Antitrust and patent law / Alan Devlin ; consultant editor, Lars Kjølbye.
2016
K1506 .D48 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Title
Antitrust and patent law / Alan Devlin ; consultant editor, Lars Kjølbye.
Published
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Call Number
K1506 .D48 2016
ISBN
9780198728979 (hbk.)
0198728972 (hbk.)
0198728972 (hbk.)
Description
xxxvi, 491 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)948341860
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Added Author
Table of Contents
Table of Cases
xi
Table of Legislation
xxxi
I.
INTRODUCTION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1.
Antitrust and Patent Law
3
I.
Introduction
3
II.
Issues at the Patent-Competition Law Intersection
5
III.
Scrutinizing Patentee Conduct: An Antitrust Challenge
8
IV.
Roadmap for the Book
12
2.
Important Developments in Antitrust-Patent Law
17
I.
Introduction
17
II.
Actavis Rewrites US Antitrust and Patent Law
19
III.
EU Law on Reverse Payments
38
IV.
CJEU Limits Strategic Manipulation of the Patent System in AstraZeneca, but Retreats from an Effects-based Approach
42
V.
CJEU Reigns in `By-object' Analysis in Cartes Bancaires
47
VI.
Strategic Use of Standard-Essential Patents
53
VII.
Antitrust Issues Surrounding Patent-Assertion Entities
54
II.
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS OF EUROPE AND AMERICA
3.
Patent Crisis and its Antitrust Implications
59
I.
Introduction
59
II.
Patent System's Economic Function
63
III.
US Patent System
72
IV.
Patent Law in Europe
89
V.
Conclusion: How the Patent Crisis Implicates Competition Policy
101
4.
How the EU and US Antitrust Regimes Differ
103
I.
Introduction
103
II.
Different Traits, Goals, and Policies of EU and US Antitrust Law
104
III.
How EU and US Competition Laws Diverge
112
IV.
Firms Enjoy Less Procedural Protections in Europe
123
III.
UNDERSTANDING THE PATENT--COMPETITION LAW INTERFACE
5.
Relationship Between Patent and Antitrust Law
131
I.
Introduction
131
II.
Evolving Views of the Patent---Competition Law Intersection
132
III.
Scope-of-the-Patent Theory Takes Hold
135
IV.
Dissecting the Antitrust-IP Interface and the Scope-of-the-Patent Test
158
V.
Conclusion: Rethinking the Patent-Antitrust Relationship
168
IV.
SPECIAL ISSUES IN TECHNOLOGY MARKETS
6.
Market Definition, Monopoly Power, and Patented Technology
173
I.
Introduction
173
II.
Market Definition under US Law
179
III.
Relevant Market under EU Law
194
IV.
Patented Technology and Market Definition
204
V.
Market Power under US and EU Law
220
VI.
When Does a Patent Lawfully Subsume Monopoly Power?
226
7.
Antitrust Issues Surrounding Open and Closed Systems
229
I.
Overview
229
II.
When Should Antitrust Open Up Closed Networks?
232
III.
US Law Requires a Firm to Open a System Only in Exceptional Cases
239
IV.
EU Law Requires Dominant Firms to Open a System When Viable Competition Requires It
251
8.
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
257
I.
Introduction
257
II.
Noerr-Pennington Immunity Before the Supreme Court
259
III.
Lower Courts Shape Noerr-Pennington
268
IV.
Antitrust Immunity for Filing Suit in Europe
292
V.
PATENT HOLD-UP AND MISUSE
9.
Manipulation of the Standard-Setting Process
299
I.
Introduction
299
II.
Standard-Setting Hold-Up
302
III.
US Antitrust Limits on SEPs
312
IV.
Antitrust Limits on SEP Assertion in the European Union
325
V.
Conclusion
332
10.
Targeted Patent Aggregation
335
I.
Introduction
335
II.
Anticompetitive Patent Acquisitions by Operating Companies
341
III.
Patent Aggregation by Patent-Assertion Entities
356
IV.
Patent Acquisitions under EU Competition Law
370
11.
Patent Misuse
385
I.
Introduction
385
II.
Rules of Patent Misuse
388
III.
Conclusion
401
VI.
AGREEMENTS CONCERNING PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
12.
Technology Transfer
407
I.
Introduction
407
II.
US Antitrust Rules on Patent Licensing
409
III.
Technology Transfer under EU Competition Law
424
13.
Exclusionary Agreements in the Biopharmaceutical Industry
443
I.
Introduction
443
II.
Economic Effects of Reverse-Exclusionary Payments
445
III.
Pay-for-Delay Agreements under US Law
452
IV.
Reverse-Exclusionary Agreements under EU Law
461
CONCLUSION
14.
Closing Thoughts
471
Index
473