A matter of dispute : morality, democracy, and law / Christopher J. Peters.
2011
K3171 .P669 2011 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
A matter of dispute : morality, democracy, and law / Christopher J. Peters.
Published
Oxford ; New York, N.Y. : Oxford University Press, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
K3171 .P669 2011
ISBN
9780195387223 (hbk. : alk. paper)
0195387228 (hbk. : alk. paper)
0195387228 (hbk. : alk. paper)
Description
xvi, 360 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)651488331
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Prologue: The Price of Law
xiii
ch. 1
Introduction: A Government of Laws
1
1.
The Problem of Exceptions
2
A.
Can the Problem Be Solved with Rules?
4
B.
The Necessity of Ad Hoc Decisionmaking
5
2.
Aristotle's Challenge
7
3.
The Plan of the Book
12
4.
Theory (Legal, Political, Adjudicative, Constitutional)
15
A.
Analytic Legal Philosophy and the Problem of Legal Authority
15
B.
Political Theory and the Problem of Political Legitimacy
18
C.
Adjudicative Theory and the Problem of Judicial Duty
20
D.
Constitutional Theory and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
22
5.
Assumptions and Caveats
24
A.
The First Assumption: The Subject-Specific Perspective
24
B.
The Second Assumption: Persons as Good-Faith Moral Reasoners
27
C.
The Third Assumption: The Irrelevance of Formal Sanctions
29
D.
The First Caveat: An Account, Not a Comprehensive Theory
30
E.
The Second Caveat: Sufficient, Not Necessary
31
F.
The Third Caveat: The Persistent Possibility of Morally Justified Disobedience
32
ch. 2
The Problem of Law's Authority
33
1.
The Normative Strength of Legal Authority
33
2.
The Conceptual Nature of Legal Authority
37
3.
Aristotle's Challenge Revisited
38
4.
The Epistemic-Guidance Account
39
A.
Epistemic Guidance, Substance, and Authority
41
B.
The Prima Facie Duty Revisited
44
C.
The Problem of Disagreement
47
5.
The Consensualist Account
49
A.
Legal Authority and Actual Consent
49
B.
Legal Authority and Constructive Consent
52
6.
The Dispute-Resolution Account
57
7.
Continuity, Coordination, and Legal Authority
61
8.
The Task Ahead
66
ch. 3
A Simple Model of Dispute Resolution
69
1.
Acceptable Dispute Resolution
70
2.
Dispute Resolution and Accuracy
71
3.
Accuracy and Competence
75
4.
Accuracy and Impartiality
78
5.
Accuracy and Efficiency
81
6.
Third-Party Adjudication, Participation, and Fairness
83
7.
Dispute Resolution and Consent
86
8.
Consent and Procedural Accuracy
88
9.
Dispute Resolution, Procedural Accuracy, and Constructive Consent
90
10.
Beyond the Bipartite Dispute
97
11.
Coordination and Constructive Consent
99
12.
The Encroachment Flaw Redux?
101
13.
Building from the Basic Model
104
ch. 4
Disputes, Legal Rules, and Democracy
107
1.
Madison's Insight
107
2.
Legislation as Dispute Resolution
109
A.
Legal Rules as Ex Post Dispute Resolution
109
B.
Legal Rules as Ex Ante Dispute Resolution
110
3.
The Authority of Legal Rules
115
4.
Acceptable Legislation
119
5.
What Is "Democracy"?
122
6.
Democracy as a Reasonably Accurate Procedure
123
A.
Democracy and Impartiality
124
B.
Democracy and Competence
134
7.
Democracy as a Negative Ideal
134
A.
Democracy as Reactive
135
B.
Democracy as Imperfect
136
C.
Expecting Too Much of Democracy
138
8.
Democracy as Law
139
ch. 5
Democratic Adjudication
141
1.
The Indeterminacy of Text
142
2.
The Indeterminacy of Legislative Intent
146
3.
Formalism as a Default Principle
151
4.
The Possibility of Democratic Adjudication
154
5.
Participation and Representation in Adjudication
155
A.
Adversary Adjudication
156
B.
Common-Law Representation
160
C.
Adjudication and Indeterminacy Redux
168
6.
Text, Justification, and Derivative Democratic Authority
169
A.
Primary and Derivative Authority
170
B.
Legal Positivism as a Theory about Rules
173
C.
Linguistic Intention and Justification
174
D.
A Note on the Common Law
181
7.
Courts, Litigants, and the Law
186
ch. 6
The Forms and Limits of Democratic Adjudication
189
1.
Judicial Pragmatism
190
2.
Managerial Judging
195
A.
Encouraging Settlement
196
B.
Overseeing Discovery
201
C.
Assessing the Merits before Trial
202
3.
Public-Law Litigation (and Judicial Independence)
204
4.
Judicial Minimalism
209
5.
From Democratic Adjudication to Constitutionalism
213
ch. 7
Law vs. Democracy?
215
1.
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty
215
2.
Strategies for Resolving the Difficulty
216
A.
The Substantive Strategy
216
B.
The Proceduralist Strategy
221
C.
Dualist Strategies
226
D.
The Reductionist Strategy
237
3.
Waldron's Challenge
240
4.
Constituting Democracy
243
5.
Resolving Disputes about Democracy
246
A.
The Possibility of Democratic Dysfunction
247
B.
The Inevitability of Democratic Disputes
248
C.
The Partiality of Democratic Self-Judging
249
D.
The Promise of Constitutional Dispute Resolution
251
E.
The Advantages of Constitutional Rules
252
6.
Democratic Malfunctions (and Constitutional Responses)
255
A.
Agency Failure
256
B.
Majority (and Well-Organized Minority) Factions
258
7.
Whither "Substantive" Constitutional Rights? (The Roe v. Wade Problem)
267
8.
From Law to Process
272
ch. 8
Constitutional Process
273
1.
Externality and Impartiality
274
A.
"The Dead Hand of the Past"
274
B.
The Text
281
C.
Judicial Review
282
2.
Responsiveness and Competence
286
A.
The Framing(s)
286
B.
The Political Dynamics of American Constitutional Law
294
C.
Participatory Constitutional Adjudication
310
3.
Interpretive Methodology
328
A.
The False Promise of Formalism
329
B.
The Allure of Pragmatism
335
C.
An Interpretivist Alternative
338
D.
Constitutional Precedent
341
4.
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: The Classic Strategies Revisited
346
Epilogue: The Limits of Law
349
Index
353