Anarchy and legal order : law and politics for a stateless society / Gary Chartier.
2013
K250 .C48 2013 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Anarchy and legal order : law and politics for a stateless society / Gary Chartier.
Published
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Call Number
K250 .C48 2013
ISBN
9781107032286 (hbk.)
1107032288 (hbk.)
1107032288 (hbk.)
Description
xvi, 416 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)795645156
Summary
"This book develops and defends the idea of law without the state. Animated by a vision of peaceful, voluntary cooperation as a social ideal and building on a careful account of non-aggression, it features a clear explanation of why the state is illegitimate, dangerous, and unnecessary. It proposes an understanding of how law enforcement in a stateless society could be legitimate and what the optimal substance of law without the state might be, suggests ways in which a stateless legal order could foster the growth of a culture of freedom, and situates the project it elaborates in relation to leftist, anticapitalist, and socialist traditions"--From p. 4 of cover.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Rouse Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Rouse Fund
Table of Contents
Preface
xiii
Introduction: Embodying Freedom
1
1.
Laying Foundations
7
I.
A Reasonable Conception of the Good Life Will Involve an Understanding of Both Welfare and Right Action
7
II.
Welfare Is Multidimensional
8
III.
Reasonably Seeking to Flourish or to Help Another to Flourish Requires Recognition, Fairness, and Respect
25
IV.
A Flourishing Life Is a Reasonable Life
40
2.
Rejecting Aggression
44
I.
Acting Reasonably Means Avoiding Aggression against Others and Their Justly Acquired Possessions
44
II.
Aggression Involves Unreasonably Injuring Others' Bodies or Interfering with Their Just Possessory Interests
44
III.
The Requirements of Practical Reasonableness Preclude Many Choices Causing Injuries to Basic Aspects of Welfare
45
IV.
The Principle of Fairness Provides Good Reason to Avoid Interfering with Others' Justly Acquired Possessions
49
V.
Just Possessory Claims Do Not Extend to Other Sentients or to Abstract Patterns
89
VI.
Arguments for Exceptionless Possessory Claims Seem Unpersuasive
132
VII.
Key Requirements of Practical Reasonableness Can Be Encapsulated in the Nonaggression Maxim
153
3.
Safeguarding Cooperation
157
I.
The State Is Inimical to Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation
157
II.
Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation Is an Aspect of and a Crucial Precondition for a Flourishing Life
157
III.
State Actors' Refusal to Cooperate with Others on a Peaceful, Voluntary Basis Is Highly Problematic
159
IV.
The State Is Not Needed to Ensure Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation
165
V.
The State Is Not Needed to Ensure Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation in the Production of Crucial Public Goods
184
VI.
The State Is Dangerous
208
VII.
Embracing Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation Means Rejecting the State
232
Appendix: The Fact That General Preemptive Defense Is a Public Good Does Not Serve as a Plausible Justification for the State
234
4.
Enforcing Law
242
I.
Forcibly Imposing Legal Requirements in a Stateless Society Is Not Objectionable on the Same Grounds as Aggression by the State
242
II.
There Might Seem to Be a Tension between Opposing the State and Supporting the Idea of Law
243
III.
Legal Codes in a Stateless Society Would Have Varied Sources and Contents, but Might Exhibit Common Features
244
IV.
Resolving Disputes between Participants in Structured Legal Regimes Need Not Involve State-Like Injustice
249
V.
The Reality of Moral Constraints on Legal Rules Would Render the Notion of Consent Noncircular and Would Be Compatible with Legal Polycentricity
250
VI.
A Regime Could Forcibly Resolve Conflicts with Outlaws without Becoming Morally Indistinguishable from a State
257
VII.
A Legal Regime in a Stateless Society Would Be Morally Distinguishable from a State in Important Ways
261
5.
Rectifying Injury
263
I.
Just Legal Regimes in a Stateless Society Can Effectively Prevent, End, and Remedy Injuries
263
II.
Just Legal Regimes Would Use Civil Rather than Criminal Justice Mechanisms to Rectify Injuries
263
III.
A Just Legal Regime in a Stateless Society Could Rectify Environmentally Mediated Injuries as well as Injuries to Nonhuman Animals and Vulnerable Human Persons
302
IV.
Just Legal Regimes Can Rectify Injuries without the Involvement of the State
318
6.
Liberating Society
320
I.
Just Legal Rules and Institutions in a Stateless Society Could Facilitate Liberating Social Change Using Nonaggressive Means
320
II.
Techniques for Fostering Social Change Need Not Be Aggressive
321
III.
Just Legal Rules and Institutions in a Stateless Society Would Further Wealth Redistribution
328
IV.
Rectifying Injustice Could Help to Create Alternatives to Workplace Hierarchies
351
V.
A Stateless Society's Legal Order Would Foster the Emergence of a Free Culture
362
VI.
Just Legal Rules in a Stateless Society Would Conduce to Positive but Nonaggressive Social Change
376
7.
Situating Liberation
378
I.
Just Legal Rules and Institutions in a Stateless Society Would Embody Leftist, Anticapitalist, and Socialist Values
378
II.
The Project of Creating a Stateless Society with Just Legal Rules and Institutions Is a Leftist Project
378
III.
The Project of Building a Stateless Society with Just Legal Rules and Institutions Is an Anticapitalist Project
386
IV.
The Project of Fostering a Stateless Society with Just Legal Rules Can Reasonably Be Described as Socialist
397
V.
The Model of Stateless Law Outlined Here Embodies a Distinctively Leftist, Anticapitalist, and Socialist Antistatism
405
Conclusion: Ordering Anarchy
407
Index
411
About the Author
415