Thinking like a lawyer : an introduction to legal reasoning / Kenneth J. Vandevelde.
2011
K212 .V36 2011 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Thinking like a lawyer : an introduction to legal reasoning / Kenneth J. Vandevelde.
Published
Boulder, CO : Westview Press, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
K212 .V36 2011
Edition
Second edition.
ISBN
9780813344645 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0813344646 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0813344646 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Description
xvi, 332 pages ; 23 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)656213300
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 317-323) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
xv
Introduction
1
I.
How Lawyers Think
1
II.
The Plan of This Book
4
III.
Thinking Like a Law Student
6
pt. ONE
BASIC LEGAL REASONING
1.
Identifying Applicable Law
9
I.
The Sources of American Law
10
A.
Enacted Law
11
1.
The Legislative Process
12
2.
The Administrative Process
14
B.
Case Law
15
1.
The District Court
16
a.
Bringing a Dispute Before the Court
16
b.
Identifying Issues
20
c.
Deciding Issues
21
d.
Distinguishing Between Issues of Law and Fact
24
2.
The Court of Appeals
25
3.
The Supreme Court
27
II.
Identifying Applicable Law
28
A.
Identifying the Government with Power: An Introduction to Choice of Law Theory
28
1.
Vertical Choice of Law Analysis
29
2.
Horizontal Choice of Law Analysis
29
B.
Identifying Law by Subject Matter: An Introduction to Rule Analysis
31
1.
The Nature of Rules: Form
31
2.
The Nature of Rules: Substance
32
3.
The Problem of Generality
33
C.
Identifying Void Rules: An Introduction to Constitutionalism
34
2.
Analyzing the Law
37
I.
Analyzing Statutes
37
II.
Analyzing Cases
40
A.
The Components of a Case
40
1.
Facts
40
2.
Procedural History
40
3.
Questions Presented
41
4.
Rules of Law
41
5.
Application of Law to Fact
42
6.
Holding
45
7.
Disposition
47
8.
Dissents and Concurrences
47
B.
An Introduction to Stare Decisis
50
III.
Analyzing Rights and Duties
53
A.
The Meaning of Right and Duty
53
B.
Three Characteristics of Rights and Duties
54
C.
The Significance of the Three Characteristics
55
3.
Synthesizing the Law
57
I.
Synthesizing Rules: General to Specific
57
A.
The Basic Organizing Principle
58
B.
Relationships Among Rules
58
1.
Rules Defining an Element of a More General Rule
58
2.
Rules Applying a More General Rule
59
3.
Rules Limiting a More General Rule
60
4.
Rules Cumulative to Another Rule
62
5.
Rules Contradicting Another Rule
63
C.
Outlining the Synthesis
65
II.
Synthesizing a Rule: Specific to General
67
A.
The Basic Model
68
B.
The Problem of Indeterminacy
69
C.
Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments
71
D.
Using Rule Synthesis as an Advocate
73
1.
Supporting the New Rule
73
2.
Opposing the New Rule
74
4.
Researching the Facts
77
I.
The Role of Factual Research
77
II.
The Rules of Factual Investigation
78
A.
The Law of Evidence
79
1.
Types of Evidence Admissible
79
2.
The Requirement of Relevance
80
3.
Reasons to Exclude Relevant Evidence
81
a.
Unreliability: The Example of Hearsay
81
b.
Prejudice: The Example of Prior Bad Acts
82
c.
Other Policies: The Example of Privilege
83
B.
The Burden of Proof
83
1.
Types of Burdens of Proof
84
2.
Techniques to Persuade the Trier of Fact
86
3.
Presumptions
87
C.
The Problem of Cognitive Bias
89
5.
Applying the Law
91
I.
Deduction
93
A.
The Basic Model
93
B.
The Problem of Indeterminacy
95
C.
Addressing Indeterminacy Through Specificity
96
D.
Addressing Indeterminacy Through Rules of Statutory Interpretation
97
1.
The Special Rules of Statutory Interpretation
97
2.
The Indeterminacy of These Special Rules
99
E.
Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments
101
1.
The Two Types of Policy Judgments Required
101
2.
The Nature of Policy Judgments
102
3.
Combining the Policy Judgments to Decide Cases
103
a.
In General
103
b.
Line Drawing
104
c.
Balancing
105
F.
The Special Problem of Dictum
106
G.
Using Deduction as an Advocate
108
1.
Supporting Application of the Rule
109
2.
Opposing Application of the Rule
112
H.
Addressing Indeterminacy Through Analogies
115
II.
Analogy
115
A.
The Basic Model
115
B.
The Problem of Indeterminacy
117
C.
Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments
118
D.
The Special Problem of Dictum
121
E.
Using Analogy as an Advocate
121
1.
Arguments for Following the Precedent
121
2.
Arguments for Distinguishing the Precedent
124
III.
Comparing Deduction and Analogy
127
IV.
Deduction and Analogy in a Jury System
128
V.
Epilogue: Changing Case Law
130
A.
Flexibility Without Changing Case Law
130
B.
Justifications for Changing Case Law
130
C.
Techniques for Changing Case Law
132
1.
Confining a Case to Its Facts
132
2.
Overruling Sub Silentio
132
3.
Creating Exceptions
133
4.
Employing Legal Fictions
134
5.
Explicit Overruling
135
pt. TWO
REASONING WITH POLICIES
6.
Policy Analysis, Synthesis, and Application
139
I.
Policy Analysis
140
A.
The Dilemma of Choosing Among Opposed Policies
140
B.
Specific Policy Conflicts
141
1.
The Individual and the Community
143
a.
Individualism and Majoritarianism
144
b.
Autonomy and Paternalism
146
c.
Justice and Efficiency
148
d.
Rights Theory and Utilitarianism
149
2.
Naturalism and Positivism
152
3.
Instrumentalism and Formalism
154
a.
In General
154
b.
Application to Statutory Interpretation
161
II.
Policy Synthesis
165
A.
The Relationship in Theory Among Policies
165
B.
The Relationship in Consequence Among Policies
170
1.
Consistent Policies
170
2.
Opposed Policies
171
3.
Independent Policies
172
III.
Policy Application
173
A.
The Technique of Deciding
173
B.
The Indeterminacy of Policy Judgments
174
C.
Predicting the Decision of the Court
178
7.
Contracts
181
I.
Traditional Contract
181
A.
Offer and Acceptance
182
1.
The Objective Test
182
2.
The Subjective Test
183
B.
Consideration
184
II.
Detrimental Reliance
185
III.
The Nature of the Contractual Duty
187
A.
The Duty to Perform the Express Promise and Any Implied Promises
187
B.
Liability for Breach of the Duty to Perform
188
1.
Breach of a Contractual Promise
188
2.
Loss by the Promisee
189
3.
Loss as a Consequence of the Breach
191
8.
Torts
195
I.
The Nature of Tort Law
195
II.
The Structure of Modern Tort Law
196
A.
Intentional Tort
196
B.
Negligence
198
1.
Injury
199
2.
Causation
200
3.
Breach
201
4.
Duty
203
C.
Strict Liability
203
9.
Constitutional Law
207
I.
Constitutional Interpretation
207
II.
Powers of the Government: Federalism
210
III.
Individual Rights
214
A.
Free Speech
215
B.
Due Process
216
10.
Civil Procedure
221
I.
Personal Jurisdiction
222
A.
Statutory Basis of Personal Jurisdiction
222
B.
Limitations Imposed by Due Process
222
1.
Traditional Bases of Personal Jurisdiction
222
2.
Minimum Contacts
224
a.
General Jurisdiction
224
b.
Specific Jurisdiction
224
1.
Purposeful Availment
225
2.
Reasonableness
225
c.
Jurisdictional Rules as a Compromise
226
II.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
228
A.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
229
B.
Diversity Jurisdiction
230
pt. THREE
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL REASONING
11.
A Historical Perspective on Legal Reasoning
235
I.
The Enlightenment Origins of American Legal Thought
236
A.
The Emergence of Enlightenment Epistemology
236
B.
The Emergence of Liberalism
239
C.
The Decline of Naturalism
241
II.
Legal Formalism
242
III.
The Critique of Legal Formalism
245
A.
The Methodological Critique
245
B.
The Political Critique
249
IV.
Legal Realism
250
V.
Contemporary Mainstream Legal Reasoning
255
12.
Contemporary Perspectives on Legal Reasoning
259
I.
Law and Economics
260
II.
Critical Legal Studies
266
III.
Identity-Based Movements
270
A.
Feminist Legal Theory
270
B.
Critical Race Theory
275
C.
Other Identity-Based Movements
277
IV.
Liberalism
279
V.
Pragmatism
281
VI.
Conclusion
285
Conclusion
289
Appendix: Thinking Like a Law Student
291
Notes
303
Selected Bibliography
317
Index
325