Environmental governance of common pool resources : a comparison of fishery and forestry / Jing Liu, Michael Faure, and Peter Mascini.
2018
K3585 .L585 2018 (Map It)
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Title
Environmental governance of common pool resources : a comparison of fishery and forestry / Jing Liu, Michael Faure, and Peter Mascini.
Published
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.
Call Number
K3585 .L585 2018
ISBN
9781138049765 (hbk)
113804976X
9781315169392 (ebk)
1315169398
113804976X
9781315169392 (ebk)
1315169398
Description
xv, 301 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)986523682
Summary
"This book analyses the way in which public and private regulation address environmental problems related to fishing and forestry by establishing and maintaining property rights and by overcoming the limitations of property rights in coping with these common resource problems. It compares the environmental governance of fishery and forestry in nine jurisdictions."--Preliminary page.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-295) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of abbreviations
x
Foreword
xiv
1.
Introduction
1
1.1.
Background
1
1.1.1.
Governing environmental problems: an intertwined system of public and private regulation
1
1.1.2.
Common-pool resources problems
2
1.2.
Research questions and problem definition
3
1.3.
Methodology
4
1.4.
Structure
5
2.
Common-pool resources, property rights and public and private regulation
7
2.1.
Different property rights and institutional arrangements
7
2.1.1.
Private property rights and the market
10
2.1.2.
Public property rights and the state
11
2.1.3.
Communal property rights and self-governing institutions
13
2.2.
Refinements
14
2.3.
interaction between public and private regulation and their influence on the functioning of property rights
16
2.3.1.
interaction between public and private regulation
17
2.3.2.
influence of public private interaction on the functioning of various property rights
18
2.4.
Case selection
19
3.
Forestry
21
3.1.
Introduction: forest problems and forest transition
21
3.2.
Forest governance: international law, domestic law and private/hybrid regimes
24
3.2.1.
International law
24
3.2.2.
Domestic law
25
3.2.3.
Private/hybrid regimes
26
3.3.
selection of countries
30
3.4.
Case study: Indonesia
31
3.4.1.
Environmental problem: deforestation
31
3.4.2.
Good governance
32
3.4.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
33
3.4.4.
interaction between public and private regulation
42
3.4.5.
How does the interacted system address deforestation?
47
3.4.6.
Conclusion
54
3.5.
Case study: Bolivia
55
3.5.1.
Environmental problem: deforestation
55
3.5.2.
Good governance
56
3.5.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
56
3.5.4.
interaction between public and private regulation
61
3.5.5.
How does the interacted system address deforestation?
66
3.5.6.
Conclusion
71
3.6.
Case study: North America
71
3.6.1.
Th environmental problem: the health of riparian forests
71
3.6.2.
Good governance
73
3.6.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
73
3.6.4.
interaction between public and private regulation
76
3.6.5.
How does the interacted system influence riparian zone protection?
80
3.6.6.
Conclusion
82
3.7.
Case study: Sweden
82
3.7.1.
Environmental problem: the loss of forest biodiversity
82
3.7.2.
Good governance
83
3.7.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
83
3.7.4.
interaction between public and private regulation
88
3.7.5.
How does the interacted system influence biodiversity protection?
95
3.7.6.
Conclusion
98
3.8.
Comparison and conclusion
98
3.8.1.
Indonesia and Bolivia
98
3.8.2.
North America and Sweden
100
3.8.3.
Putting the pieces together
102
4.
Fishery governance
104
4.1.
Introduction: the status of fish resources
104
4.2.
Fishery governance: international law, domestic law and private regimes
106
4.2.1.
International law
106
4.2.2.
Domestic law
107
4.2.3.
Private regimes
112
4.3.
selection of countries
116
4.3.1.
Characteristics of fishery governance
116
4.3.2.
choice of countries
117
4.4.
Case study: South Africa
118
4.4.1.
Fishery problems
118
4.4.2.
Good governance
119
4.4.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
119
4.4.4.
protection of fishery resources in general
123
4.4.5.
Interaction between public and private regulation
125
4.4.6.
How does the interacted system address overfishing?
128
4.4.7.
Conclusion
133
4.5.
Case study: Mexico
133
4.5.1.
Fishery problems
133
4.5.2.
Good governance
134
4.5.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
134
4.5.4.
protection of small-scale fishery resources
139
4.5.5.
Interaction between public and private regulation
141
4.5.6.
How does the interacted system address overfishing?
148
4.5.7.
Conclusion
155
4.6.
Case study: New Zealand
156
4.6.1.
Fishery problems
156
4.6.2.
Good governance
156
4.6.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
157
4.6.4.
protection of fisheries resources in general
168
4.6.5.
Interaction between public and private regulation
170
4.6.6.
How does the interacted system address overfishing?
173
4.6.7.
Conclusion
179
4.7.
Case study: Japan
179
4.7.1.
Fishery problems
179
4.7.2.
Good governance
181
4.7.3.
Property rights as well as public and private regulation
181
4.7.4.
How does the interacted system address overfishing?
190
4.7.5.
Conclusion
197
4.8.
Comparison and conclusion
198
4.8.1.
definition of property rights
199
4.8.2.
Enforcement
205
4.8.3.
Coordination
206
4.8.4.
Information
208
4.8.5.
Scale
208
4.8.6.
Externalities
209
5.
Comparative analysis
210
5.1.
Summary of the case studies
210
5.1.1.
Indonesia
211
5.1.2.
Bolivia
212
5.1.3.
North America (the US and Canada)
214
5.1.4.
Sweden
215
5.1.5.
South Africa
216
5.1.6.
Mexico
217
5.1.7.
New Zealand
219
5.1.8.
Japan
220
5.2.
Types of resources and corresponding property rights
222
5.2.1.
Types of resources
222
5.2.2.
Property rights
223
5.3.
Public and private regulation
226
5.3.1.
Public regulation
226
5.3.2.
Private regulation
229
5.4.
interaction of public and private regulation
231
5.4.1.
Standards
231
5.4.2.
role of the government
232
5.4.3.
Complementarities between public and private regulation
233
5.4.4.
Differences between public and private regulation
234
5.5.
Preconditions for a proper functioning of property rights
235
5.5.1.
Definition of property rights
235
5.5.2.
Enforcement
239
5.5.3.
Coordination
240
5.5.4.
Information
242
5.5.5.
Scale
244
5.5.6.
Externalities
244
5.6.
General trends
245
6.
Concluding remarks
249
6.1.
Starting points
249
6.2.
Goal
249
6.3.
Theoretical framework
251
6.4.
Concluding observations
253
6.4.1.
Relevance of the nature of the resource
253
6.4.2.
choice of property rights
253
6.4.3.
Definition of property rights
255
6.4.4.
Enforcement
256
6.4.5.
Coordination
256
6.4.6.
Information
257
6.4.7.
Scale
258
6.4.8.
need for government regulation
258
6.4.9.
role of private certification
259
6.4.10.
Discrete design of decentralization and deregulation
259
6.4.11.
Towards a smart interaction between public and private regulation
260
6.4.12.
Tragedy of the commons and externalities
261
6.5.
Context specificity
262
6.6.
Limits
263
6.7.
Further research
263
References
265
Index
296