Sovereign debt management / edited by Rosa M. Lastra, Lee Buchheit.
2014
K4450 .S67 2014 (Map It)
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Title
Sovereign debt management / edited by Rosa M. Lastra, Lee Buchheit.
Published
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Copyright
©2014
Call Number
K4450 .S67 2014
Edition
First edition.
ISBN
9780199671106
0199671109
0199671109
Description
lvi, 487 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)859580346
Note
"This book is also intended as a liber amoricum in honor of Lee Buchheit"--Preface.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Table of Cases
xxxv
Table of Legislation
xxxix
List of Contributors
xlvii
List of Abbreviations
li
I.
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
1.
Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots / Elena L. Daly
1.
Introduction
1
2.
The Context
2
3.
Techniques to Encourage Creditor Participation
11
4.
Implications
35
2.
Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Sticks / Elena L. Daly
3.
Techniques to Discourage Holdouts
10
4.
Conclusion
35
3.
Managing Holdouts: The Case of the 2012 Greek Exchange / G. Mitu Gulati
1.
Introduction: Argentina versus Greece
1
2.
The Basics
4
3.
Why Did the Restructuring Succeed? Creditor Incentives
24
4.
Conclusions
54
4.
Revisiting the Pari Passu Clause / Georges Affaki
2.
Equal Ranking
2
3.
Earmarking of Assets
10
4.
Equal Payment
15
5.
The Elliott--Peru Saga
17
6.
Targeting Third Parties
27
7.
The Quest for the Origins of the Pari Passu
32
8.
Chaos in the Market
46
9.
Conclusion
50
5.
The Role of the International Monetary Fund / Rosa M. Lastra
2.
The History
3
3.
The Tools
14
4.
Sovereign Debt and the IMF
23
5.
Conclusions
64
6.
Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries / Thomas A. Duvall
2.
The Initial HIPC Debt Initiative
3
3.
The Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative
12
4.
The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
25
5.
Conclusions
29
7.
The Longer-Term Consequences of Sovereign Debt Restructuring / Odette Lienau
2.
Avoiding Conflation in Key Terms
4
3.
The Possible Consequences of Selective Emphasis
8
4.
A Focus on the Longer-Run Ramifications of Debt Restructuring
15
5.
Conclusion
29
II.
Enforcement Of Sovereign Debt
8.
Defences / Jacob H. Johnston
2.
Sovereign Debt Litigation Defences
4
3.
Conclusion
46
9.
Special Immunities: Central Bank Immunity / David Gross
2.
Argentina I
8
3.
Argentina II
19
4.
Conclusion
33
10.
Special Immunities: Bank for International Settlements / Diego Devos
2.
The Bank for International Settlements and its Immunities
3
3.
BIS Immunities Challenged by Holdout Bondholders Creditors of Argentina
12
4.
Conclusions
28
11.
Creditors' Remedies / Ryan McCarl
2.
The Implications of NML v. Argentina: A Pessimists View
9
3.
An Alternative Story: NML Capital as an Outlier
27
4.
Conclusion
43
12.
Sovereign Arbitration / Karen Halverson Cross
2.
Arbitration Clauses in Sovereign Debt Contracts
2
3.
Investor--State Arbitration of Sovereign Debt Disputes
8
4.
Conclusion
52
III.
Complicating Factors
13.
Restructuring in a Monetary Union: Legal Aspects / Antonio Sainz de Vicuna
2.
Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Case of a State Participating in the European Monetary Union: Elements of Differentiation Vis-a-Vis other Sovereign Debt Restructurings
6
3.
Analysis of Some Legal Issues Arising in the Restructuring of the Sovereign Debt of the Hellenic Republic in 2012
20
4.
Legal Framework for Debt Issuance by States Participating in the European Monetary Union
34
5.
Idea of Establishing a Statutory Framework for Debt Restructuring within a Regional Monetary Union
47
6.
Conclusions
50
14.
Restructuring in a Monetary Union: Economic Aspects / Daniel Gros
2.
Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union
10
3.
Who Holds Sovereign Debt in Europe?
21
4.
Strengthening Financial Market Resilience
30
5.
Concluding Remarks
52
15.
Sovereign Debt and Banking Crises: An "Arial View" / Anna Gelpern
1.
Introduction: Font Matters
1
2.
Far from Europe
5
3.
Banks or Governments
9
4.
Governments or Banks
24
5.
Back to Europe (the Doom Loop)
39
6.
Conclusions
43
16.
International Lender of Last Resort: A Floor of Support for Troubled Sovereign Debt / Adam Lerrick
2.
A Third Party in a Two-Party Game
8
3.
For an International Lender of Last Resort: Incentives, Discipline, and Control of Risk
15
4.
A Floor of Support to Preserve the Flow of Private Sector Funds
21
5.
A Floor of Support to Restore Private Sector Investment Flows
33
6.
A Floor of Support to Underpin an Orderly Restructuring
42
7.
Toward a Credible International Lender of Last Resort
49
17.
Odious Debt / Sir William Blair
2.
The Position of an Assignee of the Debt
9
3.
Turning Metal into Gold: A Case of Alchemy
20
4.
The Lessons to Be Learned
34
5.
The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010
38
6.
Postscript
42
18.
Sovereign Contingent Liabilities / G. Mitu Gulati
2.
Sovereign Comfort
3
3.
Contingent Charms
9
4.
The Explosion of 2008--12
12
5.
Precedents
18
6.
The Restructurer's Dilemma
24
7.
Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Obligations
33
8.
Conclusions
51
IV.
Economics Of Sovereign Borrowing
19.
Why Governments Default / Ebrahim Rahbari
2.
Enforcement of Private Debt Contracts
3
3.
Sovereign Default
8
4.
So Why Do Governments Default?
26
5.
The Political Economy of When and How to Default as a Sovereign
71
6.
Conclusions
80
20.
Sovereign Debt Markets / Gene Frieda
2.
Sovereign Borrowing: The Last Thirty Years
11
3.
Macro Drivers of Demand for Sovereign Debt
19
4.
Emerging Market Self-Insurance and the Rise of China
24
5.
Surfing the China Wave
29
6.
The Apparent End of `Original Sin'
35
7.
Sovereign Debt Demand Dynamics
43
8.
Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction
57
9.
Europe: A Microcosm of Past, Present, and Future Crises
68
10.
Lessons Learned, Ignored, and Forgotten
86
11.
The Fallen Saints of Original Sin
88
12.
The Limits of Conflict Resolution
100
13.
Hostages to Benchmarks and Ratings
106
14.
Conclusion
109
21.
Borrowing and Debt: How Do Sovereigns Get into Trouble? / Arturo C. Porzecanski
2.
Budgetary Outcomes
7
3.
Contingent Liabilities and Currency Mismatches
12
4.
Maturity Mismatches and High Coupons
24
5.
Access to Financing
35
6.
Indicators of Debt Sustainability
44
7.
Conclusions
55
V.
Proposals To Reform Sovereign Debt Systems
22.
Statutory Sovereign Debt Resolution Mechanisms / Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal
2.
The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)
4
3.
The European Stability Mechanism: An Institution Designed to Avert Financial Crises
36
4.
Perfecting the Status Quo
69
5.
Concluding Remarks
77
6.
Corollary
81
23.
Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery / Sean Hagan
2.
Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Context of a Systemic Crisis
5
3.
The Resolution of Financial Institutions in a Cross-Border Context
21
4.
Household Debt and its Systemic Implications
44
5.
Restructuring Sovereign Debt: An Unresolved Problem
53
6.
Conclusion
77
24.
Corporate Bankruptcy Law and State Insolvencies / Philip R. Wood
2.
How Do Sovereign Bankruptcies Work?
5
3.
What Rights Do Creditors Have?
12
4.
Moratorium on Payments and Attachments
22
5.
Bankruptcy Ladder of Priorities
27
6.
Control of the Debtor's Financing
43
7.
Reorganization Plans
54
8.
Discharge of a Debtor
65
9.
Other Differences between Corporate and Sovereign Insolvencies
67
10.
International Bankruptcy Court
68
11.
General Differences in Status
72
12.
Conclusion
73
25.
European Collective Action Clauses / David Billington
1.
What is a Collective Action Clause?
1
2.
The Holdout Creditor Problem
3
3.
Are CACs the Only Way?
7
4.
Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt
10
5.
The Move towards Standardization: Model CACs pre-2013
17
6.
The European Sovereign Crisis and Response
21
7.
The Model Clause in Detail
25
8.
Conclusion
73
26.
Eurozone Financial Rescue and Stabilization Measures, and their Legal Foundations / Nikita Aggarwal
2.
Background to the Crisis
4
3.
EU Financial Rescue and Stabilization Measures, and Legal Foundations
20
4.
Future Financing Measures: Longer-Term Solutions
69
5.
Concluding Observations
76
27.
UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Financing / Yuefen Li
2.
The Need for Global Principles to Promote Responsible Sovereign Financing
6
3.
The PRSLB Tackle Global Debt Problems with Well-Rooted and Tested Principles
19
4.
Injecting Legitimacy into the PRSLB through its Decision-Making Process: Representation, Consultation, and Deliberation
32
5.
Soft Law Facilitates Endorsement and Implementation
37
6.
The Role of the United Nations in the Global Economic Agenda and the PRSLB
47
7.
Concluding Remarks. The PRSLB in the Progression of International Law
57
28.
Sovereign Debt in the Light of Eternity / Lee C. Buchheit
2.
The Moral Element
3
3.
The Legal Element
10
4.
The Financial Element
15
5.
The Political Element
20
Appendix
471
Index
473