Uncertainty in international law : a Kelsenian perspective / Jörg Kammerhofer.
2011
KZ3375.K45 K36 2011 (Map It)
Available at Cellar
Formats
| Format | |
|---|---|
| BibTeX | |
| MARCXML | |
| TextMARC | |
| MARC | |
| DublinCore | |
| EndNote | |
| NLM | |
| RefWorks | |
| RIS |
Items
Details
Author
Title
Uncertainty in international law : a Kelsenian perspective / Jörg Kammerhofer.
Published
London ; New York : Routledge, 2011.
Call Number
KZ3375.K45 K36 2011
ISBN
9780415577847 (hbk)
0415577845 (hbk)
9780203847213 (ebk)
0203847210 (ebk)
0415577845 (hbk)
9780203847213 (ebk)
0203847210 (ebk)
Description
xv, 286 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)475450143
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages [263]-280) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Foreword / Judge Bruno Simma
x
Preface
xii
Table of cases
xiv
1.
Introduction: What is uncertainty?
1
2.
Self-defence under the United Nations Charter
5
2.1.
The ̀black hole' theory
7
2.2.
Defining armed attack
12
2.2.1.
Whether àrmed attack' is a necessary condition
12
2.2.2.
What is an àrmed attack'?
17
2.2.3.
The scale of the armed attack
20
2.2.4.
When does an armed attack occur?
24
2.3.
The perception of armed attack
29
2.3.1.
Objective or subjective determination?
29
2.3.2.
Zoom
31
2.4.
The nature of the attacker
35
2.4.1.
Acts by private individuals as armed attacks
36
2.4.2.
Attribution of acts to a state as armed attack
43
2.5.
The telos of self-defence
49
2.5.1.
The mechanics of prohibition and exception
49
2.5.2.
Telos
51
2.6.
Conclusion
56
3.
Customary international law
59
3.1.
One-element theories
61
3.2.
State practice
62
3.2.1.
What is state practice?
62
3.2.2.
The element and its evidence
68
3.2.3.
How much state practice and for how long?
70
3.2.4.
The reception of state practice - does it depend on others?
72
3.2.5.
The limits of regulation by customary norms
72
3.2.6.
Is customary international law impossible to change?
74
3.3.
Opinio iuris
76
3.3.1.
Customary international law resolved as consent
77
3.3.2.
Opinio iuris properly so called
78
3.3.3.
Is the orthodox synthesis only an illusion?
80
3.4.
Desuetudo in customary law - how do customary norms die?
85
4.
Interpretation and modification
87
4.1.
Treaty interpretation - the conventional debate
88
4.1.1.
The dichotomy of terms and intent
88
4.1.2.
What are rules of interpretation?
92
4.1.3.
Particularities of UN Charter interpretation
96
4.2.
The Kelsenian challenge
104
4.2.1.
The Pure Theory of Law's theory of interpretation
105
4.2.2.
Are the methods of interpretation irrelevant?
106
4.2.3.
The nature of the norm
111
4.2.4.
Back to the frame theorem?
113
4.3.
Language, facts and beyond - further confusion?
117
4.3.1.
Language and law - semantic uncertainty
117
4.3.2.
From vagueness to subsumption - application of law to facts
120
4.3.3.
Conclusion on interpretation
121
4.4.
Subsequent practice to treaties
125
4.4.1.
Interpretation versus modification of treaties
125
4.4.2.
Subsequent practice as justification for treaty modification?
131
4.4.3.
The relationship between customary international law and treaties
135
5.
Conflict of norms in international law
139
5.1.
A preliminary definition of conflict of norms
141
5.2.
Lex specialis legi generali derogal
146
5.2.1.
Lex specialis as a rule of logic
152
5.2.2.
Lex specialis as more effective or reflective of party intentions
152
5.2.3.
Lex specialis as positive norm
154
5.3.
Lex posterior legi priori derogal
157
5.3.1.
Lex posterior as a rule of logic
158
5.3.2.
Lex posterior as positive norm
167
5.4.
Pragmatic non-resolving
172
5.5.
Lex superior legi inferiori derogal
175
5.5.1.
International law's sui generis hierarchies
176
5.5.2.
The hierarchy of legal orders
180
5.5.3.
Types of conflict between lex superior and lex inferior
185
5.6.
Conclusion
193
6.
A constitution for international law
195
6.1.
What is a s̀ource' of international law?
197
6.1.1.
The concept of s̀ource of law' in legal theory
197
6.1.2.
The nature of the sources of international law
202
6.2.
How are the sources of international law justified?
205
6.2.1.
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
208
6.2.2.
Deduction: Alfred Verdross and natural law as fictional normative order
210
6.2.3.
Induction: Herbert Hart and the problem of law from facts
224
6.3.
The Pure Theory's constitutional theory
230
6.3.1.
The Stufenbau determines the sources of international law
231
6.3.2.
The architecture of the constitution of international law
235
6.3.3.
Our epistemic situation vis-a-vis the sources of international law
239
7.
The inevitable Grundnorm
241
7.1.
The four functions of the Grundnorm
244
7.1.1.
The Grundnorm as the expression of the Is-Ought dichotomy
245
7.1.2.
The Grundnorm as highest basis of validity of a normative order
245
7.1.3.
The Grundnorm as the unifying force of the normative order
248
7.1.4.
The Grundnorm identifies and authorises the norm-maker
249
7.2.
The Grundnorm is the dichotomy of Is and Ought
250
7.2.1.
The Grundnorm as Kantian Category?
250
7.2.2.
The subjective and objective senses of an act
254
7.2.3.
Epistemology and ontology of norms
255
7.2.4.
Synopsis and restatement
257
7.3.
Theory influences the existence of its object
259
Bibliography
263
Index
281