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Items
Details
Title
Rethinking legal reasoning / Geoffrey Samuel.
Published
Cheltenham, UK : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, [2018]
Call Number
K212 .S36 2018
ISBN
9781784712600 (hardback)
1784712604
9781784712617 (eBook)
1784712604
9781784712617 (eBook)
Description
xvi, 386 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)1055763956
Summary
"'Rethinking' legal reasoning seems a bold aim given the large amount of literature devoted to this topic. In this thought-provoking book, Geoffrey Samuel proposes a different way of approaching legal reasoning by examining the topic through the context of legal knowledge (epistemology). What is it to have knowledge of legal reasoning?"
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 333-346) and index.
Series
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
ix
Permissions
x
Table of common law cases and practice directions
xi
Table of common law legislation
xvi
General introduction
1
1.
What was the contribution of the medieval civilians?
12
1.1.
General remarks
12
1.2.
Glossators
14
1.3.
Methods of the glossators
17
1.4.
Post-Glossators (Commentators)
21
1.5.
Theory and methods of the Post-Glossators
24
1.6.
Ius commune and the development of method
27
2.
What was the contribution of the Roman lawyers?
33
2.1.
General overview
33
2.2.
Institutes: persons, things and actions
36
2.3.
Casuistry and categorisation
38
2.4.
Philosophical and theory contexts
41
2.5.
Attitude and specific techniques
42
2.6.
Logic and rationalisation
47
2.7.
Reasoning and texts
49
2.8.
Legal fictions
51
2.9.
Assessing the contribution of the Roman jurists
52
3.
What was the contribution of the later civilians and the common lawyers?
57
3.1.
Humanist re-orientation
57
3.2.
Civilian rationalists
60
3.3.
Nominalism and rights
65
3.4.
Codification and reasoning
67
3.5.
Codification and legal science
70
3.6.
Social interests
73
3.7.
Common law reaction
74
3.8.
Reacting to civilian formalism
79
3.9.
Legal argumentation
82
3.10.
Legal argumentation and the civilians
84
3.11.
Quovadisl
86
4.
What is the institutional legacy?
87
4.1.
Introduction
87
4.2.
Rule model
89
4.3.
Interpretation model
95
4.4.
Rights model
99
4.5.
Interest model
105
4.6.
Policy model
109
4.7.
Remedies model
111
4.8.
Legal models: some concluding remarks
114
5.
What is the legal literature legacy?
117
5.1.
Teaching and practice of law
117
5.2.
Common law teachers
120
5.3.
Legal taxonomy
122
5.4.
Taxonomy and reasoning
126
5.5.
Taxonomy and fact
128
5.6.
Mapping and reasoning
131
5.7.
Representing knowledge
132
5.8.
Unjust enrichment
134
5.9.
Scientific and legal taxonomy
136
5.10.
Empirical categories
138
5.11.
Rationalisation and reasoning
140
6.
How do legal reasoners treat facts?
143
6.1.
Introduction: law and fact
143
6.2.
Institutional model and facts
145
6.3.
Ex facto ius oritur
147
6.4.
Law and causation
151
6.5.
Proof of causation
155
6.6.
Causing damage and causing a risk
158
6.7.
Ex iure factum oritur (virtual facts)
160
6.8.
Competing narratives
163
6.9.
Theorising fact
166
7.
Is legal reasoning like medical reasoning?
168
7.1.
Introduction: patients and clients
168
7.2.
Legal and medical reasoning: generalities
170
7.3.
Diagnosing a legal problem
171
7.4.
Reasoning and models
174
7.5.
Knowledge models and reasoning about facts
176
7.6.
Induction
179
7.7.
Deduction
181
7.8.
Coherence versus policy: dialectical and functional reasoning
184
7.9.
Explanation, understanding and confrontation
188
7.10.
Explanation and manipulation
190
8.
Is legal reasoning like reasoning in film studies?
197
8.1.
Preliminary problems
197
8.2.
Form and content (personification theory)
202
8.3.
Role of anima
207
8.4.
Childish (and elitist) introspection
209
8.5.
Representation and dimensions
211
8.6.
Depicting reality: representation theory
213
8.7.
Competing images
216
8.8.
Reception theory
218
8.9.
From theory to interpretation
222
8.10.
Theory versus interpretative frameworks
225
8.11.
Towards fiction theory?
228
9.
Is legal reasoning based on fictions?
229
9.1.
Introduction: fiction theory
229
9.2.
Epistemological attitude
231
9.3.
Legal reasoning and concepts
233
9.4.
Reasonable person
236
9.5.
Nomen iuris
238
9.6.
Inferential legal reasoning
238
9.7.
Fiction and policy
241
9.8.
Fact and fiction
243
9.9.
Interpretation and fiction
246
9.10.
Taxonomy and fiction
248
9.11.
Fiction and knowledge representation
251
9.12.
Conclusion: legal reasoning and reality
255
10.
Can legal reasoning be rethought?
258
10.1.
Introduction: demystifying legal reasoning
258
10.2.
Rule model and system
260
10.3.
Analogy
263
10.4.
Analogy and the rule model
267
10.5.
Casuistic reasoning
270
10.6.
Reasoning about facts: schemes of intelligibility
273
10.7.
Lessons from social science schemes
276
10.8.
Demystification and the rule model of law
277
10.9.
Paradigm question
279
11.
Rethinking legal reasoning: should jurists take interests more seriously?
285
11.1.
Introduction
285
11.2.
Rights and interests
286
11.3.
Defining an interest
289
11.4.
Advantages attaching to the notion of an interest
291
11.5.
Interests attaching to the persona
294
11.6.
Interests attaching to the res
298
11.7.
Interests attaching to the actio
301
11.8.
Interests and the institutional plan
306
12.
Should jurists take interests more seriously (continued)?
307
12.1.
Abuse of a right
307
12.2.
Liberty, expectations and interests
310
12.3.
Damages, debt and interests
312
12.4.
Penalties and interests
315
12.5.
Sectional interests
317
12.6.
Mediating role of an interest
321
12.7.
Diluting tendencies of interests
323
12.8.
Rights versus interests
325
12.9.
Taking interests seriously
327
Concluding remarks
329
Bibliography
333
Index
347