Order within anarchy : the laws of war as an international institution / James D. Morrow, University of Michigan.
2014
KZ6385 .M665 2014 (Map It)
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Title
Order within anarchy : the laws of war as an international institution / James D. Morrow, University of Michigan.
Published
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Call Number
KZ6385 .M665 2014
ISBN
9781107048966 (hardback)
1107048966 (hardback)
9781107626775 (paperback)
1107626773 (paperback)
1107048966 (hardback)
9781107626775 (paperback)
1107626773 (paperback)
Description
xiv, 354 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)865297855
Summary
"Order Within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. International law as a political institution helps to create such expectations by specifying how violence should be limited and clarifying which actors should comply with those limits. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 321-336) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of Tables
ix
List of Figures
xi
Acknowledgments
xiii
1.
Introduction
1
Law Fosters Strategic Expectations
3
Self-Enforcing Institutions and International Law
5
Institutions and Norms in International Relations Theory and International Law
8
The Game-Theoretic Critique of Realism and Constructivism
11
Realism, Idealism, and International Law
14
Law as an Institutional Equilibrium
16
The Essential Social Nature of Game Theory
19
The Plan of the Book
20
2.
Common Conjectures, Norms, and Identities
23
Strategic Expectations and Common Conjectures
25
Social Facts: Norms, Identities, and Justifications
29
Common Conjectures in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma
34
Elaborations of Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma
40
Reciprocity, Common Conjectures, and Norms
46
Identities and Common Conjectures
47
Communication and Common Conjectures
50
Identities and Interests versus Preferences
53
Common Conjectures and Law
55
3.
The Laws of War in Their Strategic Context
58
The Laws of War
60
Problems Facing the Laws of War at the State Level
63
Deliberation Violation as State Policy
63
Opportunistic Defection
64
Self-interested Interpretation of the Rules
65
Problems Facing the Laws of War at the Individual Level: Agency and Noise
67
Violations by Individuals
68
Inadvertent Violations
68
Perfidy
69
Three Strategic Problems Facing an Effective System of Law of War
70
On the Battlefield
72
Military Discipline
74
State-to-State Compliance
75
Fusing the Models into One
77
Screening through Ratification
78
Firewalls
80
Elements of the Laws of War Not in the Model: Drawing "Bright Lines"
81
Issues in the Laws of War from the Perspective of the Model
82
Summary of Testable Hypotheses from the Model
86
3' Modeling Minutia
89
The Three Models
90
On the Battlefield
90
Military Discipline
94
State-to-State Deterrence
95
Violations and Compliance across the Three Models
101
Screening through Ratification
106
4.
Patterns of Compliance with the Laws of War during the Twentieth Century
111
Factors that Might Affect Compliance and Reciprocity
112
Legal Obligation
113
Regime Type
113
Different Issues
116
Relative Power
116
A Brief Description of the Data
117
The Correlation of Compliance
118
Ratification Status and Regime Type
119
State versus Individual Violations
123
Legal Clarity
124
Differences across Issues
127
Other Variables
129
Comparisons across Variables
130
Explaining the Patterns
130
Analysis of Outlying and Discordant Cases
132
Searching for Firewalls
134
Timing of First Violations
136
Cases of First Use Late in a War
140
Cases of Early First Use
141
Conclusion
144
4' Statistical Gore
146
The Data Collection
147
Clarifications of What Acts Are Violations
154
Coding Decisions for Specific Issue Areas
154
Measuring Compliance
159
Measures of Independent Variables
160
Treaty Status of Both States in Question
161
Power Relationship
162
Other Independent Variables
163
Estimation Issues
164
When Do States Comply?
166
Declaration of War
167
The Main Analyses
169
Multivariate Analysis of Reciprocity and Total Compliance
179
Searching for Firewalls with Numbers
183
Duration Analysis of First Violations
183
Dry Holes
191
5.
Spoilt Darlings? Treatment of Prisoners of War during the World Wars
192
The POW Treaties and the Obligations They Impose
193
The Strategic Logic of Prisoners of War
194
The Logic of the Battlefield
195
After Capture and before Imprisonment
197
Treatment while a Prisoner
198
POWs in World War I
199
Death Rates and Treatment in POW Camps
199
On the Battlefield
204
POWs in World War II
205
Death Rates in Camps
206
The War between Germany and the Western Allies
208
At the State Level and in the Camps
208
On the Battlefield
214
The Eastern Front
217
Between Totalitarian Governments
217
In the Camps
218
On the Battlefield
220
The War in the Pacific: No Game of Cricket
224
Between the Warring Parties
224
On the Battlefield
227
After the Shooting Stopped
231
An Alternative Explanation: Culture
234
Testing the Conclusions of the Model with the Cases
237
6.
Assessing Variation across Issues: Aerial Bombing, Chemical Weapons, Treatment of Civilians, and Conduct on the High Seas
240
Chemical Weapons
241
Aerial Bombing
247
Conduct on the High Seas
256
Treatment of Civilians
264
Other Explanations
270
Conclusion
274
7.
Dynamics of Common Conjectures: The Rational Evolution of Norms
277
The Sources and Ways of Change in Norms According to Constructivists
279
The Sources of Common Conjectures
280
What Is Evolutionary Game Theory?
283
The Dynamics of Conventions
286
Rational Evolution of Political Institutions
291
The Evolution of How Prisoners of War Should Be Treated
295
8.
Conclusion: Current Issues and Policy Insights
299
Does the Present Look Like the Past?
300
Challenges for the Laws of War in the Twenty-First Century
303
Terrorism and the Control of Violence: The Criminal Model versus the Combat Model
305
The Criminal Model
306
The Combat Model
307
Terrorism: The Gray Space between Criminality and Combat
309
The Perils of Universalism and Unilateralism
315
The Limits of International Law
317
Power and Legitimacy
319
References
321
Index
337