The internal market as a legal concept / Stephen Weatherill, Jacques Delors Professor of European Law at the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Somerville College.
2017
KJE2045 .W43 2017 (Map It)
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Title
The internal market as a legal concept / Stephen Weatherill, Jacques Delors Professor of European Law at the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Somerville College.
Published
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Call Number
KJE2045 .W43 2017
Edition
First edition.
ISBN
9780198794806 (hbk.)
0198794800 (hbk.)
9780198794813 (pbk.)
0198794819 (pbk.)
0198794800 (hbk.)
9780198794813 (pbk.)
0198794819 (pbk.)
Description
xxvii, 240 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)962330746
Summary
What does the 'internal market' mean? The EU is committed to the construction of an internal market, and in this analysis Stephen Weatherill explains that the EU's internal market is an ambiguous legal concept. One may readily suppose that the United Kingdom possesses an internal market. So does Germany, so does France, so does Australia, and Canada, and the United States of America. The European Union aspires to an internal market, but the detailed patterns governing these several internal markets are not uniform; in fact they vary according to the extent to which the constituent units are permitted to pursue different regulatory policies. They vary according to the scope of law-making competence and powers allocated to the central authority. They vary according to the governing institutional (judicial and political) arrangements. The quality and intensity of the regulated environment varies according to the choices made. 0There is a broad band of possible internal markets, ranging from one that is radically decentralized as a result of a choice in favour of unrestricted inter-jurisdictional competition to, at the other extreme, one that is radically centralized in the sense that law-making competence has been completely stripped away from the constituent units in favour of the central authority. Within that spectrum there is a huge range of options. In this inquiry into the limits and ambiguities of the internal market as a legal concept, Weatherill examines and explains the choices made by the EU and demonstrates what they entail for the shape of the EU's internal market. This book is not about 'Brexit', but it shows that one of the claims commonly made by Brexiteers - that the internal market can be confined merely to a deregulatory exercise in free market economics - has no support whatsoever in either EU constitutional law or in EU legislative and judicial practice -- Flap of cover.
Note
What does the 'internal market' mean? The EU is committed to the construction of an internal market, and in this analysis Stephen Weatherill explains that the EU's internal market is an ambiguous legal concept. One may readily suppose that the United Kingdom possesses an internal market. So does Germany, so does France, so does Australia, and Canada, and the United States of America. The European Union aspires to an internal market, but the detailed patterns governing these several internal markets are not uniform; in fact they vary according to the extent to which the constituent units are permitted to pursue different regulatory policies. They vary according to the scope of law-making competence and powers allocated to the central authority. They vary according to the governing institutional (judicial and political) arrangements. The quality and intensity of the regulated environment varies according to the choices made. 0There is a broad band of possible internal markets, ranging from one that is radically decentralized as a result of a choice in favour of unrestricted inter-jurisdictional competition to, at the other extreme, one that is radically centralized in the sense that law-making competence has been completely stripped away from the constituent units in favour of the central authority. Within that spectrum there is a huge range of options. In this inquiry into the limits and ambiguities of the internal market as a legal concept, Weatherill examines and explains the choices made by the EU and demonstrates what they entail for the shape of the EU's internal market. This book is not about 'Brexit', but it shows that one of the claims commonly made by Brexiteers - that the internal market can be confined merely to a deregulatory exercise in free market economics - has no support whatsoever in either EU constitutional law or in EU legislative and judicial practice -- Flap of cover.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Table of Cases
xi
Table of Legislation
xxiii
1.
Internal Market as a Legal Concept
1
A.
`Internal Market' as an Ambiguous Legal Concept
1
2.
Finding the Internal Market in the Treaty
3
A.
Concept of the `Internal Market' Empowers the EU -- but Not Without Limits
3
B.
Control and Testing -- Negative Law
5
C.
EU Legislative Action -- Positive Law
10
D.
Decorative
13
3.
Law, Politics and Economics of the Internal Market
15
A.
Treaty of Rome
15
B.
Single European Act and the Political Bargain
16
C.
Treaty of Lisbon and the Political Bargain
19
D.
Economics of the Internal Market
21
E.
Internal Market beyond Economics Alone
24
4.
Principal Themes and Structure
27
5.
Internal Market
33
A.
Breadth of the Market as a Legal Concept
33
B.
Limits of the `Market'
39
C.
Internal Market as a Concept Which Takes the Scope of Negative Law beyond That of Positive Law
43
6.
Internal Market
49
A.
Limits, What Limits?
49
1.
Early Years, Easy Years
50
2.
Dassonville
51
3.
Cassis de Dijon
53
4.
Competition Law
57
B.
Where Do the Limits Lie?
60
C.
Mis-steps and Re-sets
65
1.
Sunday Trading
66
2.
Readjustments
68
3.
Services
70
4.
Adjusting the Readjustment
71
5.
Restrictions on Use
74
6.
Concluding Comments
76
D.
People and Citizens
76
1.
Remoteness
76
2.
People and Families
78
3.
Citizenship Too
81
E.
State Aid
84
1.
Aid Must Be Granted `Granted Directly or Indirectly Through State Resources'
86
2.
Selectivity
88
3.
Making Connections and Re-Shaping Lines
89
F.
Conclusion: The Limits of the Internal Market
90
7.
Personal Scope
95
8.
Justification
99
A.
Structure
99
B.
Principles
100
C.
Breadth
103
1.
Breadth -- Free Movement Law
103
2.
Breadth -- Competition Law
106
D.
Public Health
109
E.
Environmental Protection
112
F.
Protection of the Economic Interests of Consumers
115
9.
Creativity in the Gap between Negative and Positive Law: The Principle of Conferral Unleashed
123
A.
Sport as a Case Study
124
B.
Collective Labour Action as a Case Study
125
C.
Justification and Sensitivity
128
10.
Abuse
131
11.
Fundamental Rights and National Identity in the Internal Market
135
A.
Early Years, Early Cases
136
B.
Schmidberger and Omega
137
C.
National Identity
139
12.
Internal Market as a Site of Diversity
143
13.
Legislative Dimension: Harmonization
151
A.
Nature and Purpose of Harmonization
151
B.
Article 114 -- an Instrument of Re-regulation
153
C.
Constitutional Commitments to Re-regulation
155
D.
Judicial Review and Re-regulation
156
1.
Judicial Review of Inadequate Standards
156
2.
Judicial Review of Over-regulation
157
3.
Judicial Interpretation of the Harmonized Legislative Acquis
160
E.
Permissibility of Prohibition
162
F.
Legislative Practice and Re-regulation
163
G.
Limits of Harmonization
166
1.
Slow Road to Emergence of `Competence Sensitivity'
166
2.
Single European Act and Tobacco Advertising I
168
3.
Subsequent Case Law
170
4.
Limits, What Limits?
173
H.
Subsidiarity and Proportionality
175
1.
Subsidiarity
176
2.
Proportionality
178
3.
Political Controls
179
14.
Legislative Competence More Broadly
187
A.
Wide Sweep
187
B.
Labour Market Regulation and Social Policy
189
1.
Defrenne
190
2.
Policy Choices
191
3.
From the Treaty of Rome to the Single European Act
194
4.
From the Single European Act via Maastricht to the Treaty of Amsterdam
196
5.
Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020
198
C.
EU Social Policy Today
200
1.
Spontaneous Alignment
201
2.
Legislation on Social Policy
201
3.
Approximation/Harmonization
203
D.
Social Policy -- the Current Debate
204
E.
Social Policy -- the Continuing Debate
207
15.
Pre-emption
209
A.
Directions Contained in the Treaty
209
B.
Legislative Practice
211
C.
Sources of Pressure on the Model of Minimum Harmonization
212
1.
Court of Justice
212
2.
Commissions Attack on `Minimum Harmonization'
215
D.
Normative Perspectives on the Choice between Models of Harmonization
219
16.
Conclusion
223
A.
Ambiguity and Limits
223
B.
Limits and Lines
225
C.
Lines and Choices
227
D.
Choices and Empowerment
229
E.
Empowerment and Ambiguity
232
Index
235