Scalia v. Scalia : opportunistic textualism in constitutional interpretation / Catherine L. Langford.
2017
KF8745.S33 L36 2017 (Map It)
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Details
Title
Scalia v. Scalia : opportunistic textualism in constitutional interpretation / Catherine L. Langford.
Published
Tuscaloosa : The University of Alabama Press, [2017]
Call Number
KF8745.S33 L36 2017
ISBN
9780817319700 hardcover
0817319700 hardcover
9780817391607 electronic book
0817391606
9780817391607
0817319700 hardcover
9780817391607 electronic book
0817391606
9780817391607
Description
xi, 162 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)986788680
Summary
"An analysis of the discrepancy between the ways Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argued the Constitution should be interpreted versus how he actually interpreted the law. -- Antonin Scalia is considered one of the most controversial justices to have been on the United States Supreme Court. A vocal advocate of textualist interpretation, Justice Scalia argued that the Constitution means only what it says and that interpretations of the document should be confined strictly to the directives supplied therein. This narrow form of constitutional interpretation, which limits constitutional meaning to the written text of the Constitution, is known as textualism. [This book] examines Scalia's discussions of textualism in his speeches, extrajudicial writings, and judicial opinions. Throughout his writings, Scalia argues textualism is the only acceptable form of constitutional interpretation. Yet Scalia does not clearly define his textualism, nor does he always rely upon textualism to the exclusion of other interpretive means. Scalia is seen as the standard bearer for textualism. But when textualism fails to support his ideological aims (as in cases that pertain to states' rights or separation of powers), Scalia reverts to other forms of argumentation. Langford analyzes Scalia's opinions in a clear area of law, the cruel and unusual punishment clause; a contested area of law, the free exercise and establishment cases; and a silent area of law, abortion. Through her analysis, Langford shows that Scalia uses rhetorical strategies beyond those of a textualist approach, concluding that Scalia is an opportunistic textualist and that textualism is as rhetorical as any other form of judicial interpretation." -- Publisher's website.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 145-154) and index.
Record Appears in
Variant Title
Scalia versus Scalia
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Gift

The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
ix
Introduction
1
1.
Textualism as a Response to the "Living" Constitution
9
2.
Textualism in Scalia's Speeches and Extrajudicial Writings
24
3.
Interpreting a Clear Clause: The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
51
4.
Interpreting Competing Clauses: Mediating Religion between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
72
5.
When the Constitution Is Silent: Rejecting the Right to an Abortion
97
Conclusion: Scalia's Opportunistic Textualism
116
Notes
129
Bibliography
145
Index
155