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Items
Details
Author
Title
Statutory interpretation / by Caleb Nelson.
Published
New York, NY : Foundation Press Thomson/West, 2011.
Call Number
KF425 .N46 2011
ISBN
9781599417707 (hbk.)
1599417707 (hbk.)
1599417707 (hbk.)
Description
xxxvii, 1,025 pages ; 26 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)678476500
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Series
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Author's Note
v
Table of Cases
xvii
Table of Authorities
xxxi
ch. 1
An Introduction to the Interplay Between Purpose and Text
1
Preliminary Note on the Goals of Statutory Interpretation (With Particular Attention to the Relation Between Legislative Intent and Statutory Meaning)
1
Riggs v. Palmer
7
Notes and Questions
14
23 Stat. 332 (1885)
26
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
27
Notes and Questions
34
United States v. Locke
39
Notes and Questions
47
Note on Judicial Interpretations of 28 U.S.C. [§] 1453(c)(1)
54
Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc.
57
Notes and Questions
59
Note on the Case of the Speluncean Explorers
62
Note on the Concept of "Rules" and "Standards"
68
Jaskolski v. Daniels
71
Notes and Questions
75
Note on Different Types of Indeterminacy in Statutory Language
77
ch. 2
Canons of Construction
81
A.
Canons That Formalize Common Principles of English Usage
83
1.
The "Ordinary Meaning" Principle
83
2.
The Possible Relevance of Terms of Art
84
a.
Words or Phrases With Technical Meanings in Particular Fields
84
b.
Words or Phrases That Have Acquired Prior Meaning in the Law
85
3.
Noscitur a Sociis
86
4.
Ejusdem Generis
87
5.
The Presumption of Consistent Usage
87
6.
The Presumption Against Superfluity
88
7.
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
89
Some Statutory Provisions Relevant to Gustafson v. Alloyd Co
91
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co
94
Notes and Questions
105
B.
Canons That Formalize Principles Specific to the Interpretation of Statutes
108
1.
The Rule of Lenity
108
Muscarello v. United States
113
Notes and Questions
125
Cleveland v. United States
127
Notes and Questions
134
Note on "Hybrid" Statutes and the Rule of Lenity
136
2.
The Saving Canon and the Presumption of Severability
138
3.
The Canon Favoring Avoidance of "Constitutional Doubt"
146
National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
149
Notes and Questions
159
4.
The Presumption (or Clear-Statement Rule) Against Extraterritoriality
164
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co
166
Notes and Questions
180
5.
The Presumption (or Clear-Statement Rule) Against Retoractivity
191
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
193
Notes and Questions
214
Note on Rivers v. Roadway Express and Lindh v. Murphy
219
6.
Some Other Canons
224
C.
Conflicts Among Canons
226
ch. 3
Legislative History
231
How Our Laws are Made (John V. Sullivan rev. ed. 2007)
236
A.
The Rise of Reliance Upon Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation
251
Preliminary Note for Boutilier v. INS
258
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
260
Notes and Questions
262
Preliminary Note for United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
268
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
271
Notes and Questions
294
B.
Recent Debates About the Use of Legislative History
299
1.
Constitutional Arguments
301
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
303
Notes and Questions
322
Note on Chadha and the Debate Over Legislative History
326
United States Department of Justice (Office of Legal Policy), Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation (1989)
334
Notes and Questions
337
2.
Nonconstitutional Arguments Against Reliance Upon Legislative History
341
a.
Theoretical Objections to the Logic Behind the Use of Legislative History
341
i.
Objections Based on the Alleged Incoherence of Collective Intent
341
ii.
Objections Based on the Alleged Irrelevance of "Subjective" Intent
346
b.
Practical Objections That the Use of Legislative History Will do More Harm than Good
350
i.
Objections to the Premise That Using Legislative History Produces Better Matches Between Interpreted and Intended Meaning
350
ii.
Objections Based on the Goal of Providing Adequate Notice of the Law's Content
357
iii.
Objections Based on Cost
360
C.
Interactions Among Different Types of Legislative History and Between Legislative History and Other Interpretive Tools
362
1.
The Hierarchy of Types of Legislative History
362
2.
Interactions Between Legislative History and the Canons
367
a.
Does the Rule of Lenity Trump Recourse to Legislative History, or Vice Versa?
368
b.
When Should Comments in Legislative History Satisfy Clear-Statement Rules?
368
b.
When Should Comments in Legislative History Satisfy Clear-Statement Rules?
372
c.
When Should Legislative History Overcome Canons Like the Presumption of Consistent Usage?
375
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline
375
Notes and Questions
387
3.
The Use of Legislative History to Identify "Scrivener's Errors"
389
Lamie v. United States Trustee
390
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh
397
Notes and Questions
407
A Problem Informed / Koons Buick
410
ch. 4
Interpreting Statutes in Light of Past Interpretations and Other Statutes
418
A.
Interpreting Statutes in Light of Past Judicial Decisions About the Same Statutes
418
Introductory Note About Stare Decisis
418
1.
Should Stare Decisis Have Special Force in Statutory Cases?
426
Flood v. Kuhn
429
Notes and Quetions
439
2.
Should the Legislature's Failure to Override a Prominent Interpretation of a Statute Add to the Precedential Force of That Interpretation?
448
a.
The Idea of Congressional Acquiescence in Judicial Interpretations
448
b.
The Idea of Congressional Acquiescence in Administrative Interpretations
455
Bob Jones University v. United States
456
Notes and Questions
473
3.
When the Legislature Reenacts a Statute Without Relevant Change, Is it Implicity Codifying Prominent Glosses on the Old Statute?
478
4.
What if Subsequent Statutes Suggest Approval of a Precedent Without Actually Codifying It?
485
B.
Interpreting Statutes in Light of Other Statutes (and Past Decisions About Those Other Statutes)
486
1.
The Concept of Statutes in Pari Materia
486
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt
497
Notes and Questions
502
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey
508
Notes and Questions
521
2.
The Presumption (or Clear-Statement Rule) Against Implied Repeals
525
Morton v. Mancari
526
Notes and Questions
533
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co
540
Notes and Questions
547
3.
Statutory Directions About How to Interpret Statutes
554
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council
567
Notes and Questions
576
Clinton v. City of New York
579
Notes and Questions
590
ch. 5
Some Special Issues in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes
595
A.
Federal Statutes and General Jurisprudence
595
1.
Interpreting Federal Statutes That Use Terms Familiar to State Law
599
a.
The Possibility That a Term in a Federal Statute Might Be a Mere Placeholder for Definitions Supplied by the Law of Individual States
599
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County
600
Notes and Questions
602
Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phonix & Von Gontard, P.C.
606
Notes and Questions
611
b.
The Possibility That a Term in a Federal Statute Should Be Given a Uniform Interpretation That Allegedly Reflects the Statute's Purposes but That Deviates From General Jurisprudence
613
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications
613
Notes and Questions
621
c.
The Possibility That a Term in a Federal Statute Might Draw Its Meaning From the General Common Law or From Common Patterns in Legal Doctrines Usually Articulated under the Rubric of State Law
623
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden
623
Notes and Questions
627
2.
Some Other Ways in Which Federal Statutes are Often Read Against the Backdrop of General Jurisprudence
629
Morissette v. United States
629
Notes and Questions
639
Meyer v. Holley
646
Notes and Questions
651
3.
The Case of Federal Casuses of Action
653
a.
Background About Federal Causes of Action
654
b.
The Details of Federal Causes of Action
673
Monessen Southwestern Railway Co. v. Morgan
675
Notes and Questions
680
B.
What Role Should Administrative Interpretation of a Federal Statute Play in Subsequent Judicial Interpretation of the Statute?
689
1.
The Basis and Scope of Chevron Deference
691
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
691
Notes and Questions
701
2.
The Relationship Between Chevron and Other Interpretive Tools
726
a.
Chevron and the Canons
727
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
733
Notes and Questions
755
b.
Chevron and Legislative History
764
c.
Chevron and Judicial Stare Decisis
769
C.
Federal Statutes and Federalism
776
1.
When Should Federal Statutes Be Read to Regulate the States Themselves?
776
a.
Atascadero and the Federal Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
777
b.
When Should General Language in Federal Statutes Be Understood to Impose Legal Burdens or Obligations on State Governments?
781
c.
Gregory and Federal Prescription of the Qualifications for Important State Offices
788
Gregory v. Ashcroft
790
Notes and Questions
805
2.
Federal Statutes and the Preemption of State Law
813
a.
"Express" Preemption
817
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
819
Notes and Questions
835
b.
"Implied" Preemption
846
i.
Field Preemption
847
ii.
Conflict Preemption
851
Perez v. Campbell
854
Notes and Questions
858
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co
869
Notes and Questions
890
ch. 6
Statutes Over Time
904
A.
Aspects of Conventional Jurisprudence That Permit the Proper Application or Interpretation of Statutes to Change Over Time
905
1.
The Potential for Unexpected Applications of an Invariant Directive
905
Massachusetts v. Welosky
907
Notes and Questions
914
2.
The Concept of "Open-Textured" Terms and Phrases
918
In re Erickson
920
Notes and Questions
924
3.
The Possibility of Inferring Exceptions or Embellishments to Help Aging Statutes Continue to Serve Their Original Purposes
926
United States v. Lorenzetti
928
Notes and Questions
933
Coda: A Problem from the Copyright Act of 1909
939
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co
940
Notes and Questions
942
4.
The Potential for the Choices That Courts Make in Resolving Indeterminacies to Depend on When Courts Make Those Choices
945
a.
The Relevance of Contemporary Policy Considerations
945
b.
The Relevance of Modern Constitutional Doctrine
947
c.
The Relevance of Other Statutes
948
Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. Chakrabarty
954
Notes and Questions
962
5.
The Effect of Stare Decisis
966
B.
Academic Theories That Take "Dynamic" Interpretation Farther
969
1.
Alexander Aleinikoff's Proposal to Alter the Temporal Reference Point of Traditional Interpretive Techniques
969
Idaho v. Hodel
973
Notes and Questions
981
2.
A Brief Survey of Other, More Complicated "Dynamic" Theories
983
ch. 7
A Concluding Problem
990
United States v. Marshall
990
Notes and Questions
1008
Index
1017