Law and the limits of government : temporary versus permanent legislation / Frank Fagan.
2013
K284 .F34 2013 (Map It)
On loan from Cellar, due 22. Feb 2020
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Items
Details
Author
Title
Law and the limits of government : temporary versus permanent legislation / Frank Fagan.
Published
Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA : Edward Elgar, [2013]
Copyright
©2013
Call Number
K284 .F34 2013
ISBN
9780857938657 (hardback)
0857938657 (hardback)
9780857938664 (e-book)
0857938665 (e-book)
0857938657 (hardback)
9780857938664 (e-book)
0857938665 (e-book)
Description
xii, 153 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)830351335
Summary
Law and the Limits of Government by Frank Fagan is a creative and enormously useful book for any scholar of legislation, timing rules, and politics. Jacob Gersen, Harvard Law School, US Why do legislatures pass laws that automatically expire? Why are so many tax cuts sunset? In this first book-length treatment of those questions, the author explains that legislatures pass laws temporarily in order to reduce opposition from the citizenry, to increase the level of information revealed by lobbies, and to externalize the political costs of changing the tax code on to future legislatures. This book provides a careful analysis which does not normatively prescribe either permanent or temporary legislation in every instance, but rather specifies the conditions for which either permanent or temporary legislation would maximize social welfare. Containing comprehensive, theoretical and empirical analysis of temporary lawmaking, Law and the Limits of Government will appeal to academics in law, economic and political science, lawmakers and policy advocates.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 142-146) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of figures
vii
List of tables
ix
Foreword Francesco Parisi
x
Acknowledgements
xii
pt. I
THEORY
1.
Introduction
3
2.
Short- to medium-term residual effects
10
2.1.
Introduction
10
2.2.
The model
13
2.2.1.
Agent relations
14
2.2.2.
Agent's optimal compliance
23
2.2.3.
Legislature's optimal timing rule
25
2.3.
Comparing welfare
27
2.4.
Discussion
29
2.5.
Conclusion
31
Appendix
33
3.
Long-term residual effects
35
3.1.
Introduction
35
3.2.
Social norms
37
3.2.1.
The norm consumer
41
3.2.2.
The norm producer
44
3.3.
From voluntary to involuntary compliance
47
3.3.1.
The introduction of a norm
50
3.3.2.
The disappearance of second-party enforcement
51
3.3.3.
The disappearance of first-party enforcement
54
3.4.
Conclusion
56
4.
Information and commitment
58
4.1.
Introduction
58
4.2.
The model
64
4.3.
Equilibrium analysis
67
4.3.1.
The insufficient reputation reward setting
67
4.3.2.
The sufficient reputation reward setting
68
4.3.3.
The equivalence setting
69
4.4.
Comparing welfare
70
4.5.
Conclusion
73
Appendix
75
5.
Temporary tax legislation
77
5.1.
Introduction
77
5.2.
Cost-benefit analysis
81
5.2.1.
The normative neutrality of rent extraction
87
5.2.2.
The ambiguous cost of uncertainty
91
5.2.3.
The unambiguous cost of reelection strategy
96
5.3.
Conclusion
100
pt. II
EVIDENCE
6.
Passage probability
105
6.1.
Introduction
105
6.2.
Theory
106
6.3.
Data and summary statistics
109
6.4.
Findings
112
6.5.
Conclusion
122
7.
Sponsor's age
124
7.1.
Introduction
124
7.2.
Theory
125
7.3.
Data and summary statistics
126
7.4.
Findings
134
7.5.
Conclusion
135
8.
Conclusion
137
Bibliography
142
Index
147