Constitutional courts as positive legislators : a comparative law study / Allan R. Brewer-Carias.
2011
K3370 .B739 2011 (Map It)
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Title
Constitutional courts as positive legislators : a comparative law study / Allan R. Brewer-Carias.
Published
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Call Number
K3370 .B739 2011
ISBN
9781107011656 (hardback)
1107011655 (hardback)
1107011655 (hardback)
Description
xxviii, 933 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)698361347
Summary
"This book analyzes the role of constitutional courts, conditioned by the principles of progressiveness and of prevalence of human rights, particularly regarding the important rediscovery of the right to equality and non-discrimination"-- Provided by publisher.
"In all democratic states, constitutional courts, which are traditionally empowered to invalidate or to annul unconstitutional statutes, have the role of interpreting and applying the Constitution in order to preserve its supremacy and to ensure the prevalence of fundamental rights. In this sense they were traditionally considered "negative legislators," unable to substitute the legislators or to enact legislative provisions that could not be deducted from the Constitution. During the past decade the role of constitutional courts has dramatically changed as their role is no longer limited to declaring the unconstitutionality of statutes or annulling them. Today, constitutional courts condition their decisions with the presumption of constitutionality of statutes, opting to interpret them according to or in harmony with the Constitution in order to preserve them, instead of deciding their annulment or declaring them unconstitutional. More frequently, Constitutional Courts, instead of dealing with existing legislation, assume the role of assistants or auxiliaries to the legislator, creating provisions they deduct from the Constitution when controlling the absence of legislation or legislative omissions. In some cases they act as "positive legislators," issuing temporary or provisional rules to be applied pending the enactment of legislation. This book analyzes this new role of the constitutional courts, conditioned by the principles of progressiveness and of prevalence of human rights, particularly regarding the important rediscovery of the right to equality and non-discrimination"-- Provided by publisher.
"In all democratic states, constitutional courts, which are traditionally empowered to invalidate or to annul unconstitutional statutes, have the role of interpreting and applying the Constitution in order to preserve its supremacy and to ensure the prevalence of fundamental rights. In this sense they were traditionally considered "negative legislators," unable to substitute the legislators or to enact legislative provisions that could not be deducted from the Constitution. During the past decade the role of constitutional courts has dramatically changed as their role is no longer limited to declaring the unconstitutionality of statutes or annulling them. Today, constitutional courts condition their decisions with the presumption of constitutionality of statutes, opting to interpret them according to or in harmony with the Constitution in order to preserve them, instead of deciding their annulment or declaring them unconstitutional. More frequently, Constitutional Courts, instead of dealing with existing legislation, assume the role of assistants or auxiliaries to the legislator, creating provisions they deduct from the Constitution when controlling the absence of legislation or legislative omissions. In some cases they act as "positive legislators," issuing temporary or provisional rules to be applied pending the enactment of legislation. This book analyzes this new role of the constitutional courts, conditioned by the principles of progressiveness and of prevalence of human rights, particularly regarding the important rediscovery of the right to equality and non-discrimination"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Author's Note
1
pt. ONE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
5
Introduction: Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review, and the Negative Legislator
5
ch. 1
Judicial Review of Legislation and the Legislator
13
I.
The Systems of Judicial Review and the Role of Constitutional Courts
13
II.
Control of Constitutionality and Control of Conventionality
20
III.
The Interpretation of the Constitution and the Influence of the Constitutional Courts on Constitutional and Legal Reforms
29
IV.
The Question of Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators
31
ch. 2
Constitutional Courts' Interference with the Constituent Power
41
I.
Constitutional Courts' Resolution of Disputes of Constitutional Rank and Enactment of Constitutional Rules
41
II.
Constitutional Courts and Judicial Review of Provisions of the Constitution and of Constitutional Reforms and Amendments
45
III.
The Role of Constitutional Courts' Adaptation of the Constitution and the Question of Legitimate Changes to the Constitution
50
1.
Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights Guarantees
51
2.
The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters
65
IV.
The Problem of Illegitimate Mutations of the Constitution
68
ch. 3
Constitutional Courts' Interference with the Legislator on Existing Legislation
73
I.
Constitutional Courts' Interpretation of Statutes in Harmony with the Constitution
73
II.
Constitutional Courts Complementing the Legislator by Adding New Rules (and New Meaning) to an Existing Legislative Provision
79
III.
Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interfering with the Temporal Effects of Legislation
94
1.
The Power of the Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects: Postponing the Effect of the Court's Ruling
95
2.
The Power of the Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects: Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of Its Own Decisions
103
A.
The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects Regarding Declarative Decisions
103
B.
The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nunc Constitutive Decisions
108
3.
The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation
114
IV.
The Deformation of the Interpretative Principle: Constitutional Courts' Reforming of Statutes and Interpreting Them Without Interpreting the Constitution
115
ch. 4
Constitutional Courts' Interference with the Legislator Regarding Legislative Omissions
125
I.
Constitutional Courts' Filling the Gap of Absolute Legislative Omissions
126
1.
Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions
126
2.
The Protection of Fundamental Rights against Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection
135
II.
Constitutional Courts' Filling the Gap of Relative Legislative Omissions
148
1.
Constitutional Courts and Equality Rights: Deciding on the Unconstitutionality of Statutes without Declaring Their Nullity
149
2.
Constitutional Courts' Issuing Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator
153
3.
Constitutional Courts' Issuing Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator
160
III.
Constitutional Courts as Provisional Legislators
165
ch. 5
Constitutional Courts as Legislators on Matters of Judicial Review
173
I.
Constitutional Courts Creating Their Own Judicial Review Powers
173
1.
The Judge-Made Law Regarding the Diffuse System of Judicial Review
173
2.
The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights
174
3.
The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation
178
II.
Constitutional Courts Creating Procedural Rules on Judicial Review Processes
186
Final Remarks
189
pt. TWO
NATIONAL REPORTS
193
Argentina: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Alfredo Mauricio Vitolo
195
I.
Reduction of the Scope of the Political Questions Doctrine
199
II.
Recognition of Procedural Guarantees in the Absence of Legislation
200
III.
Standing
202
IV.
Accion Declarative De Certeza (Declaratory Judgments) as a Direct Form of Exercise of Constitutional Review
203
V.
Sua Sponte Constitutional Review
204
VI.
Erga Omnes Effect of Judicial Decisions
205
VII.
Activist Jurisprudence
205
1.
"Educating" Congress
206
2.
Reconciling Internal Legislation with Human Rights Treaties by Means of Interpretation
207
3.
Amending Political Will and Rewriting Statutes
208
VIII.
Conclusion
211
Australia: Interpretation And Review / Cheryl Saunders
213
I.
Framework
213
1.
Authority for Review
213
2.
Jurisdiction
215
3.
Concrete Review
217
A.
Advisory Opinions
217
B.
Declarations of Incompatibility
219
4.
Standing
220
II.
Approach
223
1.
Phases
224
A.
1903-1920
224
B.
1920-1944
225
C.
1944-1981
226
D.
1981-1998
228
E.
1998 to the Present
230
2.
Legalism and Realism
231
A.
Legalism
231
B.
Realism
232
C.
Realistic Legalism
234
3.
Interpretation and Change
236
A.
An Instrument of Government
236
B.
Relevance of the Framers
238
III.
Sources
240
1.
Precedent
240
2.
Extrinsic Materials
241
3.
Foreign Law
244
4.
International Law
246
Bibliography
249
Austria: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Konrad Lachmayer
251
I.
Introduction: Constitutional Justice in Austria
251
II.
Brief Description of the Judicial Review Method Applied in Austria
252
1.
Introduction
252
2.
Access to Constitutional Justice
254
III.
Judicial Questions on Matters of Judicial Review
256
1.
Judicial Decisions on Judicial Review
256
2.
Effects of Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Matters
257
IV.
Important Developments and Decisions of the Constitutional Court
258
1.
Developing the Contents of the Fundamental Principles of the Austrian Constitution
258
2.
Concrete Guidelines for the Legislator
259
3.
Creating Constitutional Systems
261
4.
Principle of Equality
262
V.
Conclusion -- Opening Up Constitutional Potentials and Value-Based Judgments
263
Belgium: The Belgian Constitutional Court As Positive Legislator: In Search Of A Balance Between Rights Protection And Respect For Acts Of Parliament / Patricia Popelier
265
Introduction
265
I.
The Impact of the Constitutional Court on Constitutional Relations
266
II.
Legislative Omissions in the Case Law of the Constitutional Court
269
1.
Some Examples
271
2.
Two Examples
272
III.
Legal Framework
273
IV.
Consequences of the Finding That a Legislative Lacuna is Contrary to the Constitution
275
Conclusions
279
Brazil: Constitutional Courts As Negative Legislators: The Brazilian Case / Evanilda de Godoi Bustamante
283
Introductory Considerations
283
I.
The Diffuse and Incidental System of Judicial Review
285
II.
The Concentrated System of Judicial Review
289
1.
Concentrated Constitutional Jurisdiction by Direct Actions
289
A.
The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality
290
B.
The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality
292
C.
The Direct Action against Unconstitutional Omissions
293
D.
The Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental Precept
296
2.
Concentrated Constitutional Review by Concrete Claims
298
A.
Mandado de Seguranca (When Used to Contest an Act within the Legislative Procedure)
299
B.
The Writ of Injunction (Mandado de Injuncao)
300
C.
Additive Decisions and the Writ of Injunction
302
III.
Effects of the Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Matters
303
1.
Inter Partes and Erga Omnes Decisions
303
2.
Binding and Nonbinding Decisions
305
3.
The Scope of the Binding Effects of the Decisions of the Court
306
4.
Interpretative and Reductive Decisions by the Federal Supreme Court
308
5.
The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters (on Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality)
310
6.
The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters (on Diffuse Decisions on Constitutional Matters)
311
7.
Constitutional Mutations
312
IV.
Conclusion: The Idea of the Negative Legislator
312
Canada: The Canadian Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Kent Roach
315
Introduction
315
I.
Canada's System of Judicial Review
317
1.
Federalism and the Court as Negative Legislator
317
2.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
318
3.
Negative and Positive Rights
318
4.
Charter Litigation
319
5.
Reference Cases
319
6.
Constitutional Remedies
321
7.
Positive Alternatives to Judicial Invalidation: Reading In or Judicial Amendments to Legislation
322
8.
Alternatives to Immediate Invalidation: Delayed Declarations of Invalidity and Reply Legislation
324
Summary
326
II.
Canada's Experience with Courts as Positive Legislators
328
1.
Criminal Justice
328
2.
National Security
329
3.
Gay Rights
331
4.
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
333
5.
Political Policy
334
6.
Minority-Language Policy
335
7.
Social and Economic Policy
337
8.
Labor Policy
338
9.
Health-Care Policy
340
Conclusion
342
Colombia: Le Juge Constitutionnel Colombien, Legislateur-Cadre Positif: Un Gouvernement Des Juges / German Alfonso Lopez Daza
345
Introduction
345
I.
Dynamisme De La Cour Constitutionnelle Colombienne Dans Son Role De Protectrice De La Constitution De 1991
346
II.
Justice Constitutionnelle Versus Pouvoir Executif-Pouvoir Legislatif
348
III.
La Cour Constitutionnelle Colombienne-Legislateur Cadre Positif
350
1.
Sentences manipulatrices
353
2.
Sentence substitutive
353
3.
Sentences interpretatives ou conditionnees
353
4.
Sentence additive ou d'integration
354
5.
Sentence de recommandation du legislateur
355
6.
Les sentences-lois
355
7.
Les sentences a effet differe
355
IV.
Construction Theorique Du Concept "Gouvernement Des Juges"
356
Bibliographie
359
Colombia: The Colombian Constitutional Court: From Institutional Leadership To Conceptual Audacity / Sandra Morelli
363
I.
Preliminary Considerations
363
II.
Displacement in Colombia
366
1.
What Is the Unconstitutional State of Affairs?
367
III.
The Constitutional Control of Laws
378
1.
Warning
378
2.
The Control of the Constitutionality of the Acts Amending the Constitution
383
A.
The Constitutional Control Limited to the Vices of Procedure
384
B.
The Procedural Vices of the Law through Which a Constitutional Referendum Is Summoned
385
a.
The Power of the Congress of the Republic to Amend the Law Presented at the Request of a Popular Initiative
386
b.
The Violation of the Law of Benches (Bancadas)
386
Costa Rica: The Normative Resolutions of the Constitutional Court / Ruben Hernandez Valle
389
I.
Typology of Favorable Legal Review Resolutions
389
1.
Favorable Exhortative Resolutions
389
2.
Simple Unconstitutionality Resolutions
391
A.
Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Partial Nature
391
B.
Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Full Nature
391
3.
Interpretative Resolutions
392
A.
Unconstitutionality Due to Erroneous Interpretation or Misapplication of a Provision in a Specific Case
392
B.
Unconstitutionality as a Result of the Effects of the Challenged Text or Provision
394
4.
Favorable Resolutions of Inapplicability
395
5.
Normative Resolutions
395
A.
Favorable Additive Resolutions
396
B.
Favorable Substitutive Resolutions
397
II.
Critical Analysis of Normative Resolutions
401
1.
The Justification of Normative Resolutions
401
2.
Criticism of Regulatory Resolutions
402
III.
Regulatory Resolutions and the Limits to Constitutional Jurisdiction
403
Bibliography
406
Croatia: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Petar Bacic
407
I.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia: Composition, Competences, and Proceedings
407
1.
Introduction
407
2.
Composition and Terms of Duty
409
3.
Competences of the Constitutional Court
410
4.
Proceedings of the Constitutional Court
411
5.
Abstract Review
413
6.
Concrete Review
415
7.
Effects of the Constitutional Court's Decision
415
8.
Constitutional Complaint
417
9.
Other Competences
420
A.
Jurisdictional Disputes
420
B.
Impeachment of the President of the Republic
420
C.
Supervision of the Constitutionality of Programs and Activities of Political Parties
420
D.
Control of the Constitutionality and Legality of the Elections and the National Referendum and the Electoral Disputes
421
E.
Constitutional Court Procedures of Appeal
421
F.
Monitoring the Execution of Constitutionality and Legality, and Supervisory Control over Passing Regulations for Executing the Constitution, Laws, and Other Regulations
422
II.
Judicial Activism in Constitutional Review Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
423
1.
Judicial Activism versus the Legislative Branch
424
2.
Methodological Activism of the Constitutional Court -- The Interpretation and Power of the Legal Argument
428
3.
Procedural Activism - Precedence of Form over Content
431
4.
Substantial Activism - Support for Democracy and Constitutional Rights
433
III.
Conclusions on the Activism of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
440
Czech Republic: Czech Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator? / Zdenek Kuhn
445
I.
The History and the Powers of the Czech Constitutional Court
446
II.
Constitutional Complaints Against Decisions of General Courts
448
III.
Interpretative Decisions in Abstract Constitutional Review: "Soft Constitutional Review"
454
IV.
Positive Aspect of Negative Decisions of the Court
458
V.
Unconstitutional Gaps in the Legal System: Providing Constitutional Remedies or Judicial Substitution for the Legislator?
461
VI.
The Czech Constitutional Court Acting Openly as Positive Legislator - Cases of Constitutionality of Amendments to the Law
466
VII.
Court's Self-Perceptions and Conclusions
468
France: Le Conseil Constitutionnel "Legislateur Positif." Ou La Question Des Interventions Du Juge Constitutionnel Francais Dans L'Exercise De La Function Legislative / Bertrand Mathieu
471
I.
Titre Liminaire: Elements D'Analyses Sur Le Controle De Constitutionnalite En France
472
II.
Les Interactions Entre La Fonction Juridictionnelle Du Conseil Constitutionnel Et La Fonction Legislative
478
1.
Les principes cadres
478
2.
De quelques modalites d'intervention mediates du Conseil constitutionnel
479
Les incidences sur la fabrication de la loi
479
Les incidences sur les revisions constitutionnelles
479
La question de la separabilite des dispositions inconstitutionnelles
480
Les consequences tirees de l'inconstitutionnalite relevee
481
L'outil de la proportionnalite
483
III.
Analyse D'une Modalite Specifique D'intervention Du Conseil Constitutionnel: Les Reserves D'interpretation
484
1.
Elements de definition et champ d'application
484
2.
Les destinataires des reserves d'interpretation
488
3.
La portee des reserves d'interpretation: essai de typologie
489
L'exclusion d'une interpretation inconstitutionnelle: le postulat du respect de la Constitution par le legislateur
489
L'argument de la maladresse du legislateur
490
La'tentation de la reecriture
490
La'modification du champ d'application de la loi
492
La'paralyse de l'application de la loi
493
4.
Elements statistiques sommaires
494
En Guise De Conclusion
495
Germany: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Ines Hartel
497
I.
Judicial Means For Judicial Review
498
1.
Civil Rights Injunctions
498
2.
Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Statutes
499
3.
Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Legislative Omissions
500
4.
Ex Officio Powers of Constitutional Judges and of the Constitutional Court or Tribunals
501
5.
Authority of the Supreme Court of Constitutional Courts to Remove and Take Over Cases from Lower Courts (Avocamiento)
501
II.
Judicial Decisions on Judicial Review
502
1.
Constitutional Interpretation
502
2.
Declaration of the Unconstitutional Character of Statutes (Declaration of Incompatibility)
503
3.
Annulment (Complete or Partial) of Unconstitutional Statutes
506
4.
Influencing the Constitution
509
5.
Decisions Including Legislative Structures
510
6.
Additive Decisions Reforming Legislation
513
7.
Admonitory Decision
514
8.
Judicial Replacement of the Legislator
516
9.
Judicial Replacement of the Government in Policy-Making Processes
517
III.
Effects of Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Matters
518
Belgium, France, Germany: L'activite du juge constitutionnel comme legislateur-cadre positif / Christian Behrendt
521
Introduction
521
I.
La Notion D'"Interference"
525
II.
La Classification Des Interferences
527
III.
L'importance Quantitative Des Interferences
529
1.
L'importance des lignes directrices
530
2.
L'importance des injonctions
531
IV.
Le Recours A La Technique Des Interferences: Une Tentative D'evaluation
533
Conclusions
537
Greece: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Stylianos-Joannis G. Koutnatzis
539
I.
The System Of Judicial Review
540
1.
Judicial Organization
540
2.
Control of Legislative and Executive Acts
541
A.
Origins and Development of Judicial Review throughout Greece's Constitutional History
541
B.
Judicial Review under the Greek Constitution of 1975
542
a.
Constitutional Basis of Judicial Review
542
b.
Substantive and Procedural Constitutional Claims
543
c.
Primary Features of Judicial Review
544
d.
Means of Concentration of Review
546
e.
The Proposal to Establish a Constitutional Court
549
f.
Control of Conventionality
552
g.
Control of Executive Acts
553
h.
Control of Constitutional Amendments
555
II.
The Application of Judicial Review
555
1.
The Development of Constitutional Jurisprudence
556
A.
The Greek Courts' Deferential Tradition
556
B.
Phases in the Judicial Implementation of the 1975 Constitution
558
2.
Positive Legislation through Constitutional Adjudication
563
A.
Extension of Preferential Treatment in Equality Principle Cases
563
B.
The Council of State's Environmental Jurisprudence
567
a.
Constitutional Entrenchment of the Current Status of Environmental Protection
568
b.
The Principle of Sustainable Development
570
III.
Final Remarks
571
Hungary, Lorant Csink, Jozsef Petretei, and Peter Tilk, Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator
575
I.
Antecedents of Constitutional Adjudication
575
II.
The Establishment Of The Constitutional Court
576
III.
The Legal Character Of The Decisions of The Court
578
IV.
The Manifestation Of Positive Legislation
579
1.
Constitutional Requirement
579
2.
Mosaic Annulment
581
3.
Role of the Court in the Examination of Omissions
582
4.
Interpretation of the Constitution
583
India: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators: The Indian Experience / Surya Deva
587
Introduction
587
I.
Judicial Review: Constitutional Provisions And Judicial Interpretation
588
1.
Judicial Review: The Provisions
588
2.
Judicial Review: The Interpretation
591
II.
Judiciary Becoming The Legislator: Some Examples
594
1.
Guidelines for Police Arrest and Detention: D K Basu v. State of West Bengal
594
2.
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace: Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan
596
3.
Ragging Menace at Universities
598
Conclusion
600
Italy: The Italian Constitutional Court As Positive Legislator / Giampaolo Parodi
603
Bibliography
620
Mexico: The Mexican Supreme Court As Positive Legislator / Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor
623
Introduction
623
I.
The Supreme Court As A Constitutional Court
624
1.
Brief Background
624
2.
Constitutional Evolution
625
3.
Powers
625
A.
Constitutional Control
625
B.
Other Jurisdiction and Powers
627
II.
The Supreme Court As A Positive Legislator
627
1.
Amparo Proceedings (Specific Effects)
628
2.
Abstract Unconstitutionality Cause of Action against General Norms (Laws and International Treaties) and Constitutional Controversies (Erga Omnes Effect)
632
3.
Legislative Omissions
639
Conclusions
642
Netherlands: The Dutch Supreme Court: A Reluctant Positive Legislator? / Michiel L. van Emmerik
645
Introduction
645
I.
The Ban On Judicial Constitutionality Review And Its Scope
648
1.
Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution
648
2.
Summary
651
II.
Enforcing International Human Rights Law
652
1.
Introduction: Monism and Article 94 of the Constitution
652
2.
"Eligible to Bind All Persons" and Judicial Lawmaking
653
3.
The Increasing Role of the European Convention in National Case Law
656
4.
Concluding Remarks
660
III.
The Lawmaking Role Of The Courts
661
1.
Introduction
661
2.
Defining the Process of Lawmaking
662
3.
The Case Law of the Supreme Court Concerning Its Lawmaking Role
663
A.
The Dual Custody Case: Distinguishing Positive from Negative Lawmaking
664
B.
The Dutch Citizenship Case: Avoiding Policy Decision
665
C.
The Spring Decisions: Judicial Activism or Prudent Lawmaking?
667
D.
After the High-Water Mark: A Slow Retreat to Judicial Restraint
667
E.
Toward a New Model: The 1999 Labour Expenses Deduction Judgment
669
F.
The Exception to the Rule: European Union Law
673
4.
Reactions of "La Doctrine" after 1999
675
IV.
Means And Effects Of Judicial Review
678
1.
Introduction
678
2.
Procedures Available to Enforce Fundamental Rights Law
678
3.
Remedies for Fundamental Rights Violations
679
4.
Effects of Judgments
681
5.
Mitigating the Temporal Effects of Judgments
683
6.
Judicial Reforms
685
Summary
686
Bibliography
688
Norway: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Eivind Smith
693
I.
On The Origins Of The Norwegian System Of Judicial Review
693
II.
On The Character Of The Norwegian System Of Judicial Review
695
III.
The Supreme Court Of Norway As A Positive Legislator?
697
Poland: The Constitutional Courts As A Positive Legislator / Marek Safjan
701
I.
Preliminary Remarks
701
II.
What Is The Function Of The Court As A Positive Legislator?
703
III.
Indirect, Positive Impact - Effects Of Negative Legislation
703
IV.
Direct Forms Of Impact Exerted By The Constitutional Courts Versus Normative Acts
708
1.
Interpretation of the Constitution
708
2.
Interpretation of Laws: Interpretative Rulings
714
3.
Signalization
717
Conclusions
718
Portugal: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Esperanca Mealha
721
I.
Brief Description Of The Judicial Review Method Applied In Portugal
721
1.
The Preemptive Control
722
2.
The Abstract Review and the Concrete Review of Legislation
723
3.
The Enforceability and Implementation of Decisions of the Constitutional Court
723
II.
Powers Of The Constitutional Court
724
1.
Portuguese Constitutional Court as a Negative Legislator
724
2.
Powers of the Court and Effects of Constitutional Review Decisions
725
3.
Interpretation of Statute in Harmony with the Constitution
728
4.
Manipulative and Additive Decisions
729
5.
The Impact of Constitutional Case Law
730
Serbia: A Constitutional Court In Transition: Making Sense Of Constitutional Adjudication In Postauthoritarian Serbia / Bosko Tripkovic
735
Introduction
735
I.
Normative Goals of Judicial Review
736
II.
Performance of the Serbian Constitutional Court
741
1.
General Features of the System of Judicial Review
741
2.
Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Process
747
A.
Representation
747
B.
Deliberation
753
3.
Constitutional Court and Liberal Values
757
A.
Direct Protection of Liberal Values
758
B.
Indirect Protection of Liberal Values
762
Conclusion
764
Slovak Republic: Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic as Positive Legislator via Application and Interpretation of the Constitution / Lucia Berdisova
761
I.
Interpretation of the Constitution
769
II.
Abstract Control of Constitutionality
771
1.
Effect of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court regarding the Unconformity Between Legal Regulations
773
III.
Concrete Control of Constitutionality
775
Switzerland: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators / Tobias Jaag
783
I.
Introduction
783
1.
Courts as Legislators in General
783
2.
The Federal Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court
784
A.
Judicial Review in General
784
B.
Limitations on Judicial Review
785
3.
The Federal Supreme Court as Legislator
786
A.
Negative Legislation
786
B.
Positive Legislation
788
4.
Federal and Cantonal Law
788
II.
Refusal of the Federal Supreme Court to Act as Positive Legislator
789
1.
Principle
789
2.
Examples
789
III.
The Federal Supreme Court as Positive Legislator
791
1.
In General
791
2.
Fundamental Rights
791
A.
New Fundamental Rights
791
B.
Interpretation and Substantiation of Fundamental Rights
793
3.
Political Rights
793
4.
Procedural Guarantees
795
5.
Federal Conflicts
796
6.
Compensation for Infringement of Property Rights
797
7.
Further Examples
798
Conclusions
798
Bibliography
800
Abbreviations
802
United Kingdom: Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators / John Bell
803
Introduction and Terminology
803
I.
Constitutional (Judicial) Review, Concentrated Or Distributed
806
II.
Specific Issues
807
1.
Constitutional Review Procedures
807
2.
Judicial Decisions
808
A.
Human Rights and Judicial Activism
809
B.
Judicial Substitution
811
3.
Effect of Decisions
813
United States of America: Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators in the United States / Richard S. Kay
815
I.
Legislators and Positive Legislators
815
II.
How American Courts Legislate Through Constitutional Adjudication
820
III.
Enforcing Judicial Legislation
829
Venezuela: Constitutional Courts As Positive Legislators: The Venezuelan Experience / Daniela Urosa Maggi
843
I.
The Normative Jurisdiction According to the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber
846
II.
Cases Where the Constitutional Chamber Has Extended Its Own Competencies Through the Practicing of the Normative Jurisdiction
847
1.
Competencies in Constitutional Amparo Matters
848
A.
Modification of the Competencies to Hear the Amparo Claims
849
B.
Modification of the Procedure of the Constitutional Amparo Claim
849
2.
Competencies in the Special Recourse to Review Decisions
850
3.
Competencies to Hear the Interpretation of the Constitution Recourse
852
4.
Competencies in Matters of Concentrated Control of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Other Acts Having Rank of Law
855
A.
Jurisprudential Inclusion of the Competency of Incidental Control over Statutes
855
B.
Modification of the Procedure of the Nullity Cases
857
5.
Competencies in Matters of Control over Unconstitutionality for Omission
858
6.
Competency in Matters of Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests
859
A.
Creation of a Claim for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests
859
B.
Procedure to Be Followed and Legitimacy in Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests
860
7.
Competencies in Matters of habeas Data
860
III.
Cases of Judicial Activism on Matters of Constitutional Interpretation: The Constitutional Chamber as Positive Constituent
862
1.
Decisions No. 6 of January 27, 2000 (case Milagros Gomez et al) and No. 180 of March 28, 2000 (case Allan Brewer-Carias et al.): Legitimization of the Constitutional Transition Regime Approved by the National Constituent Assembly on December 1999 and Legitimization of the Acts Performed by Such Assembly in the Execution of Such Transition [ect.]
863
2.
Decision No. 34 of January 26, 2004 (case Vestalia Araujo): Interpretation of Article 203 of the Constitution
864
3.
Decision No. 565 of April 15, 2008 (case Attorney General of the Republic): Interpretation of Article 164.10, of the 1999 Constitution
865
IV.
Precedents of the Constitutional Chamber in Which It Acted as Positive Legislator For Adding to the Legal System Regulatory Principles That Did Not Exist Before
867
1.
Decision No. 1013 of June 12, 2001 (case Elias Santana): Interpretation and Limitation of Rights Related to Freedom of Expression and Right to Rebuttal
867
2.
Decision No. 978 of April 30, 2003 (case Bolivar Banco): Resolution of the Method and Opportunity for Exercising the State Tax Authority on Tax Stamp Matters Pending the Issuing of the Relevant National Legislation
868
3.
Decision No. 511 of April 5, 2004 (case Maira Rincon Lugo): Decision on the Taking over Proceeding of Cases from Lower Courts (Avocamiento), Having Binding Nature for All Other Courts of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice
869
4.
Decision No. 1682 of July 15, 2005 (case Carmela Manpieri): Interpretation of Article 77 of the Constitution - Comparison between Men and Women De Facto and Men and Women Marriage - and the Praetorian Development of Its Legal Regime
870
5.
Decision No. 1456 of July 27, 2006 (case Yamilex Nunez de Godoy) and the Praetorian Development of the Legal Regime of Assisted Reproduction
871
V.
Precedents of the Constitutional Court That Acts as Positive Legislator to Modify Preexisting Laws
872
1.
Decisions That Modify Legal Rules through Substitutive Decisions on No Prior Declaration of Annulment of the Rule
872
A.
Decision No. 2855 of November 20, 2002 (case Fedenaga): Constitutionality of Articles 40 and 43 of the Decree with Force of Law on Rural Lands and Agrarian Development
873
B.
Decision No. 2560 of August 5, 2005 (case Romulo Pacheco): Modification of Article 172 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure
874
C.
Decision No. 301 of February 27, 2007 (case Adriana Vigilanza): Modification of the Sense and Scope of Article 31 of the Income Tax Law
875
2.
Decisions of the Constitutional Chamber That Annulled and Established the New Wording of Legal Provisions
877
A.
Decision no. 80 of February 1, 2001 (Case of Procedural Terms): Modification of Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code Regarding the Calculation of Procedural Terms
877
B.
Decision No. 1264 of June 11, 2002 (case Jesus Rendon): Partial Annulment of Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Code That Governs Judicial Holidays
878
C.
Decision No. 2241 of September 24, 2002 (case Andres Velazquez): Partial Annulment of Article 80 of the Organic Law on the Financial Administration of the Public Sector
879
D.
Decision No. 3241 of December 12, 2002 (case COVEIN): Partial Annulment of Article 1 of the Ordinance on the Industry and Commerce License Tax of the Bolivar Municipality of the Anzoategui State
880
E.
Decision No. 865 of April 22, 2003 (case Ernesto Jose Rodriguez Casares): Annulment of Article 48 of the Ordinance on Urban and Rural Common and Personal Lands for the Bolivar District of the Zulia State
881
F.
Decision No. 1104 of May 23, 2006 (case Carlos Brender): Partial Annulment of Article 90 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General of the Republic
882
G.
Decision No. 163 of February 28, 2008 (case Ciro Ramon Araujo): Partial Annulment of the Organic Law of Public Defense
883
a.
Partial Annulment and Modification of the Text of Article 3 of the Organic Law of Public Defense
883
b.
Partial Annulment and Modification of Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the Organic Law of Public Defense
883
c.
Partial Annulment and Modification of Article 15 of the Organic Law of Public Defense
884
VI.
Brief Conclusions Regarding The Unconstitutionality of the Exercise of the Normative Powers by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Chamber of Justice
885
pt. THREE
SYNTHESIS REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
889
Preliminary Remarks
889
1.
The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution
889
2.
New Role of Constitutional Courts and the Question of Acting as Positive Legislators
891
First Trend
Constitutional Courts Interfering With the Constituent Power
893
1.
Constitutional Courts Resolving Constitutional Federal Disputes and Enacting Constitutional Rules
893
2.
Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Provisions
894
3.
Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Reforms and Amendments
894
4.
The Role of Constitutional Courts Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights
896
5.
The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters
897
Second Trend
Constitutional Courts Interfering With Existing Legislation
899
1.
Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interpreting Statutes in Harmony with the Constitution
899
2.
Constitutional Courts Complementing the Legislator by Adding New Rules (and a New Meaning) to the Existing Legislative Provision
900
3.
Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interfering with the Temporal Effects of Legislation
902
A.
The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effect: Postponing the Effect of the Courts' Ruling
903
B.
The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects: The Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of Their Own Decisions
904
a.
The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tune Effects of Declarative Decisions
905
b.
The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nunc Constitutive Decisions
906
4.
The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation
907
Third Trend
Constitutional Courts Interfering with the Absence of Legislation Or with Legislative Omissions
907
1.
Constitutional Courts Filling in Absolute Legislative Omissions
907
A.
The Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions
908
B.
The Protection of Fundamental Rights from Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection
909
2.
Constitutional Courts Filling in the Gap of Relative Legislative Omissions
912
A.
Constitutional Courts' Issuing of Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator
913
B.
Constitutional Courts' Issuing of Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator
914
3.
Constitutional Courts as Provisional Legislators
915
Fourth Trend
Constitutional Courts As Legislators on Matters of Judicial Review
917
1.
Constitutional Courts' Creating of Their Own Judicial Review Powers
917
A.
The Judge-made Law on the Diffuse System of Judicial Review
917
B.
The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights
918
2.
The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation
919
3.
Constitutional Courts' Creation of Procedural Rules on Judicial Review
920
Final Remarks
921
Appendix
925
Index
929