A nascent common law : the process of decisionmaking in international legal disputes between states and foreign investors / by Frédéric Gilles Sourgens.
2015
K2100 .S798 2015 (Map It)
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Title
A nascent common law : the process of decisionmaking in international legal disputes between states and foreign investors / by Frédéric Gilles Sourgens.
Published
Leiden ; Boston : Brill Nijhoff, [2015]
Call Number
K2100 .S798 2015
ISBN
9789004288195 (hardback ; alk. paper)
9004288198 (hardback ; alk. paper)
9789004288201 (e-book)
9004288201 (e-book)
9004288198 (hardback ; alk. paper)
9789004288201 (e-book)
9004288201 (e-book)
Description
xxviii, 398 pages ; 25 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)893452185
Summary
Frédéric Gilles Sourgens submits that investor-state dispute resolution relies upon an inductive, common law decisionmaking process, which reveals a necessary plurality of first principles within investor-state dispute resolution. Relying upon, amongst others, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the book explains how this plurality of first principles does not devolve into arbitrary indeterminacy.0This book provides an alternative account to current theoretical conceptions of investor-state arbitration. It explains that these theories cannot adequately resolve a key empirical challenge: tribunals frequently reach facially inconsistent results on similar questions of law. Sourgens makes an inductive approach, focused on the manner of decisionmaking by tribunals in the context of specific records that can explain this inconsistency.
Note
Frédéric Gilles Sourgens submits that investor-state dispute resolution relies upon an inductive, common law decisionmaking process, which reveals a necessary plurality of first principles within investor-state dispute resolution. Relying upon, amongst others, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the book explains how this plurality of first principles does not devolve into arbitrary indeterminacy.0This book provides an alternative account to current theoretical conceptions of investor-state arbitration. It explains that these theories cannot adequately resolve a key empirical challenge: tribunals frequently reach facially inconsistent results on similar questions of law. Sourgens makes an inductive approach, focused on the manner of decisionmaking by tribunals in the context of specific records that can explain this inconsistency.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 369-394) and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Szladits Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Szladits Fund
Table of Contents
Preface
xiii
Table of Cases
xv
Part 1 The Framework of Investor-State Arbitration
1.
Critical Mass: The Unique Role of Investor-State Arbitration in International Law
3
1.1.
Quantitative Explanation
6
1.2.
Qualitative Explanation
11
1.3.
Functional Explanation
17
1.4.
Consequence of Doctrinal Divergence
20
1.5.
Method
25
2.
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Adjudicatory Framework
30
2.1.
Beneath the Contract Law Analogy
35
2.1.1.
The Imperfections of the Contract Law Analogy
37
2.1.2.
The Virtues of the Contract Law Analogy
45
2.2.
Beneath the Treaty Analogy
48
2.2.1.
The Imperfections of the Treaty Analogy
50
2.2.2.
The Virtues of the Treaty Analogy
53
2.3.
Reconstructing Investor-State Arbitration through Unilateral Acts
55
3.
Stability of the Adjudicatory Framework
61
3.1.
The Offer and Acceptance Analogy and Denunciation of the ICSID Convention
64
3.2.
The Offer and Acceptance Analogy and the Termination of Standing Consent Instruments
72
3.3.
Denunciation and Modification under the Treaty Analogy
75
3.4.
Denunciation and Modification of Consents to Arbitration under the Unilateral Act Model
79
3.5.
Implications for the Process of Decisionmaking
85
4.
Iura Novit Curia
93
4.1.
Beneath Iura Novit Curia
95
4.1.1.
The Problems of Applying Iura Novit Curia in Investor-State Arbitration
101
4.1.2.
The Virtues of Iura Novit Curia
111
4.2.
Beneath the Terms of Reference
116
4.2.1.
The Problems of Limiting Applicable Law to the Pleadings
118
4.2.2.
The Virtues of Limiting Applicable Law to the Pleadings
122
4.3.
Reconstructing Iura Novit Curia as Urteilskraft
123
Part 2 Establishing Jutisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration
5.
The Problem of Jurisdictional Judgment
141
5.1.
Burdens of Proof and Persuasion in Establishing Jurisdiction
144
5.1.1.
Existence and Scope of Consent
148
5.1.2.
Jurisdictional Facts
157
5.2.
The Shortcomings of Use of Burdens of Proof and Persuasion in the Jurisdictional Context
168
5.3.
Ex Officio Establishment of Jurisdiction
175
5.4.
The Shortcomings of Jurisdictional Decisionmalcing Ex Officio
179
5.5.
Preliminary Reconciliation
183
6.
Proof of Consent
185
6.1.
The Function of Jurisdiction in International Law[—]Factory at Chorzów
187
6.2.
Application of the Factory at Chorzów Approach in Investor-State Arbitrations
194
6.3.
The Process of Jurisdictional Proof of Consent in Investor-State Arbitration
197
6.4.
Investor Reliance and Interpretation of Consent Instruments
200
6.5.
Clarity Presumptions are Inconsistent with the Factory at Chorzów Approach
203
6.6.
Reevaluating Jurisdictional Decisions in Light of the Proof of Law
205
7.
Establishment of Jurisdictional Facts
207
7.1.
A Level Playing Field[—]Proof of Jurisdictional Facts Before the International Court of Justice
208
7.2.
The Practice of Investment Tribunals
210
7.3.
De Facto Burdens of Production
218
7.4.
Burden of Production and Factual Presumptions
223
7.5.
Dispositive Use of Burdens Revisited
226
8.
The Inductive Process of Jurisdictional Decisionmaking
229
8.1.
Jurisdictional Balancing as Exercise of Independent Judgment
230
8.2.
Jurisdictional Balancing and the Nature of Consent
238
8.3.
The Inductive Triangulation of Jurisdictional Equilibrium Points
242
Part 3 Developing Investment Protection as Common Law
9.
The Precedent Problem
253
9.1.
Investor-State Awards as Evincing Customary International Law
256
9.2.
Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle[—]The Alleged Illegitimacy of BIT Arbitrations
264
9.3.
Grand Bargains and Self-contained Regimes
270
9.4.
The Critical Knot
280
10.
Law as Process
284
10.1.
Reliance upon Earlier Decisions in the Investor-State Arbitral Process
286
10.2.
Divergence of Investor-State Arbitral Awards
305
10.2.1.
The Argentine Cases
305
10.2.2.
The NAFTA Cases
314
10.2.3.
CME/Lauder Cases
317
10.2.4.
The SGS Cases
319
10.3.
Conclusion
321
11.
The Common Law Solution
326
11.1.
Civil Law System and Common Law Process
329
11.2.
Investor-State Arbitration as Common Law
334
11.3.
Law in Multiple Dimensions
337
11.4.
Resolving the Problems of the Prevalent Approaches
342
11.5.
Prior Decisions as Persuasive Precedent
348
11.6.
Legitimacy Restored: The Virtue of Divergence
352
Part 4 Conclusion
12.
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
357
12.1.
Independent Judgment
358
12.2.
The Inductive, Synthetic Nature of Judgment
361
12.3.
Judgment and the Transnational Legal Process
363
12.4.
Autopoiesis Revisited
365
Bibliography
369
Index
395