The public policy exception under the New York Convention : history, interpretation and application / Anton G. Maurer.
2013
K2400.A41958 M38 2013 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
The public policy exception under the New York Convention : history, interpretation and application / Anton G. Maurer.
Published
Huntington, New York : Juris, [2013]
Copyright
©2013
Call Number
K2400.A41958 M38 2013
Edition
Revised edition.
ISBN
9781937518226
1937518221
1937518221
Description
xiii, 384 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)857913428
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 351-365) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
xi
About the Author
xiii
ch. 1
Introduction
1
ch. 2
Interpretation of International Conventions
5
ch. 3
Drafting History of Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention
11
I.
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1927
12
II.
ICC Reviewed Geneva Convention and Prepared Preliminary Draft Convention
13
A.
Study of Improvements to International Arbitration
13
B.
ICC Draft Convention
14
C.
ICC Draft Convention and Public Policy Exception
14
III.
ECOSOC's Ad Hoc Committee Prepared Draft Convention
16
A.
Ad hoc Committee to Submit a Draft Convention
16
B.
Comments by Governments to ICC Draft Convention
17
C.
Meeting of the Ad hoc Committee
18
D.
Discussion of Public Policy Clause
18
E.
Draft Convention of Ad hoc Committee
23
IV.
Comments from Governments and NGOs to Draft Convention
26
A.
Comments from Governments
26
B.
Comments from NGOs
28
C.
Comments and Recommendation of the Secretary-General
30
D.
Memorandum by the Secretary-General
32
E.
Further Comments
33
F.
Consolidated Report by the Secretary-General
35
V.
United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration
35
A.
General Debate
36
B.
Proposals on, and Discussion of the Public Policy Clause in the Plenary Sessions
38
C.
Discussion of Public Policy Clause
41
D.
Working Party No. 3 for Articles III - V
43
E.
Discussion of the Proposal of Working Party No. 3 and Decision on Wording
46
F.
Drafting Committee
48
G.
Final Text Approval
48
H.
Resolution on Measures for Increasing Effectiveness of Arbitration
49
I.
Signing
50
ch. 4
Interpretation of Art. V(2)(b)
53
I.
Limitation of Grounds
53
A.
Literal Interpretation
53
B.
Confirmed by Drafting History
54
II.
Contrary to the Public Policy "of That Country"
54
A.
Literal Interpretation
54
B.
Not Governing Law nor Lex Arbitri
54
C.
No Transnational Public Policy Intended
55
D.
Differences Were Accepted
57
III.
Literal Interpretation: "Public Policy" Is Not Identical with "Domestic Law"
58
A.
Making Enforcement Easier Than under the 1927 Geneva Convention
58
B.
Mistake in Fact or Law is Not Included in Art. V
59
C.
Even the 1927 Geneva Convention Was Narrower Than "Domestic Law"
59
D.
Differences in the Wording of the Public Policy Clause
59
E.
Confirmed by Drafting History
60
IV.
"May Also Be Refused"
61
A.
Discretion
61
B.
Pro-Enforcement Bias
61
C.
Discretion Can Also Be Exercised in Implementing the Convention in Domestic Law
62
V.
"Public Policy"-Narrow or Wide Interpretation?
62
A.
Goal to Uphold Finality of an Award
63
B.
Drafting Changes Support Narrow Interpretation
64
C.
Guidance from Art. 34 and 36 UNCITRAL Model Law?
65
D.
Pro-Enforcement Policy
66
VI.
Relationship between Article V(1) and V(2)(b)
67
A.
Art. V(1) Has Its Own Meaning and Is Not Included in Art. V(2)
67
B.
Working Papers Support Back-up Position of Public Policy
70
C.
Party Autonomy and Burden of Proof
71
D.
ILA Recommendation
71
ch. 5
The Application of the Public Policy Exception in Various Countries
73
I.
Austria
73
A.
Law
73
B.
Public Policy: Violation Must Concern Basic Principles of the Austrian Legal System
73
C.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
75
1.
No Distinction between Domestic and International Public Policy
75
2.
Irreconcilable with Austrian Fundamental Principles
75
II.
Canada
77
A.
Law
77
B.
Public Policy: Fundamental Notions and Principles of Justice
78
1.
No Review of Facts or Law
78
2.
Fundamentally Offensive to Canadian Principles of Justice and Fairness
81
C.
Refusal is Permissive, Not Mandatory
85
III.
England
86
A.
Law
86
B.
Public Policy: Clearly Injurious to the Public Good or Wholly Offensive
87
1.
International Public Policy
87
2.
Serious Irregularity
89
3.
Contrary to Natural Justice
92
4.
Harmful to International Relations
93
5.
Illegality
93
C.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
95
1.
Illegal English Contract
95
2.
Uncompromisible Moral Principles
96
IV.
France
97
A.
Law
97
B.
Blatant, Actual, and Concrete Violation of International Public Policy
98
C.
Judge of the Award, Not the Dispute
101
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
102
1.
Lack of Impartiality
102
2.
Failure to Comply with Time-limit
103
V.
Germany
104
A.
Law
104
B.
Ordre Public International
104
C.
Only Severe Defects Can Violate International Public Policy
105
1.
Grave Violation of Fundamental Principles of State and Economic Life
105
2.
Decisive Impartiality
106
3.
Violation of Competition Law
107
4.
No Review of the Merits
108
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
110
VI.
Hong Kong
112
A.
Law
112
B.
May Refuse
114
C.
Narrow Interpretation
114
1.
Violation of Most Basic Notions of Morality and Justice
114
2.
International Public Policy
117
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
120
VII.
Hungary
120
A.
Law
120
B.
Public Policy: Broad Interpretation
121
C.
"High Amount" of Legal Fees are Contrary to Public Policy
122
VIII.
Ireland
123
A.
Law
123
B.
Public Policy: Narrow Scope
123
IX.
Italy
125
A.
Law
125
B.
No Review of the Merits
126
C.
International Public Policy
128
X.
Japan
130
A.
Law
130
B.
Public Policy: Basic Principles or Rules of Japanese Judicial Order
131
XI.
Republic of Korea
133
A.
Law
133
B.
Public Policy: Narrow Interpretation
134
C.
Good Morals and Social Order
135
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
138
XII.
Malaysia
139
A.
Law
139
B.
Convention Award-Foreign Award
141
C.
Public Policy: Malaysian Law, Governmental Policy, and Moral Values
144
XIII.
Mexico
145
A.
Law
145
B.
No Review of the Merits
147
C.
Public Policy
147
D.
Exception: Amparo Lawsuits
148
XIV.
New Zealand
149
A.
Law
150
B.
Public Policy: Breach of Fundamental Principle of Law and Justice
150
C.
Public Policy: Obvious, Substantial Miscarriage of Justice
151
XV.
Republic of the Philippines
153
A.
Law
153
B.
Mixed Application
154
XVI.
Singapore
156
A.
Law
156
B.
Purpose of the International Arbitration Act: Establishing an International Arbitration Center
156
C.
Primary and Secondary Jurisdiction
158
D.
Public Policy: Extremely Narrow Interpretation
158
E.
Application of Public Policy of Singapore under Art. V(2)(b)
164
XVII.
Spain
166
A.
Law
167
B.
Foreign Award
167
C.
No Review of the Merits
167
D.
International Public Policy
168
XVIII.
Sweden
174
A.
Law
174
B.
Public Policy: Clearly Incompatible with Basic Principles
175
XIX.
Switzerland
176
A.
Law
176
B.
Public Policy: Art. V(1) is Lex Specialis to Art. V(2)
176
C.
International Public Policy
177
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
181
XX.
United States of America
183
A.
Law
183
B.
Public Policy: Pro-Enforcement Bias, and Very Narrow Interpretation
183
1.
M/S Bremen, and Scherk
183
2.
Most Basic Notions of Morality and Justice
185
3.
Antitrust Claims
186
4.
Manifest Disregard of the Law
187
5.
Violations of U.S. Sanctions
190
6.
Inconsistent Testimony and Forged Agreements
190
7.
High Legal Fees
191
C.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
193
ch. 6
The Application of the Public Policy Exception in Brazil, Russia, India and China
195
I.
Brazil
195
A.
Law
195
B.
Foreign Awards
197
C.
Brazilian Public Policy: No Review of the Merits
197
1.
Public Policy is Defined by Doctrine
197
2.
Assessment of Formal Requirements Only
199
3.
No Refusals Based on Public Policy
202
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
203
II.
Russian Federation
204
A.
Law
205
B.
Public Policy: Basic Principles of Russian Law
210
1.
Basics of the Social Formation of the Russian State
210
2.
Informational Letter No. 96
213
C.
Enforcement Despite Broad Interpretation of Public Policy
215
D.
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement
218
E.
Very Broad Interpretation Leading to Refusal
221
1.
Social and Economic Interest
221
2.
Review of Merits
223
3.
Mandatory Russian Rules and National Property
224
4.
Missapplication of Russian Law
225
F.
Other Ways to Refuse Enforcement: Third Party Litigation
229
G.
Very Mixed Picture
230
III.
India
231
A.
Implementation of the New York Convention
232
1.
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961
232
2.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
234
B.
Foreign Awards-Two Major Restrictions
237
1.
Foreign Awards under the New York Convention
237
2.
Foreign Awards under the Foreign Awards Act, 1961
237
3.
Foreign Awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
242
4.
Was Limitation "Governed by Indian Law" Dropped?
246
5.
Indian Definition of "Foreign Award" Violates New York Convention
253
C.
Public Policy Exception-Statutory Law
253
1.
Foreign Awards Act 1961
253
2.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996
254
D.
Public Policy is Not Limited to Fraud, and Corruption
255
E.
The Philosophy of Legal Interpretation of the Supreme Court of India
258
F.
Application of the Public Policy Exception by the Supreme Court of India: from Narrow to Broad Interpretation
261
1.
Public Policy Doctrine-Modifications and Expansion
261
2.
Application of the Public Policy Exception under the Foreign Awards Act
265
3.
Application of the Public Policy Exception under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996
274
G.
Public Policy Exception as Gateway to Full Judicial Review
314
H.
Is There New Hope?
316
IV.
People's Republic of China
317
A.
Law
318
1.
Notice of the Supreme People's Court
319
2.
Arbitration Law and Several Other Laws are Applicable
321
B.
Foreign Awards
324
1.
Foreign Arbitral Institution
324
2.
Two Years' Deadline
326
C.
Centralized Decision by Supreme People's Court in Case of Refusal
327
D.
Public Policy: Contrary to Social and Public Interest and Fundamental Principles
331
E.
Inconsistent Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception
335
1.
Insensitive to Feelings of Chinese People
335
2.
Breach of Mandatory Provisions of PRC Laws
336
3.
Mere Unfairness or Injustice
338
4.
Violation of China's Judicial Sovereignty
340
F.
More Successes Than Failures
343
ch. 7
Conclusion
345
Bibliography
351
Index
367