Challenge Decisions Applying the Vivendi Standard
39
C.
Challenge Decisions Referring to Both Standards
43
1.4.
Conclusion
49
2.
Application of the Standard to Specific Categories of Alleged Conflict
53
2.1.
Behavior in Current Proceeding
53
2.2.
Familiarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
56
A.
Previous Contacts with a Party or Counsel
57
B.
Role Switching between an Arbitrator and Counsel
63
C.
Repeat Appointments
64
2.3.
Familiarity with the Subject-matter of the Proceeding
72
2.4.
Connection to an Adverse Third Party
73
2.5.
Conclusion
82
3.
Factors Underlying the Prevalent Dismissal of Arbitrator Challenges
85
3.
Alternative Standards of Independence and Impartiality
88
1.
International Adjudication
88
1.1.
Relevance
88
1.2.
International Court of Justice
91
A.
Independence and Impartiality Requirements
92
B.
Removal of ICJ Judges
95
C.
Case Law
96
1.3.
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization
100
A.
Independence and Impartiality Requirements
101
B.
Challenge of Panelists and Members of the Appellate Body
103
1.4.
Contextualization and Conclusion
106
2.
International Commercial Arbitration
108
2.1.
Relevance
108
2.2.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
112
A.
Behavior in Current Proceeding
113
B.
Familiarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
115
C.
Familiarity with the Subject-Matter of the Proceeding
118
D.
Connection to an Adverse Third Party
122
2.3.
SCC Arbitration Rules
125
A.
Familiarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
127
B.
Familiarity with the Subject-Matter of the Proceeding
131
2.4.
ICC Arbitration Rules
132
A.
Familiarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
136
B.
Familiarity with the Subject-Matter of the Proceeding
141
C.
Connection to an Adverse Third Party
142
2.5.
Contextualization and Conclusion
143
3.
Self-regulatory Codes of Conduct for Arbitrators
157
3.1.
Relevance
157
3.2.
IBA Guidelines
158
A.
General Standards
160
B.
Application Lists
161
C.
Case Law
164
3.3.
Contextualization and Conclusion
167
4.
Sui Generis Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
175
4.1.
Relevance
175
4.2.
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
176
4.3.
Permanent Court of Arbitration
179
4.4.
Contextualization and Conclusion
182
5.
Summary Analysis
183
5.1.
Basic Consensus
183
5.2.
Prevalent Threshold
183
5.3.
Effect of the Threshold on the Outcome
184
A.
Main Discrepancies
185
B.
Main Similarities
186
C.
Gaps in the Case Law
187
4.
Analysis of Existing Reform Proposals
188
1.
Abolishment or Modification of the System of Party-appointments
190
1.1.
Appointment by a Neutral Body
194
1.2.
Party-appointment from a Roster
198
2.
Prohibition of Dual Functions
201
2.1.
Complete Prohibition
202
2.2.
Temporary Prohibition and Vesting Period
204
2.3.
Disinvolvement upon Challenge?
205
3.
Clarification of the Threshold for Arbitrator Challenges
206
3.1.
Excessive Rigor of the Strict Proof Threshold
207
3.2.
Adequacy of the Justifiable Doubts Threshold
208
4.
Investment Court System Proposed by the European Union
212
4.1.
Investor-state Dispute Settlement under CETA
213
4.2.
Investor-state Dispute Settlement under TTIP
216
4.3.
ICS -- Panacea or Chimera?
218
5.
Improvement Suggestions
224
1.
Institutional Reforms
224
1.1.
Appointment of the Chairperson from a Roster
224
1.2.
Institutional Confirmation of Party-appointed Arbitrators
228
1.3.
Institutional Jurisdiction for Arbitrator Challenges
231
2.
Guidance on the Interpretation of a Justifiable Doubts Threshold
232
2.1.
Compulsory Grounds for Disqualification
234
2.2.
Potential Grounds for Disqualification
238
A.
Reversal of the Burden of Proof
239
B.
Burden of Proof on the Challenging Party
242
2.3.
No Grounds for Disqualification
244
2.4.
Proposal for ICSID-specific Guidelines on Conflict of Interest
245
A.
Incompatibilities
245
B.
Potential Grounds for Disqualification
248
C.
Unproblematic Circumstances
249
3.
Implementation of Suggested Reforms
250
Summary
253
Bibliography
257
Legal Sources
272
ICSID Cases
274
UNCITRAL Cases
279
Index
281
Index of Case Law
290