1.

Introduction

1

1.1.

The Three Ideologies of Judicial Decision-Making / Jerzy Wroblewski

1

1.2.

The Three Situations of Legal Decision-Making / Kaarle Makkonen

6

1.3.

The Subject Matter of the Treatise: Legal Argumentation, or How to Construct and Read the Law in a Reasoned Manner

11

1.4.

The Concept of a Frame of Legal Analysis

12

1.5.

The Theories of Truth and Legal Analysis

14

1.6.

The Semantics of Law: Rudolf Carnap's Method of Extension and Intension

20

2.

An Isomorphic Theory of Law: A Relation of Structural Similarity Between the Two Fact-Constellations Compared

29

2.1.

Kaarle Makkonen on Legal Isomorphism

29

2.2.

The Picture Theory of Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as Read in Light of Erik Stenius' Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought

31

2.2.1.

The Internal Categorial Structure and the External Configuration Structure of Reality

31

2.2.2.

A Legal Fact-Situation as an Analysed Fact-Situation

36

2.3.

The Two Requirements Placed on Legal Isomorphism

41

2.4.

The Transition From an Isomorphic Situation to a Situation of Semantic Ambiguity

43

2.5.

Legal Isomorphism and Institutional Facts

45

2.6.

The Semantic Theory of Truth / Alfred Tarski

47

2.7.

A Critical Evaluation of the Isomorphic Theory of Law

48

3.

Coherence Theory of Law: Shared Congruence Among Arguments Drawn from the Institutional and Societal Sources of Law

53

3.1.

Truth As Coherence Among the Sentences of a Scientific Theory

53

3.2.

In Search for the Concept of Coherence

55

3.2.1.

A Quantitative Approach: "The More/Longer/Greater (...), the More Coherent the Theory"

55

3.2.2.

A Qualitative Approach: "That the Law is Structured by a Coherent Set of Principles About Justice and Fairness and Procedural Due Process "

60

3.3.

The Duhem-Quine Thesis: The Inherently Holistic and Underdetermined Character of a Scientific Theory, and Its Implications for Legal Analysis

68

3.4.

Towards Partial Coherence in Law

71

3.5.

The Concept of Coherence Redefined

73

3.6.

A Critical Evaluation of the Coherence Theory of Law

77

4.

"Between the Evident and the Irrational": The New Rhetoric and Legal Argumentation Theory

79

4.1.

The Varieties of Pragmatism and the Law

79

4.2.

The Universal Audience as a Subjective Thought Construct of the Speaker / Charm Perelman

81

4.3.

The Realm of Rhetoric and the Quest for Value-Cognitivism

87

4.4.

The New Rhetoric and Its Alternatives

93

5.

Philosophical Pragmatism: Law, Judged in Light of Its Social Effects

97

5.1.

"What, In Short, is the Truth's Cash Value in Experiential Terms?"

97

5.2.

The Lure of Pragmatism and the Law

102

5.3.

"These Doctrines Form a System for Inducing People to Behave Efficiently "

106

5.4.

"Why Efficiency?" and "Is Wealth a Value?" -- A Critical Evaluation of the Economic Analysis of Law, with Brief Comments on the Marxist Theory of Law

108

6.

Analytical Legal Positivism: Retracing the Original Intentions of the Legislator Under Legal Exegesis

113

6.1.

Scientific Positivism Defined

113

6.2.

What Is Analytical Philosophy?

116

6.3.

Legal Positivism Defined

118

6.4.

The Saga of Modern Legal Positivism

124

6.4.1.

Analytical Legal Positivism

124

6.4.2.

Institutional Legal Positivism

130

6.4.3.

Exclusive and Inclusive Legal Positivism

132

6.5.

The Unresolvable Dilemma of Kaarlo Tuori's Critical Legal Positivism

136

6.6.

One Step (or Two) Back in History: The Exegetical School of Law (Ecole de l'Exegese) in France and Belgium in the Nineteenth Century

138

6.7.

A Critical Evaluation of Legal Exegesis

141

7.

Legal Realism: The Law in Action, Not the Law in Books, As the Subject Matter of Legal Analysis

145

7.1.

Philosophical Realism Defined

145

7.2.

Legal Realism, American and Scandinavian

148

7.3.

The Legacy of American Legal Realism

151

7.4.

The Concept of A Judicial Ideology by Alf Ross, and the Rule of Recognition by H. L. A. Hart

154

7.5.

The Formal Validity and Efficient Enforcement of Law

160

7.6.

A Critical Evaluation of Analytical Legal Realism

162

8.

Legal Conventionalism: Law as an Expression of Collective Intentionality

165

8.1.

Brute Facts and Institutional Facts

165

8.2.

The Definitional Characteristics of Institutional Facts by John R. Searle, with Special Concern for Self-Referentiality

169

8.3.

Conventions as Mutual Expectations of the Members of a Community

173

8.4.

Nominalism vs. Realism: Are Intentions Attributable to a Collective Agent as a Whole or to Its Individual Members Only?

177

8.5.

The Institutionally Qualified Character of Legal Conventions

179

8.6.

Shared Legal Convictions as an Expression of the Volksgeist, or the Spirit of the Nation / Friedrich Carl von Savigny

182

8.7.

The Transformations of Customary Law in Modern Society

183

8.8.

Legal Conventionalism and Legal Argumentation Theory

185

9.

"Die Rechtssatze in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang zu erkennen" -- The Thrust of Legal Formalism

187

9.1.

A Genealogy of Legal Concepts / Georg Friedrich Puchta

187

9.2.

A Jurisprudence, Based on Legal Concepts and Their Systemic Relations

189

9.3.

The Langdellian Orthodoxy -- A Brief Account of Legal Formalism in America

192

9.4.

The Constitutive Elements of Legal Formality / Robert S. Summers

194

9.5.

"Der Zweck ist der Schopfer des ganzen Rechts" -- A Critique of Legal Formalism / Lon L. Fuller

196

10.

Natural Law Philosophy: Law as Subordinate to Social Justice and Political Morality in Society

201

10.1.

The Evolvement of Natural Law Philosophy

201

10.2.

"eine wertfreie Beschreibung ihres Gegenstandes" -- The Challenge of Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law for Natural Law Philosophy

206

10.3.

The Internal Morality of Law / Lon L. Fuller

208

10.4.

"The Core of Good Sense in the Doctrine of Natural Law" -- The Minimum Content of Natural Law / H.L.A. Hart

212

10.5.

The Seven Basic Values / John Finnis

216

10.6.

A Critical Evaluation of Natural Law Theory

223

11.

Radical Decisionism: Social Justice on a Strictly Contextualist Basis

225

11.1.

The Significance of the Institutional Meta-Theory of Law

225

11.2.

Denial of All Feasible Meta-Theories of Law: Kadi-Justice, the German Free Law Movement, and Carl Schmitt on the Law

226

11.3.

Decisionism in Jurisprudence, I: Thomas Wilhelmsson on the Small-Scale, Good Narratives on Legal Responsibility

230

11.4.

Decisionism in Jurisprudence, II: Martti Koskenniemi on the International Lawyer's Radically Situational Ethics

232

11.5.

A Critical Comment of Radical Decisionism

236

12.

Intermission

239

12.1.

The Ten Frames of Legal Analysis, as Contrasted with Jerzy Wroblewski's Three Ideologies of Judicial Decision-Making and Kaarle Makkonen's Three Situations of Legal Decision-Making

239

12.2.

Jerzy Wroblewski's Ideology of Legal and Rational Judicial Decision-Making Law as a Compound of the Legislative Ideology, Judicial Ideology, and a Societal Conception of Law and Justice

243

12.3.

From a Synchronic to a Diachronic Approach: Two Sequential Models of Legal Reasoning

248

12.3.1.

Neil MacCormick's Theory of the Three C's in Legal Reasoning: From Consistency and Coherence to the Consequences of Law

249

12.3.2.

The Bielefelder Kreis: A Sequential Order of the Linguistic, Systemic, Teleological-Axiological, and Transcategorical Arguments in Legal Reasoning

251

13.

Law and Metaphysics

255

13.1.

The Truth of a Legal Sentence As Determined by the Frame of Analysis Adopted

255

13.2.

The Logico-Conceptual Constitution, Normative Ontology, and Structural Axiology of Law

258

13.3.

A Systemic Order of Things Among the Rules and Principles of Law

263

13.4.

Textual Coherence, Institutional Authorities, and the Legal Community

266

13.5.

(Is There) A Future for Analytical Jurisprudence?

268

References

271

Name Index

283

Subject Index

287