Merger control in Europe : the gap in the ECMR and national merger legislations / Ioannis Kokkoris.
2011
KJE6467 .K65 2011 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Merger control in Europe : the gap in the ECMR and national merger legislations / Ioannis Kokkoris.
Published
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2011.
Call Number
KJE6467 .K65 2011
ISBN
9780415565134 (hardback)
0415565138 (hardback)
9780203846728 (ebk.)
0203846729 (ebk.)
0415565138 (hardback)
9780203846728 (ebk.)
0203846729 (ebk.)
Description
xxii, 293 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)436030374
Note
"Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada."
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of tables
x
Table of cases
xi
Table of statutory materials
xvi
Preface
xviii
Foreword
xx
Introduction
1
I.
Purpose of the book
1
I.1.
Non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets
2
I.2.
Implications of the existence of non-collusive oligopolies for member states
4
I.3.
Structure of the book
4
Notes
7
1.
European Community Merger Regulation [—] Council Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89
9
1.1.
Purpose of the European Community Merger Regulation
9
1.2.
Origins of the notion of dominance
12
1.3.
History of Council Regulation No. 4064/89 and its applicability on collective dominance
17
1.4.
Appraisal criteria for assessing collective dominance
20
1.5.
The Airtours case
20
1.5.1.
Transparency
22
1.5.2.
Retaliatory mechanisms
22
1.5.3.
Competitors and customers
23
1.5.4.
Conclusion on Airtours
24
Notes
26
2.
The new European Community Merger Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004
36
2.1.
Arguments for and against SLC test and dominance test
38
2.1.1.
Dominance test
38
2.1.2.
SLC test
41
2.2.
SLC test v dominance test
43
2.3.
The Commission's choice
45
2.4.
The horizontal merger guidelines
49
Notes
52
3.
Merger assessment and the legal substantive test: quantitative methods in merger analysis
60
3.1.
Quantitative methods in merger assessment
60
3.1.1.
Merger simulation
64
3.1.1.1.
Merger simulation process
66
3.1.1.2.
Merger simulation: from theory
68
3.1.1.3.
Demand estimation and merger simulation
71
3.1.1.4.
Merger simulation:... to practice
73
3.1.2.
Critical loss
77
3.1.2.1.
Critical loss analysis: mechanics
78
Critical loss analysis and market definition
78
Critical loss analysis and competitive effects of the merger
81
3.1.2.2.
Critical loss analysis: practical application
87
Federal Trade Commission v Occidental Petroleum Corp.
87
Federal Trade Commission, et al. v Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al.
88
Federal Trade Commission v Swedish Match North America Inc., et al.
89
US v SunGard and Comdisco
90
California v Sutter Health System
90
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd/P&O Princess Cruises Plc and Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises Plc
91
3.1.3.
Merger simulation and critical loss analysis under the SLC and dominance test
93
3.1.3.1.
Merger simulation under the SLC and dominance test
95
3.1.3.2.
Critical loss analysis under the SLC and dominance test
97
3.2.
Conclusion
98
Notes
100
4.
Mergers leading to non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets
111
4.1.
Introduction
111
4.2.
The European Union
112
4.2.1.
Airlours/First Choice
112
4.2.1.1.
Analysis of the case
112
4.2.1.2.
A gap case?
113
4.2.2.
Oracle/PeopleSoft
119
4.2.2.1.
Analysis of the case
119
4.2.2.2.
A gap case?
124
4.2.3.
Sony/BMG
129
4.2.3.1.
Analysis of the case
129
4.2.3.2.
A gap case?
134
4.2.4.
Syngenta CP/Advanta
139
4.2.4.1.
Analysis of the case
139
Horizontally affected markets
140
Sugar beet seeds
140
Maize seeds
141
Sunflower seeds
142
Spring barley seeds [–] pea seeds
142
Oilseed rape seeds [–] onion seeds
142
Vertically affected markets
142
4.2.4.2.
A gap case?
143
4.2.5.
Johnson & Johnson/Guidant
148
4.2.5.1.
Analysis of the case
148
4.2.5.2.
A gap case?
151
Steerable guidewires
151
Carotid stents
154
Non-carotid stents
156
4.2.6.
T-Mobile/Tele.ring
159
4.2.6.1.
Analysis of the case
159
Market shares
160
HHI
161
Customer switching
161
Price development
161
Incentive structure
161
National network
162
Network capacity
162
Role of other competitors
163
Future development of Tel.ring
163
Conclusion on unilateral effects arising from the merger
163
4.2.6.2.
A gap case?
164
4.3.
The United Kingdom
165
4.3.1.
Littlewoods Organization Plc/Freemans Plc
165
4.3.1.1.
Analysis of the case
165
4.3.1.2.
A gap case?
168
4.3.2.
Lloyds TSB/Abbey National
171
4.3.2.1.
Analysis of the case
171
4.3.2.2.
A gap case?
174
4.4.
The United States
177
4.4.1.
Heinz/Beech-Nut
177
4.4.1.1.
Analysis of the case
177
4.4.1.2.
A gap case?
180
4.5.
New Zealand
182
4.5.1.
Progressive Enterprises/Woolworths
182
4.5.1.1.
Analysis of the case
182
4.5.1.2.
A gap case?
185
4.6.
Other jurisdictions
187
4.7.
Conclusion
189
Notes
190
5.
Event studies in assessing the gap
208
Introduction
208
5.2.
Efficient market hypothesis and event study analysis
210
5.3.
Literature review of event studies in mergers
211
5.4.
Rationale of event study in this book
215
5.5.
Event study implementation
218
5.5.1.
Airtours/First Choice
219
5.5.2.
Oracle/PeopleSoft
222
5.5.3.
Sony/BMG
226
5.5.4.
Syngenta CP/Advanta
228
5.5.5.
Johnson & Johnson/Guidant
230
5.5.6.
T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring
233
5.6.
Limitations of event study analysis
235
5.7.
Conclusion
239
Notes
240
6.
Market structure [—] assessment criteria of gap cases
249
Notes
258
7.
Conclusion
261
Notes
264
Appendix: substantive tests for the assessment of mergers in EU member states
265
Bibliography
274
Index
287