An introduction to law and economics / A. Mitchell Polinsky.
2011
K487.E3 P65 2011 (Map It)
Available at Cellar
Formats
Format | |
---|---|
BibTeX | |
MARCXML | |
TextMARC | |
MARC | |
DublinCore | |
EndNote | |
NLM | |
RefWorks | |
RIS |
Items
Details
Author
Title
An introduction to law and economics / A. Mitchell Polinsky.
Published
New York : Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
K487.E3 P65 2011
Edition
Fourth edition.
ISBN
9780735584488 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0735584486 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0735584486 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Description
xix, 195 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)702169016
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 173-182) and index.
Series
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Gift

The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
List of Tables
xv
Preface
xvii
ch. 1
Introduction
1
The Role of Assumptions
2
ch. 2
Efficiency And Equity
7
Is There a Conflict?
7
ch. 3
The Coase Theorem
13
Zero Transaction Costs
13
Positive Transaction Costs
14
ch. 4
First Application---Nuisance Law
17
Zero Transaction Costs
19
Strategic Behavior
20
Imperfect Information
23
ch. 5
Second Application---Breach Of Contract
29
A Fully Specified Contract
31
Efficient Breach
33
Efficient Reliance
36
ch. 6
Third Application---Automobile Accidents
43
The Driver's Care
44
The Pedestrian's Care
47
The Activity-Level Issue
50
ch. 7
Risk Bearing And Insurance
57
The Bearing of Risk
57
Insurance
60
ch. 8
Fourth Application---Breach Of Contract Again
63
Optimal Risk Allocation
64
The Effects of the Remedies
66
ch. 9
Fifth Application---Automobile Accidents Again
71
Private Insurance Not Available
72
Ideal Insurance Available
74
Imperfect Insurance Available
76
ch. 10
Sixth Application - Law Enforcement Using Fines
79
The Risk-Neutral Case
81
The Risk-Averse Case
83
ch. 11
Seventh Application---Law Enforcement Using Imprisonment
91
Disutility Rises Proportionally
92
Disutility Rises More than Proportionally
94
Disutility Rises Less than Proportionally
97
ch. 12
Competitive Markets
103
Price Equals Cost
104
The Efficiency of Competitive Pricing
105
ch. 13
Eighth Application---Pollution Control
107
Only Polluters Determine Harm
108
Victims Also Affect Harm
110
ch. 14
Ninth Application---Products Liability
113
Consumers Have Perfect Information
114
Consumers Underestimate Product Risks
116
Risk Aversion
117
Consumers Can Take Care
120
ch. 15
Tenth Application---Principal-Agent Liability
125
Basic Analysis
125
Agent Risk Aversion
130
Monitoring of Agents
131
The Judgment-Proof Problem
132
ch. 16
Eleventh Application---Suit, Settlement, And Trial
135
The Litigation Process
135
The Analysis of Substantive Legal Rules
141
ch. 17
Twelfth Application---Regulation
147
The Effects of Regulation
147
How Does Regulation Differ from Liability?
149
Is Regulation or Liability Preferable?
150
ch. 18
Efficiency And Equity Reconsidered
153
Redistribution by Taxes and Transfers
153
Can Legal Rules Redistribute Income?
155
Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?
158
ch. 19
A Summing Up
163
The Efficiency-Equity Question
163
The Incentive Question
164
The Risk-Allocation Question
166
ch. 20
Conclusion
169
The Problem of Valuation
169
Appendix A
Bibliography
173
Appendix B
Course Syllabus
183
Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law
184
Advanced Topics in Law and Economics
187
Index
191