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Items
Details
Author
Title
Law, economics, and game theory / John Cirace.
Published
Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books, [2018]
Call Number
K487.E3 C57 2018
ISBN
9781498549080 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
149854908X (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
9787498549097 (electronic)
9781498549097 (ePub ebook)
149854908X (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
9787498549097 (electronic)
9781498549097 (ePub ebook)
Description
vii, 383 pages : illustrations ; 27 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)1023606219
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 367-374) and index.
Available in Other Form
Online version: Cirace, John. Law, economics, and game theory. Lanham : Lexington Books, 2018 9781498549097 (DLC) 2018019367
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
vii
Introduction
1
pt. I
WHEN ARE THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST AND THINKING LIKE A LAWYER CONSISTENT?
9
1.
Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Criterion Compared
11
2.
Rational Economic Behavior and Logic Defined
33
3.
Judicial Use of Economic Rationality (Efficiency)
49
4.
Equal Protection and Lexical Constraints on Efficiency
65
5.
Legal Rationality and Logic Defined
77
6.
When Are Economics and Law Consistent (Isomorphic)?
95
pt. II
PROVIDING INFRASTRUCTURE AND CONTROLLING EXTERNALITIES REQUIRES RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL SELF-INTEREST AND COOPERATION
109
7.
Prisoners' Dilemma and Introduction to Game Theory
111
8.
Market and Government Failures as Prisoners' Dilemmas
133
9.
Five Requirements for Competitive Markets
157
10.
In the Long Run We Arc All Dead
175
pt. III
GENERAL CASE VERSUS HARD CASE METHODOLOGIES: ROTTENBERG, COASE, CALABRESI, AND POSNER
185
11.
Rottenberg's Theorem: Effect of a Change in Property Rights on Free Markets
187
12.
Coase's Theorems: Property Rights, Liability Rules, and Mutually Interfering Activities
205
13.
Calabresi's Criteria for Allocating Accident Costs Common to Several Activities
229
14.
Posner's Economic Analysis of the Common Law
245
pt. IV
RISK, INSURANCE, AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
251
15.
Risk, Insurance, Judge Hand Test, and Value of a Statistical Life
253
16.
Incomplete Information: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Principal-Agent Problem
269
pt. V
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CIVIL OBLIGATION
285
17.
Game Theoretic Framework for Law and Economics of Civil Obligation
287
18.
Torts: Negligence and Products Liability
291
19.
Strict Rules, Competitive Market Contract Model
313
20.
Discretionary Standards, Imperfect Competition Contract Model
335
21.
Decision Theory, Suit, and Settlement
355
Bibliography
367
Index
375
About the Author
383