Copyright and economic theory : friends or foes? / Richard Watt.
2000
K1420.5 .W38 2000 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Copyright and economic theory : friends or foes? / Richard Watt.
Published
Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : E. Elgar, [2000]
Copyright
©2000
Call Number
K1420.5 .W38 2000
Former Call Number
Comp 673 W34 2000
ISBN
1840643129
Description
ix, 210 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)43694421
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
1
Introduction
1
1.1Some basic definitions and terminology
3
1.2The simple economics of copyright
11
1.3Economics and the law
15
1.4A very short history of the origins of copyright
17
1.5Focus and structure of the book
21
2
The Economics of Copyright Piracy
24
2.1Three closely related areas
26
2.2The economic theory of copying
30
2.3The economic value of the costs of piracy
33
2.4An economic model of copyright piracy: the perfect substitute case
37
2.5Self-protection strategies
54
2.6When can piracy be favourable?
58
3
The Royalty Contract
71
3.1The optimal linear royalty
74
3.2Non-linear royalty contracts and risk sharing
85
4
Unresolved Issues in Copyright Law
108
4.1Copyright law and social optimality: an introduction
111
4.2Should copyright law exist? The early literature
113
4.3Formal economic models of optimal copyright law
123
4.4Other aspects of copyright law
132
5
An equilibrium Analysis of Copyright Law
138
5.1Optimal copyright law in the piracy model
139
6
Copyright Collectives
161
6.1Introductory concepts
162
6.2Copyright collectives as monopolies
166
6.3Competition among collectives
177
6.4Regulation of copyright collectives
190
7
Shake Hands and Make Up
200
Index
205