Corporate finance law : principles and policy / Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne.
2011
KD2094 .G85 2011 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Corporate finance law : principles and policy / Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne.
Published
Oxford ; Portland, Or. : Hart Pub., 2011.
Call Number
KD2094 .G85 2011
ISBN
9781849460040 (pbk.)
1849460043 (pbk.)
1849460043 (pbk.)
Description
lxvi, 719 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)630453198
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Added Author
Table of Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements
v
Table of Cases
xvii
Table of Legislation
xxxv
Table of Conventions, Treaties, etc
lxxii
1.
Introduction
1
2.
Overview of Financing Options
8
2.1.
Introduction
8
2.2.
Equity Financing
8
2.2.1.
Different Types of Shares
10
2.2.1.1.
Ordinary Shares
11
2.2.1.2.
Preference Shares
13
2.2.2.
Sources of Equity Finance
14
2.3.
Debt Financing
19
2.3.1.
General
20
2.3.1.1.
Choice of Debt Financing Transaction
20
2.3.1.2.
Protection of Creditors: Contractual and Proprietary
22
2.3.1.3.
Protection of Creditors: Regulation
24
2.3.1.4.
Multiple Lenders and Transfer of Debt
26
2.3.2.
Loans
27
2.3.3.
Debt Securities
30
2.3.3.1.
General
30
2.3.3.2.
Securities Versus Loan
31
2.3.3.3.
Who Issues Bonds?
32
2.3.3.4.
Debt Securities Versus Equity
33
2.3.3.5.
Varieties of Bonds
33
2.3.4.
Finance Based on Assets
36
2.3.4.1.
Receivables Financing
37
2.3.4.2.
Asset-based Lending
38
2.3.4.3.
Devices Based on Retention of Title
39
2.3.4.3.1.
Sale and Leaseback
40
2.3.4.3.2.
Asset Finance
40
2.3.4.3.3.
Stock Finance
42
2.3.4.3.4.
Sales on Retention of Title Terms
42
2.3.5.
Specialised Forms of Finance
43
2.3.5.1.
Project Finance
43
2.3.5.2.
Financing of Group Companies
43
2.3.5.3.
Trade Finance
44
2.4.
Hybrids
44
2.5.
Retained Profits
47
2.6.
The Debt/Equity Mix
50
2.7.
Conclusion
53
3.
The Relationship between Equity and Debt
54
3.1.
Introduction
54
3.2.
The Relationship between Equity and Debt in a Solvent Company
56
3.2.1.
The Position of Shareholders in a Solvent Company
57
3.2.1.1.
Ordinary Shares
57
3.2.1.2.
Preference Shares
59
3.2.1.3.
The Role of Shareholders in a Solvent Company
63
3.2.1.3.1.
Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006
63
3.2.1.3.2.
Explaining the Pre-eminence of Shareholders
64
3.2.1.3.3.
The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders
71
3.2.2.
The Position of the Creditors in a Solvent Company
73
3.2.2.1.
Non-adjusting Creditors
74
3.2.2.2.
The Risks to Creditors from the Operation of a Solvent Company
76
3.2.2.3.
Restrictions on the Company's Activities
78
3.2.2.4.
The Corporate Governance Role of Debt
80
3.3.
The Relationship between Debt and Equity in an Insolvent Company
88
3.3.1.
The Order of Payment Out on a Winding Up or Distribution by an Administrator
89
3.3.1.1.
The Holders of Proprietary Claims
91
3.3.1.2.
The Order of Priority in Relation to Floating Charge Assets
92
3.3.1.2.1.
Liquidator's or Administrator's Expenses
93
3.3.1.2.2.
Preferential Creditors
94
3.3.1.2.3.
The Prescribed Part
95
3.3.1.2.4.
General Unsecured Creditors
95
3.3.1.2.5.
The Shareholders
95
3.3.2.
Preservation of the Assets for Creditors on and during the Run-up to Insolvency
98
3.3.2.1.
Preventing Reduction of the Asset Pool
99
3.3.2.2.
Preventing Uneven Distribution of the Assets
103
3.3.2.3.
Protection of Creditors
105
3.3.3.
The Balance between Creditors and Shareholders in an Insolvent Company
105
3.3.3.1.
Lifting the Veil between the Creditors and the Shareholders
107
3.4.
Conclusion
113
4.
Legal Capital
115
4.1.
Introduction
115
4.2.
The Function of the Legal Capital Rules
115
4.3.
The Legal Capital Rules in the UK
119
4.3.1.
The Raising of Capital
120
4.3.2.
The Minimum Capital Rules
125
4.3.2.1.
The Entry Price for Limited Liability
125
4.3.2.2.
The Measurement of Consideration
125
4.3.2.3.
The Efficacy of these Rules as a Form of Shareholder Protection
127
4.3.2.4.
The Efficacy of these Rules as a Form of Creditor Protection
127
4.4.
Maintenance of Capital
132
4.4.1.
Dividend Payments
133
4.4.2.
Repurchases and Redemptions of Shares
133
4.4.3.
Reductions of Capital
135
4.4.4.
The Prohibition Against Financial Assistance
137
4.4.5.
The Efficacy of these Rules as a Form of Creditor Protection
138
4.5.
Alternatives to the Legal Capital Rules
141
4.5.1.
Creditor Protection via Contract
141
4.5.2.
Creditor Protection via Insolvency Law
142
4.5.3.
The Solvency Statement Approach
145
4.6.
Conclusion
153
5.
Creditor Protection: Contractual
154
5.1.
Introduction
154
5.2.
Contractual Rights Against the Borrower
155
5.2.1.
Restrictions on the Borrower's Activities
156
5.2.1.1.
The Negative Pledge Clause
159
5.2.1.2.
Forms of Negative Pledge Clause
161
5.2.1.3.
Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants
161
5.2.2.
Rights to Information and Financial Covenants
165
5.2.2.1.
Rights at the Time of Making the Loan
165
5.2.2.2.
Ongoing Rights
168
5.2.3.
Termination and Acceleration Rights
170
5.2.3.1.
Events of Default
172
5.2.3.2.
Effect of Wrongful Acceleration
172
5.2.3.3.
Validity of Acceleration Clauses
173
5.2.4.
Set-off
175
5.2.4.1.
Use of Set-off and Flawed Asset Structures in Lending
176
5.2.4.2.
Independent Set-off
177
5.2.4.3.
Transaction Set-off
178
5.2.4.4.
Banker's Right to Combine Accounts
179
5.2.4.5.
Contractual Set-off and Exclusion of Set-off
180
5.2.4.6.
Insolvency Set-off
183
5.2.4.6.1.
The Limits and Operation of Insolvency Set-off
183
5.2.4.6.2.
The Mandatory and Exclusive Nature of Insolvency Set-off
184
5.2.4.6.3.
Policy Justifications for Insolvency Set-off
187
5.3.
Contractual Rights Against Third Parties
190
5.3.1.
Guarantees, Indemnities and Performance Bonds
192
5.3.1.1.
Introduction
192
5.3.1.2.
Important Distinctions
192
5.3.1.3.
Guarantees
194
5.3.1.3.1.
Protection of the Third Party: Construction of the Guarantee
194
5.3.1.3.2.
Protection of the Third Party: Discharge of the Third Party
195
5.3.1.3.3.
Protection of the Third Party: Third Party's Rights against the Principal Debtor
197
5.3.1.4.
Indemnity and Performance Bond
198
5.3.1.4.1.
Nature of Third Party's Liability
198
5.3.2.
Credit Insurance
201
5.3.3.
Credit Default Swaps
202
5.3.4.
Subordination
209
5.3.4.1.
Types of Subordination
210
5.3.4.1.1.
Turnover Trust
211
5.3.4.1.2.
Contingent Debt
215
5.3.4.1.3.
Contractual Subordination
215
5.3.4.1.4.
Structural Subordination
217
5.4.
Conclusion
217
6.
Creditor Protection: Proprietary
219
6.1.
Introduction
219
6.1.1.
Purpose of Obtaining Proprietary Rights
220
6.1.2.
Absolute Interests
221
6.1.3.
Distinctions in Relation to a Company's Assets
222
6.2.
Absolute and Security Interests
225
6.2.1.
What is a Security Interest?
225
6.2.2.
The Characterisation of Interests as Absolute or Security Interests
227
6.2.3.
Reasons for Choosing a Structure based on an Absolute or a Security Interest
229
6.2.4.
Policy Considerations
230
6.2.5.
The Detailed Process of Characterisation
232
6.2.5.1.
Grant and Grant-back
232
6.2.5.2.
Grant
233
6.2.5.3.
Retention of Title
234
6.2.5.4.
Quistclose Trusts
235
6.3.
Types of Security Interests
236
6.3.1.
Introduction
236
6.3.2.
Non-possessory Security Interests
237
6.3.2.1.
Security over Future Property
237
6.3.2.2.
Mortgage
240
6.3.2.3.
Charge
241
6.3.2.4.
Security Interest over Lender's own Indebtedness
242
6.3.3.
The Floating Charge
242
6.3.3.1.
Introduction
242
6.3.3.2.
Crystallisation
243
6.3.3.3.
The Distinction between Fixed and Floating Charges
249
6.3.3.3.1.
Introduction
249
6.3.3.3.2.
The Defining Features of a Fixed Charge and a Floating Charge
249
6.3.3.3.3.
The Methodology of Characterising a Charge as Fixed or Floating
256
6.3.3.3.4.
Should Floating Charges be Treated Differently?
257
6.3.3.4.
The Future of the Floating Charge
260
6.4.
Registration and Priorities
261
6.4.1.
The Requirement of Registration
261
6.4.1.1.
Charges over Securities
262
6.4.1.2.
Other Fixed Charges which are Not Registrable
267
6.4.1.3.
Other Registers
267
6.4.2.
The Registration Process
268
6.4.3.
The Effect of Registration
268
6.4.3.1.
Consequences of Failure to Register
268
6.4.3.2.
Registration as Notice
270
6.4.4.
Priorities
272
6.5.
Enforcement
279
6.5.1.
Methods of Enforcement: Security Interests
282
6.5.1.1.
Foreclosure
282
6.5.1.2.
Appropriation of Financial Collateral
282
6.5.1.3.
Possession and Sale
283
6.5.1.4.
Appointment of a Receiver
284
6.5.2.
Methods of Enforcement: Absolute Interests
287
6.5.2.1.
Devices Based on Retention of Title
287
6.5.2.2.
Devices based on the Grant of an Absolute Interest
290
6.5.3.
The Effect of Administration
290
6.6.
Economic Arguments about Secured Credit
292
6.6.1.
Means of Assessing a System of Secured Credit
293
6.6.2.
The Puzzle of Secured Credit
294
6.6.2.1.
Monitoring
294
6.6.2.2.
Signalling
296
6.6.2.3.
Non-adjusting Creditors
296
6.7.
Reform
301
6.7.1.
Attributes of an Ideal Law
301
6.7.2.
Unsatisfactory Aspects of English Law
302
6.7.3.
Options for Reform
303
6.7.4.
Outline of Notice Filing Scheme
304
6.7.4.1.
Functional Approach
304
6.7.4.2.
Registration
306
6.7.4.3.
Priorities
307
6.7.4.4.
Enforcement
309
6.7.5.
Assessment of Reform
309
7.
Multiple Lenders
313
7.1.
Introduction
313
7.2.
Basic Concepts
315
7.2.1.
Trust
315
7.2.2.
Agency
323
7.3.
Issue of Debt Securities
323
7.3.1.
Attracting Lenders
324
7.3.2.
Structure of Securities Issue
327
7.3.2.1.
Difference Between Bonds and Stock
327
7.3.2.2.
Stock
329
7.3.2.2.1.
Debt Owed to a Trustee
329
7.3.2.2.2.
Debt Contained in a Deed Poll
330
7.3.2.3.
Eurobonds
330
7.3.2.3.1.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Trustee Structure
331
7.3.2.3.2.
Subject Matter of the Trust
334
7.3.2.3.3.
Bond Issue Without Trustee
339
7.3.3.
Ascertaining the Views of Holders
340
7.3.4.
Trustees' Obligations
343
7.3.5.
Excluding Trustees' Duties
350
7.4.
Syndicated loans
356
7.4.1.
Comparison between Agency in Syndicated Loans and Trustee in Bond Issues
356
7.4.2.
Finding Lenders
358
7.4.3.
The Role of the Arranger
359
7.4.4.
Liability of the Agent Bank in Relation to False Statements in the Information Memorandum
361
7.4.5.
The Position of the Agent Bank
364
7.4.6.
Majority Lenders
365
7.5.
Conclusion
366
8.
Transferred Debt
367
8.1.
Why is Debt Transferred?
367
8.2.
Methods of Transfer
370
8.2.1.
Novation
370
8.2.2.
Assignment
373
8.2.2.1.
Statutory and Equitable Assignments
374
8.2.2.2.
Clauses Prohibiting Assignment
378
8.2.2.3.
Reform
388
8.2.3.
Negotiable Instruments
389
8.2.4.
Transfer of Stock
390
8.2.5.
Transfer of Intermediated Securities
392
8.2.6.
Transfers via CREST
395
8.2.7.
Transfers of Shares
397
8.3.
Structures which have a Similar Effect to Transfer
400
8.3.1.
Sub-participation
400
8.3.2.
Credit Derivatives
403
8.3.3.
Securitisation
403
8.4.
Conclusion
406
9.
Public Offers of Shares
407
9.1.
Introduction
407
9.2.
Why would a Company Consider an IPO?
407
9.2.1.
The Advantages of an Offer of Shares to the Public
407
9.2.2.
The Disadvantages of a Public Offer
410
9.2.3.
Summary
415
9.3.
The Theory of Regulation of Public Offers
416
9.3.1.
Objectives of Regulation
416
9.3.2.
The Need for Regulation
417
9.3.3.
Regulatory Strategies
419
9.3.3.1.
Trusteeship
419
9.3.3.2.
Affiliation Strategies
420
9.3.3.3.
Mandatory Disclosure
421
9.4.
The Regulation of Public Offers in the UK: Ex Ante Protection via Mandatory Disclosure
423
9.4.1.
Regulatory Structure
423
9.4.2.
Mandatory Disclosure in the UK
425
9.5.
The Regulation of Public Offers in the UK: Enforcement of the Mandatory Disclosure Regime
429
9.5.1.
The Aims of Enforcement
430
9.5.1.1.
Encouraging the Accurate and Timely Disclosure of Information
430
9.5.1.2.
Providing Compensation to Those Who Suffer Loss
433
9.5.2.
Private Enforcement: Civil Liability for Defective Prospectuses
434
9.5.2.1.
The Nature of the Claim under Section 90 FSMA
435
9.5.2.2.
Who Can Claim?
438
9.5.2.3.
Who Can Be Sued?
440
9.5.2.4.
Remedy
441
9.5.2.5.
Summary
444
9.5.3.
Public Enforcement
444
9.5.3.1.
Criminal Sanctions
445
9.5.3.2.
Administrative Sanctions
445
9.5.3.3.
Summary
446
9.5.4.
Intensity of Enforcement
446
9.6.
Conclusion
452
10.
Ongoing Regulation of the Capital Markets
454
10.1.
Introduction
454
10.2.
The Objectives of Ongoing Capital Market Regulation
454
10.2.1.
Promoting an Efficient Market Price
455
10.2.1.1.
Efficient Capital Markets Theory
455
10.2.1.2.
Regulation of the Ongoing Market: The Role of Mandatory Disclosure
457
10.2.1.3.
Regulation of the Ongoing Market: The Role of Market Abuse
459
10.2.2.
Promoting Corporate Governance
464
10.2.2.1.
Private Investors
468
10.2.2.2.
Institutional investors
470
10.2.2.3.
Summary
474
10.3.
The Use of Mandatory Disclosure
475
10.3.1.
Periodic Disclosures
476
10.3.1.1.
Annual Reports
476
10.3.1.2.
Half Yearly and Quarterly Reporting
481
10.3.1.3.
The Function of Periodic Disclosures
482
10.3.2.
Ad hoc Disclosures
483
10.3.2.1.
Inside Information
483
10.3.2.2.
Disclosure of Directors' Shareholdings
484
10.3.2.3.
Disclosure of Major Shareholdings
485
10.3.2.4.
Disclosures Required by the Listing Rules
488
10.3.2.5.
The Function of Ad Hoc Disclosures
489
10.4.
Enforcement of the Mandatory Disclosure Obligations
491
10.4.1.
Private Enforcement
491
10.4.1.1.
Enforcement by Shareholders of Misstatements in Governance-based Disclosures
492
10.4.1.2.
Enforcement by Shareholders and Other Investors of Investor-focused Disclosures
494
10.4.1.2.1.
Background
494
10.4.1.2.2.
Scope of the Section 90A FSMA Provisions
497
10.4.1.2.3.
A Comparison of Section 90A FSMA (Liability in Relation to Ongoing Disclosures) and section 90 FSMA (Liability for Misstatements in Prospectuses)
500
10.4.1.2.4.
Assessment of section 90A
502
10.4.1.3.
Summary of Private Enforcement Mechanisms
503
10.4.2.
Public Enforcement
504
10.4.2.1.
The FSA
504
10.4.2.2.
The Financial Reporting Review Panel
506
10.5.
The Regulation of Market Abuse
507
10.5.1.
Private Enforcement of Market Abuse
508
10.5.2.
Public Enforcement of Market Abuse
511
10.5.2.1.
The Criminal Offence of Insider Dealing under the Criminal Justice Act 1993
511
10.5.2.1.1.
Definition of an Insider
512
10.5.2.1.2.
Definition of Inside Information
512
10.5.2.1.3.
The Offence of Actual Dealing in Securities
514
10.5.2.1.4.
The Offence of Encouraging another Person to Deal
515
10.5.2.1.5.
The Offence of Disclosing Inside Information to Another Person
515
10.5.2.1.6.
Penalties and Enforcement
515
10.5.2.2.
The Criminal Offence of Market Manipulation under Section 397 FSMA
517
10.5.2.2.1.
Misleading Statements and Dishonest Concealment
518
10.5.2.2.2.
Misleading Practices and Conduct
519
10.5.2.2.3.
Penalties and Enforcement
520
10.5.2.3.
The Regulatory Offence of Market Abuse under Section 118 FSMA
521
10.5.2.3.1.
Insider Dealing
522
10.5.2.3.2.
Market Manipulation
525
10.5.2.3.3.
Levels of Enforcement of Market Abuse under Section 118
528
10.6.
Conclusion
530
11.
Regulation of Debt
532
11.1.
Introduction
532
11.2.
Regulation of Initial Issue of Debt Securities
537
11.2.1.
Introduction
537
11.2.1.1.
To whom the securities are offered
538
11.2.1.2.
Trading on a Market
540
11.2.1.3.
Denomination of Securities
541
11.2.2.
The Regulatory Regime in Outline
541
11.2.3.
Information Required in a PD Prospectus
543
11.2.4.
Disclosure Required for Listing on the PSM
545
11.2.5.
Disclosure Requirements Where Securities are Not Listed
546
11.2.6.
Restrictions on Financial Promotion
546
11.2.7.
Enforcement of the Mandatory Disclosure Regime
548
11.2.7.1.
Claims Against the Issuer
548
11.2.7.2.
Claims Against Other Parties
549
11.2.8.
Comparison of Protection by Regulation for Holders of Debt Securities and Those Making Loans: Disclosure at the Initial Stage
550
11.3.
Ongoing Regulation by Disclosure
552
11.3.1.
Mandatory Ongoing Disclosure
552
11.3.2.
Enforcement of Ongoing Disclosure Requirements
554
11.3.3.
Comparison of Protection by Regulation for Holders of Debt Securities and Those Making Loans: Ongoing Disclosure
554
11.4.
Regulation of Market Abuse
555
11.4.1.
Application of the Market Abuse Rules to the Debt Securities Markets
555
11.4.2.
Application of the Market Abuse Rules to the Making and Transfer of Loans
556
11.5.
Accepting Deposits
557
11.6.
Convertible Debt Securities
558
11.7.
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
559
11.8.
Conclusion
561
12.
Takeovers
563
12.1.
Introduction
563
12.1.1.
The Objectives of Takeover Regulation
564
12.1.2.
Comparative Aspects
566
12.2.
The Regulatory Structure of Takeover Regulation in the UK
567
12.2.1.
Historical Development
568
12.2.2.
The Implementation of the Takeover Directive
571
12.2.3.
Role and Status of the Takeover Panel
571
12.2.4.
Tactical Litigation
574
12.2.5.
Summary
576
12.3.
The Substance of Takeover Regulation in the UK
576
12.3.1.
The Procedure of a Bid
577
12.3.1.1.
Initial Approach
577
12.3.1.2.
Formal Offer
577
12.3.1.3.
Squeeze-out
580
12.3.1.4.
Sell-out
581
12.3.1.5.
Further Offers
582
12.3.2.
The Relationship Between the Target Directors and the Target Shareholders
583
12.3.2.1.
Pre-bid Defences
584
12.3.2.1.1.
Directors' Duties
585
12.3.2.1.2.
Share Transfer Restrictions
589
12.3.2.1.3.
Removal of Directors and Staggered Boards
589
12.3.2.1.4.
The Role of Shareholders, Particularly Institutional Investors
590
12.3.2.1.5.
Summary
592
12.3.2.2.
Post-bid Defences
592
12.3.2.2.1.
The No Frustration Principle
592
12.3.2.2.2.
Consequences of the UK's Adoption of the No Frustration Principle
597
12.3.3.
The Relationship Between the Target Directors and Other Stakeholders in the Target
601
12.3.4.
The Relationship between the Bidder and the Target Shareholders
605
12.3.4.1.
Undistorted Choice
606
12.3.4.2.
Protection of Minority Shareholders
611
12.3.4.2.1.
Prevention of Oppression
612
12.3.4.2.2.
An Exit Right
614
12.3.5.
The Relationship Between the Bidder Directors and Bidder Shareholders
616
12.4.
Conclusion
617
13.
Schemes of Arrangement
619
13.1.
Introduction
619
13.2.
Uses of Schemes of Arrangement
620
13.2.1.
As an Alternative to a Takeover
620
13.2.2.
To Effect a Merger
624
13.2.3.
To Effect an Arrangement Between the Company and its Shareholders
627
13.2.4.
To Effect an Arrangement between the Company and its Creditors
629
13.2.4.1.
Arrangements with Creditors Involving Solvent Companies
631
13.2.4.2.
Arrangements with Creditors Involving Financially Distressed Companies
632
13.2.5.
Summary
636
13.3.
The Mechanics of a Scheme of Arrangement
636
13.3.1.
Application to the Court for Meetings to be Summoned
637
13.3.2.
Meeting(s) of the Members or Creditors
639
13.3.2.1.
Who Needs to Consider the Scheme?
639
13.3.2.2.
Separate Class Meetings: General
640
13.3.2.3.
Separate Meetings for Shareholders
641
13.3.2.4.
Separate Meetings for Creditors
643
13.3.2.5.
Approval at the Class Meetings
646
13.3.2.6.
Summary
647
13.3.3.
The Sanction of the Court
647
13.3.3.1.
Have the Statutory Provisions Been Complied With?
648
13.3.3.2.
Did the Majority Fairly Represent the Class?
649
13.3.3.3.
Would a Reasonable Person Approve the Scheme?
650
13.3.3.4.
Effect of the Scheme
651
13.4.
Conclusion
652
14.
Private Equity
654
14.1.
Introduction
654
14.2.
Historical Development
655
14.3.
Private Equity Funds
658
14.3.1.
Structure of a Typical Private Equity Fund
658
14.3.2.
Sources of Funding for Private Equity Funds
661
14.3.3.
Why have Investors Wanted to Invest in Private Equity Funds?
662
14.4.
The Capital Structure of a Typical Private Equity Transaction
663
14.4.1.
Equity Financing
664
14.4.2.
Quasi Equity
665
14.4.3.
Debt Financing
666
14.4.3.1.
Senior Debt
667
14.4.3.2.
Second Lien Debt
669
14.4.3.3.
Mezzanine Debt
670
14.5.
Public to Private Transactions
670
14.5.1.
Financial issues
671
14.5.2.
Recommendation by the Directors
672
14.5.3.
Equality between Bidders
673
14.5.4.
Equality of Treatment of Shareholders
673
14.5.5.
Market Abuse
674
14.6.
A Comparison of Private Equity and Public Company Structures
674
14.6.1.
Ownership Structures
674
14.6.2.
Debt vs Equity Levels
679
14.6.2.1.
The Employees
681
14.6.2.2.
The Creditors
681
14.6.3.
Board/Management Structures
684
14.6.4.
Period of Investment
686
14.6.5.
Transparency and Disclosure Issues
686
14.6.6.
Summary
691
14.7.
Conclusion
693
Index
695