European prudential banking regulation and supervision : the legal dimension / Larisa Dragomir.
2010
KJE2188 .D73 2010 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
European prudential banking regulation and supervision : the legal dimension / Larisa Dragomir.
Published
London ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2010.
Call Number
KJE2188 .D73 2010
ISBN
9780415496568 (hbk.)
041549656X (hbk.)
9780203856413 (e-book)
0203856414 (e-book)
041549656X (hbk.)
9780203856413 (e-book)
0203856414 (e-book)
Description
xxv, 418 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)437186860
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages [379]-396) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of abbreviations
xiii
Table of cases
xvi
Preface
xxi
Foreword
xxiii
Introduction
1
pt. I
European banking at the beginning of the third millennium
9
1.
Banking and market structures
11
1.
Structural developments
12
1.1.
The underlying forces of change and related bank strategies
12
1.2.
The crisis and its aftermath
18
1.3.
The European banking sector
21
2.
Banks are still special
25
2.1.
Insights from financial intermediation theory
25
2.2.
Banks in economic theory
26
2.3.
The definition of banks in European law
30
3.
Is there a single European banking market?
32
3.1.
The European regulatory framework
33
3.2.
The impact of the euro on banking
36
2.
Insights from regulatory theory
38
1.
The rationale for banking regulation in economic theory
38
1.1.
The rationale for the economic regulation of banks
39
1.2.
The rationale for the social regulation of banks
41
2.
Policy objectives of banking regulation
48
2.1.
The public interest approach
48
2.2.
The self-interest theory of regulation
49
2.3.
Incentive-conflict theories of regulation
51
3.
Typology of banking regulation
53
3.1.
Categories of banking regulation by objective
53
3.2.
Types of regulation by effect
56
4.
The case for market discipline
59
4.1.
Stimulating market pressure
60
4.2.
Market endogenous mechanisms---rating agencies
60
pt. II
The normative analysis of prudential issues
63
3.
An evolutionary perspective on prudential rules
65
1.
The European corpus of prudential norms
65
2.
Early prudential concerns
66
3.
The First Banking Directive
68
4.
Post-FBD regulatory measures
71
5.
The 1985 White Paper approach
73
6.
The Second Banking Directive
76
7.
The complementary body of technical prudential rules
78
7.1.
Own funds
79
7.2.
Solvency ratio
80
7.3.
Large exposures
81
7.4.
Consolidated supervision
82
7.5.
Capital adequacy
83
7.6.
Investment services
84
8.
Financial markets regulation-the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
85
9.
The post-FSAP strategy-the 2005 White Paper on Financial Services Policy
88
10.
Regulatory reactions prompted by the crisis
91
4.
The multiple layers of prudential rules
94
1.
The EU and the Basel Committee
94
1.1.
The specific features of the Basel Committee and its work
95
1.2.
The participation of the EU/EC in the Basel Committee
100
2.
The Lamfalussy framework
105
2.1.
Essential versus non-essential implementing measures
108
3.
The multi-layered character of prudential regulation
111
4.
Coordination of conflicting prudential norms
113
5.
The interaction of prudential regulation with other categories of norms
114
5.1.
Prudential regulation and corporate law
115
5.2.
Prudential norms and accounting rules
118
5.3.
Prudential regulation and auditing
119
5.4.
Prudential norms and consumer protection law
120
5.5.
Prudential norms and competition law
121
5.
Substantive aspects of prudential regulation
124
1.
The 2006 capital requirements framework for banks and investment firms
126
1.1.
The general approach of Basel II/CRD
127
1.2.
Some preliminary remarks
128
2.
Definitions and general prudential principles
131
3.
Credit risk-the revised standardised approach
133
4.
The internal ratings based (IRB) approach for credit risk
135
5.
Market risk and operational risk
138
6.
The supervisory review process
139
7.
Market discipline
145
8.
The home-host issue
147
9.
The review of the CRD
149
6.
The principles characterising the European prudential regulatory regime
152
1.
Harmonisation of prudential banking regulation
152
1.1.
The harmonisation paradigm-from minimum towards maximum harmonisation
153
1.2.
The scope of European prudential harmonisation
156
1.3.
European prudential regulation between the public-private domains
158
1.4.
Prudential regulation between EU and Member States' competence
160
2.
The home-country control principle
165
2.1.
The scope of the home-country control principle
165
2.2.
Host-country competences provided in EU legislation
167
2.3.
The general good clause and prudential regulation
170
2.4.
Assessing the home-country control principle
175
pt. III
Institutional aspects of prudential regulation and supervision
183
7.
The institutional framework-general aspects
185
1.
Setting the context
185
2.
Preliminary remarks concerning the European regulatory framework
189
2.1.
The evolutionary approach towards institutional change
191
2.2.
Institutional balance-the constant concern
195
2.3.
The four-level approach in brief
197
3.
Supervisory arrangements-two underlying dilemmas
202
8.
The European institutional framework for prudential banking regulation
204
1.
Interaction between Commission, Council and Parliament
204
2.
The committees
208
2.1.
Multiplicity and variety
209
2.2.
The Banking Advisory Committee
214
2.3.
The European Banking Committee (EBC)
215
2.4.
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
217
3.
The European Central Banks̀ involvement in prudential regulation
225
3.1.
ECBs̀ advisory functions
226
3.2.
Participation of the ECB in regulatory bodies
230
3.3.
A latent autonomous regulatory function for the ECB
232
4.
The role of private parties in the regulatory process
234
9.
The European institutional framework for prudential banking supervision
237
1.
National supervisory authorities
238
1.1.
Member States' autonomy
240
1.2.
The Europeanisation of national banking supervisory structures
242
1.3.
National central banks and prudential banking supervision
244
2.
The meta-level of supervision
251
2.1.
The role of CEBS in banking supervision
251
2.2.
The Groupe de Contact
254
2.3.
The Banking Supervision Committee
255
2.4.
The instruments underpinning the meta-level of supervision
257
3.
Private parties' involvement in supervision
265
3.1.
Banks' internal models
266
3.2.
External credit ratings
267
10.
The way forward
269
1.
Constraints for devising the supervisory arrangements in the EU
271
1.1.
Conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality
271
1.2.
EU checks and balances
273
1.3.
The broader unfinished puzzle
276
2.
Institutional scenarios for future European banking supervision
278
2.1.
Decentralisation-based scenarios
279
2.2.
Centralisation-based scenarios
281
2.3.
Centralisation within the ECB-the enabling clause
284
2.4.
Enhanced cooperation
287
3.
The 2009 proposals for reforming the EU supervisory architecture
290
3.1.
Macro-prudential supervisory arrangements
291
3.2.
Micro-prudential supervisory arrangements
294
pt. IV
The European dimension of supervisory liability
299
11.
The issue of supervisory liability
301
1.
Actuality
301
1.1.
Juridification and formalisation
301
1.2.
Focusing on enforcement
303
1.3.
The depositor as a consumer
305
1.4.
Refined distribution of responsibility for supervision
307
1.5.
The Peter Paul affair-not yet the end of the debate
308
2.
Supervisory liability-what is at stake?
310
2.1.
Instances of supervisory liability
310
2.2.
Various layers of implementation of European prudential norms
312
2.3.
Responsibility in case of banking failure
313
2.4.
Supervisory liability versus rescue operations and deposit insurance
315
2.5.
Supervisory discretion and judicial control
318
2.6.
Statutory immunity of the banking supervisor
320
2.7.
Public expectations
322
2.8.
The quest for common normative boundaries for supervisory liability
323
12.
The current state of supervisory liability under European law
325
1.
The scope of Member States' liability for breaches of EU law
325
2.
The conditions for Member States' liability-the centrality of rights
329
3.
The issue of direct effect
332
4.
The EU law issue before national courts
334
5.
The Peter Paul affair
341
6.
A critical appraisal of the Peter Paul judgment
344
13.
Future European scenarios for supervisory liability
348
1.
Supervisory liability under the CRD
348
1.1.
Does the CRD confer rights to depositors?
349
1.2.
The seriousness of breach requirement in the context of supervisory liability
358
1.3.
The direct causal link between breach and damages
361
2.
The liability issue at EU level
362
2.1.
The liability regime of the ECB with regard to supervisory tasks
363
2.2.
Responsibility of CEBS for its contribution to the supervisory process
366
2.3.
Some final remarks anticipating the liability of a European supervisory authority
367
Concluding remarks
369
1.
Europeanisation of prudential regulation and supervision
369
2.
Refinement of prudential policy
374
3.
Reassessment of supervisory liability
377
Bibliography
379
Tables of legislation and documents
397
Index
410