Separation of powers and legislative organization : the President, the Senate, and political parties in the making of House rules / Gisela Sin, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
2015
KF4990 .S58 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Separation of powers and legislative organization : the President, the Senate, and political parties in the making of House rules / Gisela Sin, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Published
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Call Number
KF4990 .S58 2015
ISBN
9781107048799 (hardback)
1107048796 (hardback)
9781107626096 (paperback)
1107626099 (paperback)
1316057739
9781316057735
1107048796 (hardback)
9781107626096 (paperback)
1107626099 (paperback)
1316057739
9781316057735
Description
xvii, 193 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)872655177
Summary
"This book examines how the constitutional requirements of the lawmaking process, combined with the factional divisions within parties, affect U.S. representatives' decisions about how to distribute power among themselves. The incorporation of the presidential, senatorial, and House factions in the analysis of House rule making marks an important departure from previous theories, which analyze the House as an institution that makes laws in isolation. This book argues that, by constitutional design, the success of the House in passing legislation is highly contingent on the actions of the Senate and the president; and therefore, also by constitutional design, House members must anticipate such actions when they design their rules. An examination of major rule changes from 1879 to 2013 finds that changes in the preferences of constitutional actors outside the House, as well as the political alignment of these political actors vis-a-vis House factions, are crucial for predicting the timing and directionality of rule changes"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 177-190) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Tables
x
Acknowledgments
xiii
1.
A Constitutional Perspective on House Organization
1
2.
Constitutional Actors and Intraparty Groups
8
Constitutional Actors
8
Intraparty Groups
10
Identifying Intraparty Groups
13
Majority Intraparty Groups within the Democratic and Republican Parties
17
Conclusion
36
3.
A Constitutional Theory of Legislative Organization
37
Theories and Models of Lawmaking in the United States
37
The Model: Explaining Changes in House Organization
40
The Power-Sharing Game
42
The Legislative Game
44
Equilibrium Properties
47
Conclusion
51
4.
Timing of House Organizational Changes
53
Timing of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives
53
Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Implications
54
The Model's Implications for Timing: When Do House Members Adopt New Rules?
55
House Rules: Defining the Universe of Rules and Organizational Changes
58
Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Analysis
60
House Rule Changes, 1961
61
House Rule Changes, 1995-1013
62
House Rule Changes, 1879-2013
64
Conclusion
71
5.
The Senate and White House Shadows: Centralization and Decentralization of the Rules of the U.S. House, 1879-1013
72
The Directionality of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives
72
Theory: Explaining the Directionality of Rule Changes
74
Centralization of Power [—] Empowering the Speaker
74
Decentralization of Power [—] Revolting against One's Own Leader
79
Decentralization of Power [—] Empowering Outliers
83
Empirical Implications: The Directionality of Rule Changes
87
Empirical Analysis: Data and Measurement
87
Measuring the Positions of Constitutional Actors: House Factions, the Senate, and the President
87
Rules and the Distribution of Power within the Majority Party: Coding Centralization and Decentralization of Power in the House
90
Analysis
91
No Changes in CS
91
Change in CS and the Non-Speaker Group Gained an Ally (Allies) in the Senate and/or President (Senate and/or President Closer to the Non-Speaker Faction Than to the Speaker)
92
Change in CS and Senate and President Move Closer to the Speaker Group (Non-Speaker Group Has No Outside Allies)
94
Change in CS and the House Minority Party Gains Control of President and Senate
94
Multinomial Analysis
97
Conclusion
99
6.
New Rules for an Old Speaker: Revisiting the 1910 Revolt against Speaker Cannon
101
The Revolt against Speaker Cannon
102
Prevailing Interpretation of the Revolt
104
Is the Prevailing Interpretation Correct?
105
Timing of the Revolt: Why Did the Progressives Revolt Only after Cannon Had Been Serving as the Speaker for More than Six Years?
105
Why Not a Revolt before the 1909 CS Changes?
106
Why Did the Revolt Happen a Year after Taft's Election?
113
Directionality of the Revolt
121
Presidential Change, Policy Differences, and Roll Call Data
123
Alternative Explanation: Cannon Was Most Autocratic during the Year prior to the Revolt
125
Conclusion
126
7.
Conclusion
127
Appendix A Constitutional Actors, Partisanship, and House Majority Party Factions
131
Appendix B Theoretical Proof
142
Appendix C List of Changes in the Rules and Procedures of the House
152
Appendix D Universe of Rules and Procedures
157
Appendix E Coding of William H. Taft and Calvin Coolidge Presidencies
159
Appendix F Directionality of Rules and Procedures
162
Appendix G Senate's Ideal Point
174
Bibliography
177
Index
191