A history of civil litigation : political and economic perspectives / Frank J. Vandall.
2011
KF1250 .V36 2011 (Map It)
Available at Cellar
Formats
| Format | |
|---|---|
| BibTeX | |
| MARCXML | |
| TextMARC | |
| MARC | |
| DublinCore | |
| EndNote | |
| NLM | |
| RefWorks | |
| RIS |
Items
Details
Author
Title
A history of civil litigation : political and economic perspectives / Frank J. Vandall.
Published
Oxford ; New York, N.Y. : Oxford University Press, [2011]
Copyright
©2011
Call Number
KF1250 .V36 2011
ISBN
9780195391916 (hbk. : alk. paper)
0195391918 (hbk. : alk. paper)
0195391918 (hbk. : alk. paper)
Description
xix, 241 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)652447876
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Murray Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Murray Fund
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
xiii
Introduction
xv
ch. 1
The Development Of Civil Liability 1466-1916
1
A.
The Period 1400-1850
1
B.
The Period 1850-1916
3
ch. 2
The Dissatisfaction With Negligence: Policies Supporting Strict Liability 1916-1980
13
A.
Abnormally Dangerous Activities
15
B.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
16
C.
The Law's Dissatisfaction in Regard to the Theory for Resolving Products Cases
17
1.
Dissatisfaction with Commercial Law
17
2.
Negligence Leads to Unjust Results
19
3.
Specific Policy Reasons for Strict Liability
20
a.
Loss Shifting
20
b.
Safety
21
c.
Superior Knowledge
21
d.
Insurance
22
e.
Economic Analysis of Strict Liability
22
f.
Distance from the Manufacturer
24
g.
Strict Liability Avoids Universal Health Care
25
ch. 3
The Core Issue In Strict Liability: An Appropriate Test For Defect
27
A.
The Emergence of Strict Liability
27
B.
The Several Tests for Defect
30
1.
Section 402A: "Defective Condition Unreasonably Dangerous"
30
2.
The Risk-Benefit Test
32
3.
The Barker v. Lull Tests
33
4.
Negligence with Imputed Knowledge
34
5.
The Communicative Tort
35
6.
The Cheapest Cost Avoider
36
7.
Absolute Liability
37
C.
Comparative Fault
38
D.
The Role of the Court and the Jury Under Strict Liability
41
1.
The Court
41
2.
The Jury
43
3.
Cases Applying the Restatement (Second) [§] 402A
44
E.
An Embrace of Negligence
45
Conclusion
46
ch. 4
Legal Reform Emanates From The Corporate Boardroom, 1980-Present
49
A.
Constrictions in Legal Theory
49
B.
Procedural Retrenchments: The Presentation of the Products Case in the Courtroom
57
C.
Other Legislation Designed to Impede the Victim's Access to the Courts
67
1.
State Legislative "Reforms" of Products Liability Law
67
a.
The Impetus for Legislative Change
67
b.
A Radical Change: The Statute of Repose
69
c.
Further Alterations to the Products Liability System
74
i.
Compliance with Governmental Standards
74
ii.
The State-of-the-Art Defense
75
iii.
Misuse
76
iv.
Other Alterations That Further Protect the Powerful
77
2.
Comparison of Fundamental Tort Policies with State Legislative Reforms
81
a.
Loss Shifting
81
b.
Prevention
83
c.
Judge Learned Hand's Theory
85
d.
Precedent
85
e.
Justice and Administration
87
D.
Powerful Institutes and Associations Rewrite the Law
88
1.
The American Law Institute (ALI)
88
a.
The Tripartite Structure of Section 2: Magic Boxes
90
i.
The Structure of Section 2
90
ii.
Section 2: The Practice
92
iii.
The Draft Lacks an Analysis of the Traditional Policies Underlying Strict Liability
93
iv.
Section 6(c) Design Defects in Drugs: A Tabula Rasa
94
v.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Does Not Reflect the Law
97
b.
The Restatement (Third) Section 2(b) Design Defect Should Be Rejected
99
i.
Under the Restatement (Third), Fewer Suits Will Be Brought
101
ii.
Institutionalizing Needless Ambiguity
102
c.
An Examination of the Cases That Have Considered Reasonable Alternative Design Since Promulgation of the Restatement (Third) Section 2(b)
103
i.
States Rejecting the Restatement (Third)'s Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement
103
A.
California
103
B.
Missouri
104
C.
Maryland
105
D.
Pennsylvania
105
ii.
States Holding Reasonable Alternative Design as One of Several Factors to Consider in Determining Whether a Product Design is Defective
106
A.
Colorado
106
B.
New York
106
C.
Oregon
107
iii.
States Favorably Mentioning the Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement
108
A.
Georgia
108
B.
New Jersey
108
C.
Michigan
110
iv.
States Incorporating the Restatement's Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement into Their Statutes
110
A.
Louisiana
110
B.
Texas
111
C.
Mississippi
113
d.
You Won, Now Let Us Reduce the Amount of Your Recovery: Apportionment
114
i.
History of Joint and Several Liability
114
ii.
Analysis of the ALI's Proposal to Eliminate Joint and Several Liability
118
iii.
Analysis of the Potential Impact of the Restatement (Third): Apportionment on the Pennsylvania Law of Joint and Several Liability
121
A.
Track A
122
B.
Track B: Several Liability
123
2.
The Council for Tobacco Research
129
3.
The American Association for Justice
131
Appendix A
134
ch. 5
Corporations Write The Law
137
A.
Tobacco Litigation
140
1.
The 1960's and the Green v. American Tobacco Co. Case
142
2.
The Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc Case
143
3.
The Castano v. American Tobacco Co. Case
144
4.
Why the Early Cigarette Trials Were Lost
146
5.
The Theory and the Visionaries That Won the War
147
6.
The Tobacco Settlement
152
a.
Components of the Settlement
152
b.
Post-Settlement
153
7.
A Solution to the Power Tobacco Exercises Over the Legal System
154
a.
The History, Policy, and Economics of Absolute Liability as Applied to Cigarette Manufacturers
156
i.
A Historical View of Absolute Liability
156
ii.
The Reasons for Applying Absolute Liability to Tobacco Manufacturers
158
A.
Reallocating the Loss
159
B.
Health Protection
160
C.
Superior Knowledge
161
D.
The Cheapest Cost Avoider
161
E.
Economic Analysis
162
F.
Other Considerations
164
iii.
Absolute Liability for Damages from Smoking
168
iv.
The Policies Supporting a Modification to Cause-in-Fact
171
v.
The Cause-in-Fact Proposal
176
B.
Gun Policy
179
1.
Suits Against the Gun Manufacturers Have Foundered in the State Courts
180
2.
The United States is Facing a Gun Violence Epidemic
184
3.
An Analysis of Gun Control and Liability
188
a.
Self-Protection
188
b.
Enforce Existing Gun Laws
190
c.
Personal Responsibility
193
d.
Economic Impact
194
4.
Immunity Legislation for Firearms Sellers
195
C.
The SUV Rollover Index
197
ch. 6
The Application Of Concepts To Contemporary Examples
205
A.
Lobbies are Effective
205
B.
Government Rewards the Powerful: Corporate Bailouts
208
C.
Examples of Weak Regulations and Agency Policy Favoring the Regulated Industry: Pharmaceuticals, Aircraft, and Securities
210
1.
Pharmaceutical Regulation
210
2.
Aircraft Regulation
212
3.
The SEC[–]Madoff Example
213
D.
Persuasive Organizations
215
E.
Corporations Dictate Morality
217
F.
Proximate Cause v. Tort "Reform"
218
G.
The Supreme Court
219
H.
Congress, Agency Failure, Lobbying, and Crashes: The Toyota Example
221
Conclusion
223
Table of Cases
225
Index
235