Judging social rights / Jeff King, University College London.
2012
KF4749 .K557 2012 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Judging social rights / Jeff King, University College London.
Published
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, [2012]
Call Number
KF4749 .K557 2012
ISBN
9781107008021 (hbk.)
1107008026 (hbk.)
9781107400320 (pbk.)
1107400325 (pbk.)
1107008026 (hbk.)
9781107400320 (pbk.)
1107400325 (pbk.)
Description
xxvii, 370 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)773921301
Summary
"States that now contemplate constitutional reform often grapple with the question of whether to constitutionalise social rights. This book presents an argument for why, under the right conditions, doing so can be a good way to advance social justice. In making such a case, the author considers the nature of the social minimum, the role of the court among other institutions, the empirical record of judicial impact and the role of constitutional text. He argues, however, that when enforcing such rights, courts ought to adopt a theory of judicial restraint structured around four principles: democratic legitimacy, polycentricity, expertise and flexibility. These four principles, when taken collectively, commend an incrementalist approach to adjudication. The book combines theoretical, doctrinal, empirical and comparative analysis, and is written to be accessible to lawyers, social scientists, political theorists and human rights advocates"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages [328]-355) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Detailed table of contents
vii
Acknowledgments
xiii
Table of cases
xvi
Table of legislation
xxiv
1.
Introduction: aims and methods
1
I.
Introduction
1
II.
Why does it matter?
2
III.
Arguments against constitutional social rights
3
A.
The bad arguments
4
B.
The good arguments
5
C.
The best argument - the risky enterprise
7
IV.
The case for incrementalism in a nutshell
8
V.
Background political conditions - when the argument applies
10
A.
The background political conditions
10
B.
When the conditions do not apply
12
VI.
Conclusion
13
pt. I
The case for constitutional social rights
15
2.
The case for social rights
17
I.
Introduction
17
II.
Different senses of `social rights'
18
III.
Social rights, human rights, and the welfare state
20
A.
Social rights as human rights: form and justification
20
B.
The basic content of social human rights
28
1.
The social minimum
29
2.
The basic duties in respect of the social minimum
35
C.
State responsibility and the welfare state
39
IV.
Multi-institutional protection of social rights
41
A.
Legislative
41
B.
Executive/administrative
44
C.
Adjudicative
48
D.
Costitutional
51
V.
Conclusion
57
3.
The value of courts in light of the alternatives
59
I.
Introduction
59
II.
The prima facie benefits of legal accountability
60
III.
The courts and social change
63
A.
Significant social change
63
B.
Impact and administrative justice
70
C.
A pathology of legalism?
76
D.
A hollow hope for the poor?
79
IV.
Alternatives to courts: partner or substitute?
85
A.
Specialised adjudication - tribunals
86
B.
Ombudsmen
90
C.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
93
V.
Conclusion: the role of law in an incrementalist approach
95
4.
A basic interpretive approach
97
I.
Introduction
97
II.
Constitutional social rights: a basic interpretive approach
97
A.
The structure of rights: scope of interest and nature of obligation
98
B.
Constitutional text: absolute and qualified obligations
100
C.
Judicial interpretation: the inescapability of vagueness
105
III.
The need for an approach to judicial restraint
108
A.
Social rights in the shadow of Lochner and Dicey
108
B.
The allure and limits of existing interpretive approaches
111
1.
Interpretivism
111
2.
Principles, balancing, and proportionality
112
3.
Deliberative democracy
113
4.
The minimum-core approach
114
5.
Institutional reform approach
116
6.
South African reasonableness
116
IV.
Conclusion
117
pt. II
A theory of judicial restraint
119
5.
Institutional approaches to judicial restraint
121
I.
Introduction
121
II.
Formalist approaches
122
A.
The distinction between law and politics
123
B.
The principle/policy distinction
125
C.
Justiciability
129
III.
Institutional approaches
132
A.
The rising tide of institutionalism
133
B.
General features of institutional approaches
136
C.
Two paths diverge: restrictive vs. contextual institutionalism
141
D.
Measuring the success of institutional approaches
142
IV.
Developing the contextual institutional approach
143
A.
The nature of legal reasoning under a `principled approach'
143
B.
Pragmatics: how should judges apply an institutional approach?
148
V.
Conclusion
150
6.
Democratic legitimacy
152
I.
Introduction
152
II.
The dignity of legislation
153
A.
The argument from political equality
154
B.
Limits
156
1.
The gap between preferences and outcomes
156
2.
Equality or outcome-based departures from formal voting equality
159
III.
Two pressing problems with the finality of legislation
163
A.
Absence of legislative focus
164
B.
Marginalisation
165
IV.
Giving weight to democratic legitimacy
169
A.
Executive action: not pre-empting legislative focus
169
B.
Primary legislation: ensuring legislative focus
171
C.
Primary legislation: weak democratic restraint
173
1.
Absolute obligations
173
2.
Procedural rights
174
3.
Clear or core cases
175
4.
Marginalised groups
176
D.
Primary legislation: strong democratic restraint
185
V.
Conclusion
187
7.
Polycentricity
189
I.
Introduction
189
II.
The idea and importance of polycentricity
190
III.
The pervasiveness of polycentricity
192
IV.
Refinement of Fuller's idea
193
A.
A property of issues, not areas
193
B.
When a legal issue is polycentric
194
V.
Giving weight to polycentricity: attenuating factors
198
A.
Judicial mandate
198
B.
Degree
202
C.
Access to information: case management and interventions
203
D.
Relative competency
208
E.
Flexibility: remedies and revisitation
209
VI.
Conclusion
209
8.
Expertise
211
I.
Introduction
211
II.
Law and expertise in historical context
212
A.
Lesson from America
212
B.
Expertise in British law and administration
215
III.
Types of expertise
220
A.
Front-line expertise
221
B.
Managerial expertise
223
C.
Professional expertise
225
D.
Specialised adjudicative expertise
228
IV.
Giving weight to expertise
229
A.
Expertise-accountability trade-offs
229
1.
Expert intuition and accountability
230
2.
Expertise and democratic accountability
231
3.
Expertise-accountability trade-offs and cost-benefit
233
B.
Expertise types and variation of scrutiny
233
C.
Failures of expertise
235
1.
Refusal to apply expertise
235
2.
Distinctive facts
238
3.
Contradiction of established scientific or social science evidence
240
V.
Conclusion
248
9.
Flexibility
250
I.
Introduction
250
II.
Forms of inflexibility
251
A.
Legal forms
251
1.
Agenda control
251
2.
Delay
253
3.
Cost
257
B.
Bureaucratic and political forms
258
1.
Conscious forms: fettering, ideology, and stereotype
259
2.
Bounded rationality, path-dependence, and heuristics
259
III.
Giving weight to flexibility
264
A.
The perils of procedural rights
264
1.
Interest representation in administrative policy-making
264
2.
Trial-like rights in administrative decision-making
268
3.
Structural injunctions and supervisory jurisdiction
271
B.
Mandating flexibility
275
1.
Procedural rights
275
2.
Non-fettering and mandatory consideration
277
C.
Remedies: respecting flexibility
281
1.
Constitutional avoidance
281
2.
Vague legal standards
282
3.
Flexible remedies and the virtue of silence
283
IV.
Conclusion
285
pt. III
Incrementalism
287
10.
Incrementalism as a general theme
289
I.
Introduction
289
II.
Incrementalism and public administration
290
III.
Applying judicial incrementalism
293
A.
The techniques of incrementalism
294
1.
Particularisation
294
2.
Cautious expansion, analogical reasoning
296
3.
Vague legal standards
296
4.
Procedural rights
298
5.
Constitutional avoidance
299
6.
Non-intrusive remedies
300
7.
Revisitation
301
IV.
Incrementalism and its cousins
303
A.
Sunstein's judicial minimalism
303
B.
Democratic experimentalism
306
V.
Criticisms of incrementalism
311
A.
Inert incrementalism
311
B.
Insidious incrementalism
313
C.
Impossible incrementalism
314
VI.
Incrementalist answers to familiar social rights problems
315
A.
Enforcement of positive obligations
316
B.
Evaluation of resource scarcity
316
VII.
Incrementalism and the principles of restraint
320
VIII.
Conclusion
322
Appendix 1
The scope of economic and social rights under international law
326
Bibliography
328
Index
356