The philosophy of customary law / James Bernard Murphy.
2014
K282 .M87 2014 (Map It)
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Details
Title
The philosophy of customary law / James Bernard Murphy.
Published
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2014]
Call Number
K282 .M87 2014
ISBN
9780199370627 (hardback ; alk. paper)
0199370621 (hardback ; alk. paper)
0199370621 (hardback ; alk. paper)
Description
xv, 130 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)858080995
Summary
"Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is its creation of an enduring legal custom. Laws that fail to create customs fall into desuetude. Law is how custom regulates its own evolution. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by objective usage or by subjective endorsement, lead to broader questions of whether law and custom are mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function at all without customary usage? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed through two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suárez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts"--Unedited summary from book jacket.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Gift

The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Table of Contents
Preface
ix
Acknowledgments
xvii
ch. 1
Habit and Convention at the Foundation of Custom
1
Transcending the Nature-Convention Dichotomy
2
Two Faces of Custom: Ethos
6
Two Faces of Custom: Nomos
9
Roles of Habit and Convention in Custom
12
ch. 2
Customary Law in Suarez: Will of the Sovereign or of the People?
23
Semantics and Pragmatics of Law
25
Custom: Will of the Sovereign?
40
Do We Consent to Our Customs?
47
Voluntarism Collapses into Naturalism
55
ch. 3
Commentary on the Comment: Jeremy Bentham's Theory of Custom
59
Bentham's Theory of Fictitious Entities
61
Customary Law as Fiction
67
Custom as Fiction
74
Custom and Obligation
77
Custom as the Unity of Habit and Convention
81
ch. 4
James C. Carter's Natural Law Theory of Custom
89
Moral Foundation of Custom: Liberty
95
Moral Foundation of Custom: Utility
99
Consensus and Conflict in the Evolution of Custom and Law
103
Custom: Usage or Opinion?
108
We Know More Than We Can Say: Why All Law Is Custom
110
Epilogue: Custom and Law
117
Index
125