Constitutional argument and institutional structure in the United States / Nicholas Papaspyrou.
2018
KF4552 .P37 2018 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Constitutional argument and institutional structure in the United States / Nicholas Papaspyrou.
Published
Oxford ; New York : Hart, [2018]
Call Number
KF4552 .P37 2018
ISBN
9781509917174 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
1509917179 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
9781509917181 (ePDF)
9781509917198 (ePub)
1509917179 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
9781509917181 (ePDF)
9781509917198 (ePub)
Description
xxvii, 270 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)1008769424
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Available in Other Form
Online version: Papaspyrou, Nicholas. Constitutional argument and institutional structure in the United States. Oxford [UK] ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 2018 9781509917198 (DLC) 2017051418
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
v
Contents
vii
Introduction
xiii
I.
Supreme Debates
xiv
II.
Substantive Structure of Constitutional Interpretation
xviii
III.
Institutional Architecture of Constitutional Interpretation
xx
IV.
Topography of Judicial Doctrine
xxiv
V.
Methodological Prolegomena
xxvi
pt. 1
INTERPRETIVE SUBSTANCE
1.
Textual Primacy and Precedential Force: The Institutional Anchorage of Constitutional Law
3
I.
Institutional, Interpretive and Preemptive Dimensions of Constitutional Law
3
II.
Written Constitution and Supreme Court Precedent
5
III.
Contested Import of Text and Precedent
6
IV.
Grounds of Textual and Precedential Authority
8
2.
Authority of Constitutional Law
14
I.
Constitutional Authority, Political Legitimacy and Public Reason
14
II.
Political Justice and Ideal Constitutional Law
21
3.
Constitutional Interpretation as a Distinctive Kind of Practical Reasoning
24
I.
Assumption of Constitutional Legitimacy
24
II.
Place of Constitutional Interpretation in Human Practical Reasoning
25
4.
Constitutional Constructivism and Practical Deliberation
29
I.
Identifying Constitutional Norms
29
II.
Specifying Constitutional Norms
39
III.
Truth in Conventionalism
43
IV.
Instability Thesis
45
V.
Interpretation and Preemption
49
VI.
Vicissitudes of Interpretation
52
5.
Pursuit of Political Justice
54
I.
General Aim
54
II.
Conservative Element
56
III.
Just Content
59
IV.
Modes of Argumentation
65
V.
Institutional Fallibility
74
VI.
Conclusion
77
pt. 2
INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
6.
Justification of Institutional Norms
81
I.
Patterns of Institutional Assignment
81
II.
Rationality of Institutional Norms
84
III.
Paradigmatic Justification of Institutional Norms
86
IV.
Substantive Basis of Paradigmatic Institutional Justification
91
V.
Systemic Considerations
92
VI.
Uncertainty and the Limits of Instrumental Design
95
7.
Operation and the Dynamics of Institutional Norms
98
I.
Operational Priority
98
II.
Circularity and Plasticity
101
III.
Formalisation of Institutional Norms in Judicial Doctrine
103
IV.
Endless Specification of Institutional Norms
106
V.
Institutional Revision
109
8.
Functional Analysis and Institutional Checks
111
I.
Beyond the Walls of Separation
111
II.
Institutional Imperfection and Schemes of Review
112
III.
Interpretive Consistency
117
IV.
Classificatory Rigidity
121
V.
Olympian Point of View
125
9.
Democracy and Institutional Design
129
I.
Charge of Instrumentalism
129
II.
Equal Political Liberty does not Require Indifference to Outcomes
131
III.
Equal Political Liberty does Guide and Limit Instrumental Institutional Reasoning
137
IV.
Uncertainty Distinguished
138
10.
Democracy and Judicial Review
141
I.
Responsiveness of Interpretive Judgement to the Citizenry
141
II.
Chimera of Pure Procedural Justice
147
III.
Non-Ideal Theory
152
IV.
Public Autonomy and Judicial Review
154
V.
Judicial Reasoning and Objectivity
159
pt. 3
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
11.
Province and Duty of the Judicial Department
167
I.
From Marbury to the Clear Mistake Rule
167
II.
Interplay between Scope and Intensity of Review
170
12.
Subtlety of Constitutional Doctrine
178
I.
Constitutional Doctrine and Schemes of Deference
178
II.
Dual Character of Constitutional Doctrine
182
III.
Constitutional Doctrine and Schemes of Scrutiny
188
IV.
Process and Substance in Strict Scrutiny
195
V.
Constitutional Norms of Prophylactic Nature
199
VI.
Revisiting Substance and Structure
205
13.
Claim to Judicial Supremacy
207
I.
Judicial Authority over Constitutional Doctrine
207
II.
Case of Shared Enforcement Power
212
III.
Institutional Reciprocity and the Joint Project of Constitutional Construction
225
14.
Constitutional Sensibilities
232
I.
Deference to the Administration over the Interpretation of Statutory Law
232
II.
Discontinuity Thesis
237
III.
Institutional Competency and Moral Conflict
241
IV.
Domain of Principle
249
V.
Domain of Competing Policy Interests
259
Index
267