Law and economics in a nutshell / by Jeffrey L. Harrison.
2011
K487.E3 H37 2011 (Map It)
Available at Offsite ReCAP Facility
Formats
| Format | |
|---|---|
| BibTeX | |
| MARCXML | |
| TextMARC | |
| MARC | |
| DublinCore | |
| EndNote | |
| NLM | |
| RefWorks | |
| RIS |
Items
Details
Author
Title
Law and economics in a nutshell / by Jeffrey L. Harrison.
Published
St. Paul, MN : West/Thomson Reuters, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
K487.E3 H37 2011
Edition
Fifth edition.
ISBN
0314267530
9780314267535
9780314267535
Description
xxi, 466 pages : illustrations ; 19 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)729348018
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Series
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
v
Table of Cases
xix
ch. One
Introduction
1
ch. Two
Economic Tools and Concepts
8
A.
Demand, Supply and Market Equilibrium
8
1.
Demand
8
2.
Supply
12
3.
Market Equilibrium
15
B.
Elasticity
17
1.
Generally
17
2.
Incidence Analysis
19
C.
Perfect and Imperfect Markets
23
D.
Marginal Analysis General
28
E.
Efficiency
29
1.
Allocative Efficiency
30
2.
The Theory of Second Best
32
3.
Pareto Optimality and Superiority
34
4.
Kaldor--Hicks Efficiency
38
F.
Externalities
40
1.
Negative Externalities and Property Rights
40
a.
Negative Externalities
40
b.
The Tragedy of the Commons
41
c.
The Prisoner's Dilemma
42
2.
Positive Externalities, Free-Riding and Public Goods
44
a.
Positive Externalities
44
b.
Free-Riding
44
c.
Public Goods
45
G.
Takings, Efficiency and Externalities
48
H.
Some Additional Useful Concepts
50
1.
Opportunity Cost
50
2.
Discounting and Present Value
50
3.
Risk Aversion
52
ch. Three
Normative and Behavioral Complications in the Application of Economics to Law
55
A.
Rational Maximizer of Self-Interest
56
1.
Wealth and Endowment Effects
58
2.
Ultimatum Games
59
B.
Choices and Preferences
62
1.
Public Goods and Free Riding
63
2.
The Prisoner's Dilemma
64
3.
The Possibility of Counter-Preferential Choice
65
4.
False Consciousness
65
5.
Framing Problems
66
C.
Preferences, Values, and Lexical Ordering
67
D.
Normative Questions in the Application of Law to Economics
71
E.
What About Happiness?
73
ch. Four
The Coase Theorem and Related Property Issues
77
A.
The Coase Theorem
77
1.
Allocative Implications
78
2.
Assignment of Rights and Distributive Effects
81
3.
Transaction Costs
83
4.
Bargaining Problems
85
B.
The Wealth Effect
88
C.
Reactions to Transaction Costs
92
1.
Duplicating Friction-Free Transactions
92
2.
Asymmetrical Transaction Costs
97
D.
Protecting Entitlements
98
ch. Five
The Economics of Enforcing Promises
104
A.
The Economics of Exchange
105
B.
Why Does Contract Law Exist?
111
C.
The Specific Economic Functions of Contract Law
114
D.
The Economics of Contract Formation
116
1.
Capacity
116
2.
Duress
120
3.
Offer and Acceptance and Other Formalities
122
4.
The Consideration Requirement
124
a.
Adequacy of Consideration
125
b.
Nominal Consideration
126
c.
Contract Modification
126
E.
Contract Law and Distributive Goals
127
1.
Exculpatory Provisions
130
2.
Unconscionability
136
F.
Contract Remedies
143
1.
The Efficient Breach
143
2.
Specific Performance
148
3.
Liquidated Damages
151
4.
The Lost Volume Seller
153
G.
Breach and Excuses for Non-Performance
156
1.
Breach
156
2.
Excuses for Non-Performance
159
a.
Unilateral Cases
160
b.
Bilateral Cases
162
H.
Gratuitous Promises
164
ch. Six
Economics of Tort Law
170
A.
The Costs of Accidents and the Economics of Tort Law
171
B.
Liability, the Assignment of Rights and Externalities
173
C.
The Negligence Standard
177
1.
The Hand Formula
177
2.
Distributive Consequences
178
D.
Refining the Negligence Model: Contributory Negligence
179
1.
The Conventional Doctrine
179
2.
Reconciling Contributory Negligence and Efficiency
180
E.
Redefining the Negligence Standard: Comparative Negligence
183
1.
Apportioned Comparative Negligence
184
2.
Unapportioned Comparative Negligence
187
F.
Assumption of the Risk
188
G.
Strict Liability
189
1.
Efficiency and Strict Liability
190
2.
Risk-Aversion and Loss Spreading
194
3.
Duty to Rescue
200
4.
Defenses to Strict Liability
202
a.
Unforeseeable Misuse
202
b.
Unreasonable Assumption of Risk
203
c.
Contributory and Comparative Negligence
204
H.
Damages
205
1.
The Collateral Source Rule
205
2.
Future Losses
206
3.
Hedonic Losses
210
4.
Punitive Damages
211
ch. Seven
The Economics of Settlements
215
A.
Why Do Some Cases Settle?
215
B.
Why Don't All Cases Settle?
223
1.
Asymmetrical Expectations
224
2.
Bilateral Monopoly
226
3.
Human Factors
227
4.
Some Empirical Evidence
229
ch. Eight
Economic Analysis of Criminal Law
231
A.
Why Have Criminal Law?
232
1.
Creating an Incentive for Market Exchanges
234
2.
Criminal Law and Externalities
238
a.
Externalities Generally
239
b.
Externalities and "Victimless Crimes"
242
3.
Criminal Law and Behavior
247
B.
Administering Criminal Sanctions
250
1.
The Optimal Level of Criminal Conduct
251
2.
Deterrence Options
256
C.
Criminal Procedure
261
ch. Nine
The Economics of Antitrust
266
A.
The Competitive Extremes of Perfect Competition and Monopoly
267
1.
Demand and Supply
267
2.
Market Equilibrium, Producer and Consumer Surplus
272
3.
The Individual Firm Under Perfect Competition: The Marginal Cost = Marginal Revenue Rule
276
4.
Cost Curves
278
5.
Equilibrium and Perfect Competition
282
6.
Monopoly
284
7.
Perfect Competition and Monopoly Compared
287
8.
Some Limits on the Comparison
290
B.
Market Power and Market Definition
293
1.
Market Power
293
2.
The Lerner Index
294
3.
The Determinants of Market Power
295
4.
Market Definition and Cross-Elasticity
296
5.
Geographic Markets
298
6.
Supply Elasticity
299
7.
A Classic and a Contemporary Example
301
a.
United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa)
301
b.
United States v. Microsoft
303
ch. Ten
The Economics of Government Regulation
305
A.
The Natural Monopoly Rationale
306
1.
The Theory of Natural Monopoly
306
2.
Agency Regulation
310
a.
Revenue Requirement
310
b.
Rate Regulation
312
c.
Cross-Subsidization
317
3.
Contestable Markets
320
B.
Excessive Competition
321
C.
The Allocation of Inherently Scarce Resources
325
D.
Reactions to Transaction Costs and Externalities
328
1.
Rationalizing an Industry
329
2.
Increasing the Availability of Information
331
3.
Reactions to Externalities
335
E.
Social Justice Regulations
342
F.
Regulation and Happiness
345
ch. Eleven
Intellectual Property
349
A.
The Economic Rationale
350
B.
Limiting Protection
354
C.
Striking the Balance
357
1.
The Doctrine of Equivalents
357
2.
Fair Use
359
D.
Duration
363
E.
Remedies
366
ch. Twelve
The Evolution of Law
371
A.
The Evolutionary Process
371
B.
A Closer Look at the Evolutionary Theory
375
C.
Evaluation and Examples
379
ch. Thirteen
Tax Policy and Taxes on Intergenerational Transfers
387
A.
The Inheritance Tax
389
B.
The Good Tax
391
C.
How Do Inheritance Taxes Measure Up?
396
1.
Cost of Administration
397
2.
Avoidability
397
3.
Neutrality
404
D.
Inheritance in Context
405
ch. Fourteen
Marriage and Divorce
407
A.
The Economics of Marriage: Generally
408
B.
Why Marry?
412
C.
Law and the Marriage Market
415
D.
The Economics of the End of a Marriage
420
ch. Fifteen
Public Choice
428
A.
Why Have a Government?
429
B.
Approaches to Government
434
1.
Utilitarianism
434
2.
Rawls' Theory of Justice
437
C.
Why Vote at All?
439
D.
Problems of Ascertaining Preferences Through Voting
441
1.
Unanimity and Majority Voting
441
2.
Arrow's Theorem and Possible Solutions
445
a.
Logrolling
450
b.
Single-Peaked Preferences
451
E.
The Economic Theory of Legislation
452
1.
What Do Legislators Want?
452
2.
Interest Groups
455
3.
The Market for Legislation
457
Index
461