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Details
Title
Antitrust / Christopher L. Sagers.
Published
New York : Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
KF1649 .S35 2011
ISBN
9781454800002 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1454800003 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1454800003 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Description
xxix, 463 pages ; 25 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)719714866
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
Preface
xxvii
pt. I
AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST LAW
ch. 1
The History, Nature, and Theory of Federal Competition Policy
3
[§]1.1.
What Is "Antitrust"?
3
[§]1.2.
Contemporary Antitrust in the Bigger Picture
9
[§]1.3.
Using This Book
13
[§]1.4.
A One-Page Crib Sheet to the Entire Law of Antitrust
15
pt. II
THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY ANTITRUST
ch. 2
A Two-Part Strategy for Understanding Antitrust Economics
19
[§]2.1.
The Role of Economics in Antitrust
19
[§]2.2.
Economic Theory Explained Intuitively: The Ground Rules of Antitrust Economics
22
[§]2.2.1.
The Ground Rules
23
[§]2.2.2.
Getting Our Feet Wet with the Ground Rules
26
[§]2.3.
Basic Price Theory, More Traditionally Explained: Using Graphs and Mathematics to Capture Economic Concepts
30
[§]2.3.1.
Functions, Curves, and Graphs
31
[§]2.3.2.
How Competitive Markets Reach Equilibrium
32
[§]2.3.2(a).
How Firms Make Decisions, Part 1: Costs
33
[§]2.3.2(b).
How Firms Make Decisions, Part 2: Demand, Elasticity, and the Firm-Specific Demand Curve
37
[§]2.3.2(c).
How Firms Make Decisions, Part 3: Maximizing Profit
40
[§]2.3.2(d).
How Firms Make Decisions, Part 4: The Short Run, the Long Run, and the Different Kinds of Fixed Costs
41
[§]2.3.2(e).
How Firms Make Decisions, Part 5: Minimizing Loss
43
[§]2.3.3.
Equilibrium in Monopoly
44
[§]2.3.4.
Price Theory as a Normative Argument: Calculating the Areas of Consumer Surplus, Producer Surplus, and Deadweight Loss
47
ch. 3
Part Two of the Two-Part Strategy: Economic Generalizations That Pervade Modern Antitrust
51
[§]3.1.
The Basic Purpose of Antitrust: The Rise of the Consumer Protection Standard
52
[§]3.2.
What Antitrust Really Cares About Now: Protecting Optimal Conditions for Competition to Encourage "Competition on the Merits"
54
[§]3.2.1.
Antitrust Protects Competition, Not Competitors
54
[§]3.2.2.
"Social" Justifications Are Never Relevant in Antitrust: The Cognizability Issue
56
[§]3.2.3.
Antitrust Is (Almost) Always Agnostic About Prices
58
[§]3.3.
The "Harvard School" Contribution: Formulation of Antitrust Rules to Balance False Negatives and False Positives
60
[§]3.4.
Unilateral Versus Multilateral and the Copperweld Gap: Antitrust Cares More About Conspiracy Than About Individual Action
62
ch. 4
The All-Important Concept of Market Power
65
[§]4.1.
The Omnipresence of Market Power in Antitrust Law
65
[§]4.1.1.
Market Power: What It Is
65
[§]4.1.2.
Why and When Market Power Matters in Antitrust Law
66
[§]4.2.
The Traditional Doctrinal Tests for Market Power: The Market Share Proxy
69
[§]4.2.1.
The Test and Its Origins
69
[§]4.2.2.
Defining the Product Market: The Cellophane Test
70
[§]4.2.3.
Defining the Geographic Market
74
[§]4.2.4.
Measuring Share Once the Market Is Defined
75
[§]4.2.5.
Assessing Other Indices of Market Power
75
[§]4.3.
Measures of Concentration: The Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
77
pt. III
CONSPIRACIES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
ch. 5
An Introduction to Sherman Act [§]1
81
[§]5.1.
An Introduction to Business Collaboration and a Few Preliminary Ideas: "Horizontal" and "Vertical" Restraints, and Per se Illegality Versus the Rule of Reason
81
[§]5.1.1.
Limitation of the [§]1 Prohibition to "Unreasonable" Conspiracies and the Difference Between Per se and Rule-of-Reason Analysis
83
[§]5.1.2.
"Horizontal" Versus "Vertical" Arrangements: The Significance of Product Distribution in the Law of [§]1
86
[§]5.2.
Why the Per-se-Versus-Rule-of-Reason Distinction Isn't Actually Easy: The Changing Perspective Since 1975 and the Trade-Off Between False Positive and False Negative
86
[§]5.3.
A Summary of the Law of Multilateral Restraints
91
ch. 6
Per se Offenses
95
[§]6.1.
The Structure of a Per se Cause of Action
95
[§]6.2.
Categories of Conduct That Remain Per se Illegal
97
[§]6.2.1.
Horizontal Price Fixing
97
[§]6.2.1(a).
In General
97
[§]6.2.1(b).
Kinds of Conduct Commonly Found to Constitute Per se Price Fixing
98
[§]6.2.1(c).
The Sui Generis Rule of BMI: Price Fixing Agreements That Are Themselves the Product
99
[§]6.2.2.
Horizontal Market Allocations
100
[§]6.2.3.
Concerted Refusals to Deal (a.k.a. "Boycotts")
101
[§]6.2.3(a).
Distinguishing Per se and Non-Per se Boycotts
102
[§]6.2.3(b).
The First Amendment Issue
104
ch. 7
The Rule of Reason and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints
107
[§]7.1.
What the Rule of Reason Is Really About and the Elements of a Rule-of-Reason Cause of Action
107
[§]7.2.
The Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints
110
ch. 8
Intermediate Analysis: The Long Struggle to Define an Abbreviated Rule of Reason
113
[§]8.1.
Introduction
113
[§]8.2.
The Quick-Look Rule in Operation
114
[§]8.2.1.
When Is a Case a Quick-Look Case?
114
[§]8.2.1(a).
The Case Law
114
[§]8.2.1(b).
So When Is a Case a Quick-Look Case?
117
[§]8.2.2.
The Current Structure of a Quick-Look Case
121
[§]8.2.2(a).
The Burden-Shifting Framework
121
[§]8.2.2(b).
The Defendant's Justifications
123
ch. 9
One Further Problem in Horizontal Cooperation: Exchanges of Information
125
[§]9.1.
The Traditional Bookends Approach
125
[§]9.2.
The Structural Approach of United States v. Container Corp. and the Law as It Stands
128
pt. IV
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
ch. 10
Antitrust and the Distribution of Goods: A Whole New World
133
[§]10.1.
Vertical Relationships in General
133
[§]10.2.
The Law of Vertical Restraints in General
134
[§]10.2.1.
Varieties of Vertical Restraint
134
[§]10.2.2.
Vertical Restraints in Historical Perspective: The Long Road from Dr. Miles to Continental T.V. to Leegin
135
[§]10.2.3.
Doctrinal Elaborations Following Leegin's Universalization of Rule-of-Reason Treatment
140
[§]10.3.
Distinguishing Horizontal and Vertical Conspiracies
142
ch. 11
Tying and Exclusive Contracting
145
[§]11.1.
Introduction
145
[§]11.1.1.
A Special Problem in Distribution
145
[§]11.1.2.
The Limitations and Peculiarities of Clayton Act [§]3
146
[§]11.2.
Tying
147
[§]11.2.1.
What Tying Is
147
[§]11.2.2.
The So-Called "Per se" Tying Test
148
[§]11.2.2(a).
Separate Products
148
[§]11.2.2(b).
Coerced Purchase of Both Products
149
[§]11.2.2(c).
Power in the Tying Product
149
[§]11.2.2(d).
"Substantial" Amount of Commerce Affected
150
[§]11.2.3(e).
Business Justifications
150
[§]11.3.
Exclusive Contracts
152
pt. V
PROOF OF CONSPIRACY
ch. 12
Proof of Conspiracy Under Sherman Act [§]1
157
[§]12.1.
Why Conspiracy Is Hard to Prove
157
[§]12.2.
The Single Entity Problem: Copperweld, Dagher, and itocrican Needle
158
[§]12.3.
Proving Conspiracy
163
[§]12.3.1.
The Basic Framework and the Law as It Once Was
163
[§]12.3.2.
Proving Conspiracy Under Twombly, Monsanto, and Matsushita: The Pretrial Requirement of "Economic Sense"
166
[§]12.3.2(a).
The Economic Sense Test
166
[§]12.3.2(b).
When and How the Test Is Applied
167
[§]12.3.3.
The Significance of Oligopoly Theory
169
[§]12.3.4.
The Continuing Framework for Proof of Conspiracy with Circumstantial Evidence: The "Plus-Factors" Test as It Is Now Applied
171
[§]12.4.
Special Problems in Proof of Vertical Conspiracy
174
pt. VI
CONFRONTING MR. BIG: THE LAW OF MONOPOLY
ch. 13
The Offense of Monopolization
177
[§]13.1.
Early Case Law and Its Current Significance: Alcoa, United Shoe, and the Many Forms the Law Could Have Taken
179
[§]13.2.
The Basic Cause of Action as It Exists: "Monopolize" Is a Verb
182
[§]13.3.
Proving Exclusionary Conduct Under [§]2
183
[§]13.3.1.
The (So Far) Unsuccessful Search for a General Theory of Exclusion
183
[§]13.3.1(a).
Background
183
[§]13.3.1(b).
The Ambiguous Reception of "Profit Sacrifice" and "No Economic Sense" Tests
185
[§]13.3.1(c).
The Current State of Play: Analyzing Exclusion Through the Category Approach
187
[§]13.3.2.
The Role of Intent
188
[§]13.3.3.
Exclusionary Pricing: Price Predation and Its Variations
190
[§]13.3.3(a).
The Present Standard Under Brooke Group
192
[§]13.3.3(b).
Evolving Trends in Predation Law
193
[§]13.3.4.
Exclusionary Refusals to Cooperate
195
[§]13.3.4(a).
Refusals to Deal in General
195
[§]13.3.4(b).
The Essential Facilities Rule
197
[§]13.3.5.
Exclusionary Distribution: Exclusive Contracts, Tying, Bundling, Full-Line Forcing, Loyalty Discounts, and the Many Other Faces of Vertical Foreclosure
201
[§]13.3.6.
Exclusionary Misuse of Institutions: Exclusion Through Public and Quasi-Public Instrumentalities
204
[§]13.3.6(a).
Standard Setting and Government Rule Making
205
[§]13.3.6(b).
Exclusionary Litigation and Administrative Complaints
207
[§]13.3.6(c).
Enforcement of Bogus Patents: The Walker Process Cause of Action
209
[§]13.3.7.
Exclusionary Innovation
210
[§]13.3.7(a).
Refusals to License Intellectual Property
210
[§]13.3.7(b).
Product Design
211
[§]13.3.7(c).
Failure to Predisclose
212
[§]13.3.8.
The Unlimited Range of Other Conduct That Can Be "Exclusionary" and Judicial Reluctance to Consider It
213
[§]13.4.
The Legitimate Business Justification
214
ch. 14
Attempted Monopolization and Conspiracy to Monopolize
217
[§]14.1.
The [§]2 Attempt Cause of Action
217
[§]14.1.1.
Predatory Conduct
218
[§]14.1.2.
Specific Intent
219
[§]14.1.3.
Dangerous Likelihood of Success
220
[§]14.2.
The [§]2 Conspiracy Cause of Action
221
[§]14.3.
Evidence of Business Justification
222
[§]14.4.
The Practical Importance of the Attempt and Conspiracy Theories: Pleading Strategy
222
pt. VII
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ch. 15
Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property
227
[§]15.1.
The Rationalization of Two Policies
227
[§]15.2.
Specific Antitrust Applications
228
[§]15.2.1.
Acquisition of Legitimate Intellectual Property as an Antitrust Violation
229
[§]15.2.2.
Improper Extension or Abuse of Otherwise Legitimate Intellectual Property
230
[§]15.2.2(a).
Nonuse
230
[§]15.2.2(b).
Objectively Baseless Infringement Claims
231
[§]15.2.2(c).
Standard Setting and the Patent Hold-Up Problem
231
[§]15.2.3.
Licensing Issues as to Legitimate Intellectual Property
233
[§]15.2.3(a).
Licensing or Refusal to License
233
[§]15.2.3(b).
Trade-Restraining License Terms
233
[§]15.2.3(c).
Blocking Patents, Cross-Licensing, and Patent Pools
236
[§]15.2.3(d).
The "First Sale" Doctrine and the Tying Rule
237
[§]15.2.4.
Enforcement of Wrongfully Acquired Intellectual Property
238
pt. VIII
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
ch. 16
Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act
243
[§]16.1.
The Phenomenon and Its Competitive Significance
243
[§]16.2.
Theoretical Perspectives
245
[§]16.2.1.
Price Discrimination in Economic Theory
245
[§]16.2.1(a).
What It Is
245
[§]16.2.1(b).
The Prerequisites for Price Discrimination and the Incidence of It in the Real World
245
[§]16.2.2.
Its Peculiarity in a System of Competition
247
[§]16.3.
The Statute, Its Origins, and Its Peculiarities
248
[§]16.4.
Prerequisites to Recovery
250
[§]16.4.1.
Narrowed Jurisdictional Reach
250
[§]16.4.1(a).
"In Commerce": Physical Transfer of Goods Across State Lines in All RPA Actions (Probably)
250
[§]16.4.1(b).
Section 2(a) Cases Only (Probably): Domestic Consumption or Resale
251
[§]16.4.2.
Scope of the RPA
251
[§]16.4.2(a).
Legal Persons Exempted from RPA Coverage
251
[§]16.4.2(b).
Commodities
252
[§]16.5.
The Four RPA Causes of Action
252
[§]16.5.1.
The Primary Offense: Ordinary Price Discrimination Under RPA [§]2(a)
253
[§]16.5.1(a).
The Factual Predicates of the [§] 2 (a) Cause of Action
253
[§]16.5.1(b).
Causing Competitive Injury
254
[§]16.5.2.
The [§]2(a) Defenses (Which Also Apply in One Other Case)
256
[§]16.5.2(a).
Meeting Competition
256
[§]16.5.2(b).
Cost Justification
257
[§]16.5.2(c).
Changing Conditions
257
[§]16.6.
The Subsidiary RPA Causes of Action
257
[§]16.6.1.
Brokerage Payments Under RPA [§]2(c)
257
[§]16.6.2.
Promotional Materials Under RPA [§][§]2(d) and 2(e)
258
[§]16.6.3.
Inducing or Receiving Discriminatory Benefits Under RPA [§]2(f)
258
pt. IX
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
ch. 17
Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions
261
[§]17.1.
Some Brief Background
263
[§]17.1.1.
The Many Ways One Firm Can Acquire All or Part of Another: A Primer on Acquisition Transactions
263
[§]17.1.2.
The Competitive Relation Between the Merging Firms: Horizontal, Vertical, and Conglomerate Mergers and the Significance of These Distinctions
265
[§]17.2.
Sources of the Law of Merger and Acquisition: Whence [§]7, Hart-Scott-Rodino, and the Guidelines, as Well as the Peculiar Quasi-Irrelevance of the Supreme Court
267
[§]17.2.1.
The Long Legislative History of [§]7 and the Coming of HSR
268
[§]17.2.1(a).
Statutory Origins
268
[§]17.2.1(b).
The Creation of Modern Merger Law by the Warren Court
268
[§]17.2.1(c).
The Sea Change of the 1970s and the Coming of HSR
270
[§]17.2.2.
The Merger Guidelines
272
[§]17.3.
The Substantive Law of Clayton Act [§]7: Scope and Applicability
275
[§]17.4.
The [§]7 Substantive Cause of Action
279
[§]17.5.
The Substantive Cause of Action, Step 1: Market Definition, Structural Presumptions, and the Defendant's Initial Rebuttal
282
[§]17.5.1.
Horizontal Cases
283
[§]17.5.2.
Vertical Cases and Conglomerate Cases
284
[§]17.6.
The Substantive Cause of Action, Step 2: Theories of Harm
285
[§]17.6.1.
Theories of Harm from Horizontal Merger
285
[§]17.6.2.
Theories of Harm from Vertical Merger
289
[§]17.6.3.
Theories of Harm from Conglomerate Merger
293
[§]17.7.
The Substantive Cause of Action, Step 3: Defenses
296
[§]17.7.1.
The "Failing Firm" Defense
296
[§]17.7.2.
Efficiencies as a Defense
296
ch. 18
Merger Review Under Hart-Scott-Rodino
301
[§]18.1.
1976: HSR and the Revolution of Bureaucratic Merger Review
301
[§]18.1.1.
Introduction
301
[§]18.1.2.
Unpacking HSR
303
[§]18.2.
Covered Transactions
305
[§]18.3.
What Happens on Merger Review
310
[§]18.3.1.
The Initial Filing and the HSR Clock
311
[§]18.3.2.
The Second Request and Further Extensions of Time
312
[§]18.3.3.
Disputes Within the HSR Process
313
[§]18.3.4.
The Problem of "Gun Jumping"
315
[§]18.3.5.
What Happens at the End
316
[§]18.3.6.
Special Treatment for Cash Tender Offers and Bankrupt Entities
317
pt. X
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES IN ANTITRUST
ch. 19
Institutions and Procedures in Antitrust
323
[§]19.1.
Limitations on Private Recovery: The "Antitrust Injury" Rule, the Standing Requirement, and Illinois Brick
324
[§]19.1.1.
Antitrust Injury
325
[§]19.1.2.
Standing or "Remoteness"
328
[§]19.1.3.
The Direct Purchaser Rule
330
[§]19.2.
The Unusual Variety of Enforcers
332
[§]19.2.1.
Federal Enforcers
332
[§]19.2.1(a).
The Justice Department, Antitrust Division: Civil Enforcement Powers
333
[§]19.2.1(b).
The U.S. Attorneys and Criminal Enforcement
334
[§]19.2.1(c).
The Federal Trade Commission, Its Special Functions, and Its Complicated Jurisdiction
335
[§]19.2.2.
Private Plaintiffs and the Rule of Treble Damages
338
[§]19.2.3.
State Governments: As Private Plaintiffs and in Parens Patriae
339
[§]19.3.
Technical Procedural Peculiarities
340
[§]19.3.1.
Follow-On Litigation and Collateral Estoppel
340
[§]19.3.2.
The Antitrust Statute of Limitations
341
[§]19.3.3.
Government Settlements and the Tunney Act
343
[§]19.4.
Remedies in Antitrust
344
[§]19.4.1.
Recovery of Money
344
[§]19.4.1(a).
Money Damages: Private Plaintiffs, States in Parens Patriae, and the Federal Government
344
[§]19.4.2(b).
FTC: Disgorgement, Restitution, and Forfeiture
345
[§]19.4.1(c).
Money Penalties for Contempt
346
[§]19.4.2.
Structural Relief---Divestiture or Dissolution
347
[§]19.4.3.
Other Injunctions
348
[§]19.4.4.
Remedies in Merger Preclearance Review
348
pt. XI
THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST
ch. 20
The Scope of Antitrust Generally
353
[§]20.1.
Antitrust Is the Great Swiss Cheese
353
[§]20.2.
The Basic Scope of Antitrust: The "Commerce" Requirement, the Interstate Requirement, and the Reach of the Clayton and FTC Acts
355
[§]20.2.1.
"Trade or Commerce" in General; Its Exclusion of Charity and Gratuity; and That Awkward Orphan of Antitrust, Professional Baseball
355
[§]20.2.2.
Clayton Act [§]3 and the Robinson-Patman Act
359
[§]20.2.3.
The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
360
[§]20.3.
International Antitrust: The Reach of U.S. Law Overseas
362
[§]20.3.1.
The International Reach of the Sherman Act
362
[§]20.3.2.
The Extraterritorial Reach of the FTC and Clayton Acts
364
[§]20.3.3.
Extraterritorial Antitrust in Summary
365
[§]20.4.
The Basic Scope of Antitrust in Summary
366
ch. 21
Antitrust and Politics
367
[§]21.1.
The Interface of Antitrust and Politics
367
[§]21.1.1.
Why Political or Government Action Could (Theoretically) Violate Antitrust
367
[§]21.1.2.
The Constitutional Character of Political Immunities Cases
369
[§]21.1.2(a).
The Immunities Are Not Themselves Constitutional Rules (Apparently)
369
[§]21.1.2(b).
State Action Cases Are Definitely Constitutional in Some Sense: They Implicate Sovereign Immunity and Seek Federal "Preemption"
370
[§]21.1.2(c).
Cases Involving Both Immunities Doctrines Implicate Other Constitutional Issues
371
[§]21.1.3.
The Political Immunities in Summary
372
[§]21.2.
The State Itself as Defendant: Parker or "State Action" Immunity
373
[§]21.2.1.
The Basic Rule; Genuine State Action Is "Ipso Facto" Immune
373
[§]21.2.2.
The Several Failed, Would-Be Exceptions and the Lingering Uncertainty of the Market Participant Exception
375
[§]21.3.
The Problem of Private Persons as Trade-Restraining Deputies: Midcal Immunity
376
[§]21.3.1.
Clear Articulation
379
[§]21.3.2.
Active Supervision
381
[§]21.3.3.
State Agencies and Local Government Subdivisions: The Town of Hallie Rule
382
[§]21.3.3(a).
Municipalities
382
[§]21.3.3(b).
State Administrative Agencies
382
[§]21.3.3(c).
Money Damages Against Local Governments: The Local Government Antitrust Act
383
[§]21.4.
Noerr-Pennington or "Petitioning" Immunity
384
[§]21.4.1.
Basic Rule: "Petitioning" That Is Not a "Sham" Is Immune from Antitrust
386
[§]21.4.1(a).
General Rule
386
[§]21.4.1(b).
What Is a "Sham"? And Is Sham Petitioning in Itself an Antitrust Violation?
387
[§]21.4.1(c).
The Special Case of Petitioning in the Adjudicatory Context and the Lingering Uncertainty over Adjudicatory "Frauds"
388
[§]21.4.2.
Allied Tube and the "Source, Context and Nature" of the Restraint
390
[§]21.4.3.
Conduct That in Itself Violates Antitrust Is Not "Petitioning"
391
[§]21.4.4.
Purported Exceptions
393
[§]21.4.5.
The Distinct Constitutional Protection of the First Amendment: The Rule of Claiborne Hardware
395
[§]21.5.
A Note on Antitrust and Federal Action: The Doctrine of Implied Repeal
395
ch. 22
Antitrust and the Regulated Industries
397
[§]22.1.
The Range of Regtdated Industries and Their Relation to Antitrust
397
[§]22.1.1.
Introduction
397
[§]22.1.2.
A History of Economic Regulation: Changing Faith in Competition
400
[§]22.1.2(a).
The Rate-and-Entry Regulation of the "Destructive Competition" Era
400
[§]22.1.2(b).
The Health-and-Safety Regulation of the Contemporary Era
402
[§]22.1.2(c).
The Ambiguous Term "Deregulation"
402
[§]22.1.3.
A Few Useful Ideas From Administrative Law
403
[§]22.2.
The Once-and-Continuing Prevalence of Statutory Exemptions
405
[§]22.3.
The Doctrine of "Implied Repeal"
407
[§]22.4.
Rules of Judicial Deference: The Filed Rate and Primary Jurisdiction Doctrines
410
[§]22.4.1.
The Keogh or Filed Rate Doctrine
411
[§]22.4.2.
The Rule of Primary Jurisdiction
413
ch. 23
The Labor Exemption
417
[§]23.1.
The Problem of Labor in Antitrust
417
[§]23.1.1.
Introduction
417
[§]23.1.1(a).
Background
417
[§]23.1.1(b).
Summary of the Law
419
[§]23.1.2.
A (Very) Brief History: The Early Judicial Hostility and the Rise of the Modern Statutory Regime
421
[§]23.2.
The Modern Doctrinal Framework: The "Statutory" Exemption, the "Nonstatutory" Exemption, and the Allen Bradley Rule
423
[§]23.2.1.
The Statutory Exemption
424
[§]23.2.2.
The Nonstatutory Exemption
426
[§]23.2.3.
The -Allen Bradley Rule: Union-Employer Conspiracy
429
Appendix Further Topics in Antitrust Economics: The Problem of Industrial Organization
431
[§]App.1.
The Economics of Distribution: Vertical Relationships and Their Antitrust Significance
432
[§]App.1.1.
The Horizontal-Vertical Distinction
432
[§]App.1.2.
Some Basic Features: The Fundamental Problem of Product Distribution and the Goal of Product Differentiation
433
[§]App.1.2(a).
The Problem of Distribution
433
[§]App.1.2(b).
Branding or Product Differentiation
435
[§]App.1.3.
Traditional Theories of Vertical Harm and the Neoclassical Criticism
436
[§]App.1.4.
Recent Reexamination of the Neoclassical Critique
439
[§]App.2.
Modeling Imperfect Competition: Theories of Oligopoly
441
[§]App.2.1.
Oligopoly Interdependence
441
[§]App.2.2.
Further Variations on Small-Numbers Competition: Limit Pricing and Contestable Markets
443
Glossary
445
Table of Cases
453
Index
459