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The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
Cover; Series; Foundational Principles of Contract Law; Copyright; Dedication; Summary Table of Contents; Detailed Table of Contents; About the Author; Acknowledgments; Part One Theories of Contract Law, Four Underlying Principles of Contract Law, and the Transformation of Contract Law from Classical to Modern; 1. The Objective and Coverage of this Book; Doctrinal and Social Propositions; Social and Critical Morality; Terminology; and the Tenor of the Footnote Apparatus; I. Objective and Coverage; A. Objective; B. Coverage; II. Terminology; A. Doctrinal Propositions
B. Social PropositionsC. Social and Critical Morality; D. Principles and Rules; E. Classical Contract Law; F. Williston; G. Corbin; H. Commodity; I. Expression; J. Pronouns; III. The Tenor of the Footnote Apparatus; 2. Theories of Contract Law; I. Formalist Theories; A. Creating New Exceptions; B. Reconstruing; C. Transformation; D. Overruling; E. The Status of Formalism; II. Interpretive Theories; III. Normative Theories; 3. Four Underlying Principles of Contract Law and the Foundational Contract-Law Standard; 4. The Transformation of Contract Law from Classical to Modern
Part Two The Enforceability of Promises5. Bargain Promises and the Bargain Principle; I. An Introduction to Bargain Promises; II. Structural Agreements; III. Three Doctrinal Exceptions to the Bargain Principle; A. The Legal-Duty Rule; 1. The Insignificant Hold-Up Issue; B. Surrender of or Forbearance to Assert a Claim That Turns Out to Be Invalid; C. The Doctrine of Mutuality and the Illusory-Promise Rule; 6. The Theory of Efficient Breach; I. The Overbidder Paradigm; II. The Factual Predicates of the Theory; A. Inefficiently Remaking Contracts
B. Inefficiently Providing Disincentives for PlanningC. Weakening the Contracting System; III. The Loss Paradigm; IV. Conclusion; Part Three Moral Elements in Contract Law; 7. The Unconscionability Principle; I. Introduction; II. The Role of Markets; III. The Role of Moral Fault; IV. Specific Unconscionability Norms; A. Distress; B. Price-Gouging; C. Transactional Incapacity; D. Unfair Persuasion; E. Unfair Surprise; F. Sales at Above-Market Prices and the Exploitation of Price-Ignorance; 1. One-Off Sellers; 2. Door-to-Door Sellers; 3. Extension of Credit; G. Substantive Unconscionability
H. Two Statutes8. Donative Promises; I. Simple Donative Promises; II. Formal Donative Promises-Promises under Seal; III. Promises Based on a Moral Obligation to Compensate for a Prior Benefit; IV. Promises to Give to Social-Service Institutions; V. The Role of Reliance; VI. Measuring Reliance Damages in a Donative-Promise Context; VII. The Life of Reliance; 9. The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law; I. The No-Duty Rule; II. Offer and Acceptance; A. Silence as Acceptance; B. Late Acceptance; C. Unilateral Contracts; III. Performance; A. The Duty to Warn a Party That It May Be about to Breach
B. Social PropositionsC. Social and Critical Morality; D. Principles and Rules; E. Classical Contract Law; F. Williston; G. Corbin; H. Commodity; I. Expression; J. Pronouns; III. The Tenor of the Footnote Apparatus; 2. Theories of Contract Law; I. Formalist Theories; A. Creating New Exceptions; B. Reconstruing; C. Transformation; D. Overruling; E. The Status of Formalism; II. Interpretive Theories; III. Normative Theories; 3. Four Underlying Principles of Contract Law and the Foundational Contract-Law Standard; 4. The Transformation of Contract Law from Classical to Modern
Part Two The Enforceability of Promises5. Bargain Promises and the Bargain Principle; I. An Introduction to Bargain Promises; II. Structural Agreements; III. Three Doctrinal Exceptions to the Bargain Principle; A. The Legal-Duty Rule; 1. The Insignificant Hold-Up Issue; B. Surrender of or Forbearance to Assert a Claim That Turns Out to Be Invalid; C. The Doctrine of Mutuality and the Illusory-Promise Rule; 6. The Theory of Efficient Breach; I. The Overbidder Paradigm; II. The Factual Predicates of the Theory; A. Inefficiently Remaking Contracts
B. Inefficiently Providing Disincentives for PlanningC. Weakening the Contracting System; III. The Loss Paradigm; IV. Conclusion; Part Three Moral Elements in Contract Law; 7. The Unconscionability Principle; I. Introduction; II. The Role of Markets; III. The Role of Moral Fault; IV. Specific Unconscionability Norms; A. Distress; B. Price-Gouging; C. Transactional Incapacity; D. Unfair Persuasion; E. Unfair Surprise; F. Sales at Above-Market Prices and the Exploitation of Price-Ignorance; 1. One-Off Sellers; 2. Door-to-Door Sellers; 3. Extension of Credit; G. Substantive Unconscionability
H. Two Statutes8. Donative Promises; I. Simple Donative Promises; II. Formal Donative Promises-Promises under Seal; III. Promises Based on a Moral Obligation to Compensate for a Prior Benefit; IV. Promises to Give to Social-Service Institutions; V. The Role of Reliance; VI. Measuring Reliance Damages in a Donative-Promise Context; VII. The Life of Reliance; 9. The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law; I. The No-Duty Rule; II. Offer and Acceptance; A. Silence as Acceptance; B. Late Acceptance; C. Unilateral Contracts; III. Performance; A. The Duty to Warn a Party That It May Be about to Breach