The new financial deal : understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (unintended) consequences / David Skeel.
2011
KF969.58201 .S53 2011 (Map It)
On loan from Cellar, due 12. May 2023
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Author
Title
The new financial deal : understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (unintended) consequences / David Skeel.
Published
Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
KF969.58201 .S53 2011
ISBN
9780470942758 (hardback)
0470942754 (hardback)
9781118014905 (ebk)
1118014901 (ebk)
9781118014912 (ebk)
111801491X (ebk)
9781118014929 (ebk)
1118014928 (ebk)
0470942754 (hardback)
9781118014905 (ebk)
1118014901 (ebk)
9781118014912 (ebk)
111801491X (ebk)
9781118014929 (ebk)
1118014928 (ebk)
Description
xix, 220 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)670324820
Summary
"What can we expect from our era's New Deal? To answer this question, The New Financial Deal will begin with an inside account of the legislative process, then outline and access its key components: the new framework for regulating derivatives, the regulation of banking and systemic risk, and the new resolution regime. It will explain the implications of the new framework, and propose correctives that would better align its ostensible objectives--such as preventing future bailouts--with the new regulatory structure. The legislation's key theme is government partnership with and regulation of large concentrated institutions in order to reduce their risk and manage their failure. In place of the decentralized pre-crisis regulation of derivatives, the new legislation will require that most derivatives be cleared through a clearing house and traded on exchanges. The stability of the derivatives market will therefore depend on a small number of potentially enormous clearing houses. For large financial institutions that encounter financial distress, the legislation gives bank regulators sweeping new authority to step in and take over the institution. Regulators, rather than negotiations among the parties themselves, will determine the outcomes. These epochal reforms are posed to change Wall Street forever, but whether they help to regulate supermarket banks or create even more moral hazard is worthy of serious debate."-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 205-210) and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Gift

The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
Foreword
ix
Introduction
xi
A Few Major Characters
xv
ch. 1
The Corporatist Turn in American Regulation
1
The Path to Enactment
3
The Two Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act
4
A Brief Tour of Other Reforms
6
Two Themes That Emerge
8
Fannie Mae Effect
11
Covering Their Tracks
12
Is There Anything to Like?
14
pt. I
Relearning the Financial Crisis
ch. 2
The Lehman Myth
19
The Stock Narrative
20
Lehman in Context
23
Lehman's Road to Bankruptcy
26
Lehman in Bankruptcy
29
Bear Stearns Counterfactual
31
Road to Chrysler
33
Chrysler Bankruptcy
35
General Motors "Sale"
38
From Myths to Legislative Reality
39
pt. II
The 2010 Financial Reforms
ch. 3
Geithner, Dodd, Frank, and the Legislative Grinder
43
The Players
44
TARP and the Housing Crisis
47
Road to an East Room Signing
49
Channeling Brandeis: The Volcker Rule
54
The Goldman Moment
56
ch. 4
Derivatives Reform: Clearinghouses and the Plain-Vanilla Derivative
59
Basic Framework
61
Derivatives and the New Finance
63
The Stout Alternative
66
New Clearinghouses and Exchanges
68
Regulatory Dilemmas of Clearinghouses
69
Disclosure and Data Collection
74
Making It Work?
75
ch. 5
Banking Reform: Breaking Up Was Too Hard to Do
77
Basic Framework
78
New Designator and Designatees
79
Will the New Capital Standards Work?
82
Contingent Capital Alternative
84
Volcker Rule
85
What Do the Brandeisian Concessions Mean?
91
Office of Minority and Women Inclusion
93
Institutionalizing the Government-Bank Partnership
94
A Happier Story?
95
Repo Land Mine
96
ch. 6
Unsafe at Any Rate
99
Basic Framework
100
Who is Elizabeth Warren?
102
Toasters and Credit Cards
105
The New Consumer Bureau
106
Mortgage Broker and Securitization Rules
109
Consequences: What to Expect from the New Bureau
111
What it Means for the Government-Bank Partnership
114
ch. 7
Banking on the FDIC (Resolution Authority I)
117
Does the FDIC Play the Same Role in Both Regimes?
118
How (and How Well) Does FDIC Resolution Work?
122
Moving Beyond the FDIC Analogy
126
ch. 8
Bailouts, Bankruptcy, or Better? (Resolution Authority II)
129
Basic Framework
130
The Trouble with Bailouts
132
Who Will Invoke Dodd-Frank Resolution, and When?
135
Triggering the New Framework
137
Controlling Systemic Risk
142
Third Objective: Haircuts
145
All Liquidation, All the Time?
148
pt. III
The Future
ch. 9
Essential Fixes and the New Financial Order
155
What Works and What Doesn't
156
Staying Derivatives in Bankruptcy
158
ISDA and Its Discontent
163
Other Bankruptcy Reforms for Financial Institutions
168
Plugging the Chrysler Hole in Bankruptcy
170
Bankruptcy to the Rescue
173
ch. 10
An International Solution?
175
Basic Framework
176
Problems of Cross-Border Cases
177
Scholarly Silver Bullets
181
Dodd-Frank's Contribution to Cross-Border Issues
182
New Living Wills
185
A Simple Treaty Might Do
186
Risk of a Clearinghouse Crisis
188
Reinvigorating the Rule of Law
189
Conclusion
191
Notes
195
Bibliography
205
Acknowledgments
211
About the Author
212
Index
213