A philosophy of criminal attempts / Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov, Swansea University College of Law.
2015
K5090 .D66 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Title
A philosophy of criminal attempts / Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov, Swansea University College of Law.
Published
Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Call Number
K5090 .D66 2015
ISBN
9781107029835 hardcover
110702983X hardcover
110702983X hardcover
Description
xiv, 238 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)894128679
Summary
"An investigation of criminal attempts unearths some of the most fundamental, intriguing and perplexing questions about criminal law and its place in human action. When does attempting begin? What is the relationship between attempting and intending? Do we always attempt the possible and, if so, possible to whom? Does attempting involve action and does action involve attempting? Is my attempt fixed by me or can another perspective reveal what it is? How 'much' action is needed for an attempt, how 'much' intention is needed and can these matters be decided categorically? Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov's answers to these questions will interest criminal law theorists, philosophers and lawyers or law reformers, who encounter the mixed practical and philosophical phenomenon of attempting. Inspired by G. E. M. Anscombe's philosophy, Part I examines attempting generally and its relationship with intention, action subjectivity, and possibility. From the conclusions reached, Part II proposes a specific theory of criminal attempts"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 219-225) and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Table of Contents
Preface
xi
Table of cases
xiii
Introduction
1
pt. I
The anatomy of attempting
7
1.
Attempts and intention
9
1.1.
Understandings of intention
10
Intention and reasons for action
10
Intention and planning
16
Intention as being on the way to intentional action
21
1.2.
Intentional action as the sole category of intention
26
Intending as an epistemic perspective
31
Constructing intentions
32
Summary
34
1.3.
Intention and attempts
34
2.
Attempts and action
38
2.1.
Attempting as a species of intentional action
39
Basic `actions' are not (intentional) actions and cannot be attempted
40
Internal actions are intentional actions and can be attempted
45
(Descriptions of) attempts are narrower than (descriptions of) intentional actions
48
Intentional action and responsibility
52
The epistemic perspective in attempting
56
The fusion of actus reus and mens rea in attempts
58
2.2.
Action in attempts
59
All `beings on the way', however inchoate, are attempts
60
Successful actions as attempts
64
`Trying to try' is indistinguishable from trying
65
3.
Attempts and subjectivity
66
3.1.
Agent relative subjectivity
68
Why there might be no truth of the matter
75
3.2.
Third-party subjectivity
78
Intangibility
79
Invisibility
80
Multiple application
81
Multiple accounts
85
4.
Attempts and possibility
87
4.1.
The distinction between what is attempted and what happens in an attempt
88
Meeting objections
90
Alternatives
94
Attempting what is known to be impossible
95
4.2.
The need for descriptive accuracy: implications for `impossibility'
98
pt. II
The implications for criminal law
105
5.
Actus reus and mens rea
107
5.1.
Acts are not (mere) physical movements: implications for the mens rea/actus reus distinction
109
Michael Moore on the validity of the mens rea/actus reus distinction
110
After Moore: the fusion of actus reus and mens rea
117
Three objections
119
5.2.
Actus reus and mens rea: when is criminal blame warranted?
123
Liability based on an equivalence between complete offences and attempts
126
6.
Impossibility and extraordinariness in criminal attempts
134
6.1.
Ex post analysis in criminal attempts: practice and scholarship
135
Various kinds of `impossible attempts'
138
6.2.
Blameworthiness for extraordinary attempts
143
Harmfulness as a rationale for distinguishing extraordinary attempters
146
6.3.
Legal impossibility
152
7.
Criminal attempts and moral luck
154
7.1.
Equivalence theory
156
What is right about equivalence theory
156
What may be wrong with equivalence theory
159
7.2.
An alternative basis for the `equal blame' thesis
164
7.3.
Non-equivalence theory
166
Argument from risk
166
Argument from communicative response
168
7.4.
Argument from punishment
169
8.
Reckless attempts?
176
8.1.
Recklessness as a kind of intentional action
176
Recklessness as a moral term
181
8.2.
If an offence can be committed recklessly, should it also be possible to attempt the offence through recklessness?
184
(Apparent) attempts that are not attempts to bring about the end set
185
8.3.
Should there be an inchoate form of recklessness?
188
Attempts and inchoate recklessness compared
188
Inchoate recklessness and `complete' recklessness compared
192
9.
Inchoate theft and inchoate rape
194
9.1.
The problems that arise in identifying the objects of attempts
195
9.2.
Attempted theft and appropriation
197
9.3.
Rape and attempting circumstances
204
9.4.
What could the inchoate offences look like?
210
Bibliography
219
Index
226