Sovereignty's promise : the state as fiduciary / Evan Fox-Decent.
2011
KZ4041 .F69 2011 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Sovereignty's promise : the state as fiduciary / Evan Fox-Decent.
Published
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011.
Call Number
KZ4041 .F69 2011
ISBN
9780199698318 (cloth : alk. paper)
0199698317 (cloth : alk. paper)
0199698317 (cloth : alk. paper)
Description
xviii, 283 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)751748860
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages [266]-275) and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Table of Contents
Epigraph
xiii
Table of Cases and Legislation
xv
Prologue---Hobbes and Legal Order
1
1.
The demands of legality
1
2.
The people as the authors of sovereignty
5
3.
The constitution of legal order
13
4.
Trust as the basis of the state-subject relationship
19
ch. I
Introduction: The State as Fiduciary and the Rule of Law
23
1.1.
Introduction: Roncarelli and the fact of sovereignty
23
1.2.
A brief history of the fiduciary concept
30
1.3.
Towards fiduciary duties in public settings
34
1.4.
A legal conception
37
1.5.
A relational conception
40
1.6.
A Kantian, interactional conception
41
1.7.
A challenge to libertarianism
47
1.8.
Beyond the state
48
1.9.
Summary of the argument
48
pt. I
THE CROWN-NATIVE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
ch. II
Seeking Sovereignty
55
2.1.
Introduction
55
2.2.
Guerin, Sparrow, and the resistance of Aboriginal treaty rights to dualism
57
2.3.
The basis of the Crown-Native fiduciary relationship
62
2.4.
The limits of the Crown's legitimacy
69
ch. III
Some Objections
75
3.1.
Introduction
75
3.2.
Paternalism, colonialism, and legal pluralism
76
3.3.
Reconciling competing claims
78
3.4.
The sui generis argument
80
pt. II
THE FIDUCIARY THEORY OF THE STATE
ch. IV
Fiduciary Relationships and the Presumption of Trust
89
4.1.
Introduction
89
4.2.
The nature of sovereignty
90
4.3.
Fiduciary relationships and the presumption of trust
93
4.4.
Relationships arising by operation of law
94
4.5.
Do fiduciary obligations rely on voluntary undertakings?
95
4.6.
Fiduciary power as administrative power
96
4.7.
Vulnerability as incapacity
101
4.8.
Trust as the basis of the fiduciary's authority and duty
105
4.9.
Pure fiduciary duties and their reliance on trust
110
4.10.
The state as fiduciary---the subject's trust in the state
111
ch. V
The Duty to Obey the Law
113
5.1.
Introduction
113
5.2.
The terms of the debate
114
5.3.
The limits of consent
116
5.4.
Parental authority
121
5.5.
The legitimacy of legality
125
5.6.
A fiduciary theory of the duty to obey the law
128
5.7.
Opting out
135
5.8.
A public agent of necessity
140
pt. III
THE FIDUCIARY NATURE OF THE RULE OF LAW
ch. VI
Judicial Ambivalence to Public Fiduciary Duties
151
6.1.
Introduction
151
6.2.
Political trusts
153
6.3.
Authorson: Guerin extended
155
6.4.
Harris: Guerin retrenched
157
6.5.
English law's marriage of administrative power to fiduciary duty
159
6.6.
Cross-fertilization between public and private fiduciary contexts
164
6.7.
The emergence of public fiduciary duties
167
6.8.
The paucity of fiduciary doctrine in public law
171
ch. VII
Procedural Fairness---A Pandora's Box of Legality
175
7.1.
Introduction
175
7.2.
Procedural fairness as a public fiduciary duty
177
7.3.
The justification requirement
186
7.4.
Contextualism, content, and important interests
191
7.5.
The Dunsmuir reversal
194
ch. VIII
Administrative Law as Solicitude---Reasonable Decision-Making
202
8.1.
Introduction
202
8.2.
The legitimacy of the administrative state
205
8.3.
From jurisdictional review to deference?
208
8.4.
Deference as a postulate of the rule of law
214
8.5.
The content of deference
217
8.6.
Fundamental values
221
8.7.
Public justification
225
8.8.
Fundamental values and deference as respect cut down
228
8.9.
Conclusion
233
ch. IX
The Rule of Law and Human Rights
234
9.1.
Introduction
234
9.2.
The internal morality and the fiduciary interpretation of reciprocity
238
9.3.
Fuller's appreciation of freedom and dignity
244
9.4.
Raz and slavery
249
9.5.
The moral difference the internal morality necessarily makes
255
9.6.
From the rule of law to human rights
261
9.7.
Is the rule of law now just the rule of good law?
262
Bibliography
266
Index
277