Committed to reform? : pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets / Małgorzata Sadowska.
2014
KJE6852 .S23 2014 (Map It)
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Items
Details
Author
Title
Committed to reform? : pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets / Małgorzata Sadowska.
Published
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; Antwerp [Belgium] ; Portland [Oregon] : Intersentia, [2014]
Copyright
©2014
Call Number
KJE6852 .S23 2014
ISBN
1780682506 (paperback)
9781780682501 (paperback)
9781780682501 (paperback)
Description
xii, 252 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)885225028
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 231-252).
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
v
List of Tables and Figures
xi
ch. 1
Introduction
1
1.1.
Problem Definition
2
1.2.
Context
4
1.2.1.
What Are Commitment Decisions?
4
1.2.2.
Potential Benefits of Commitment Procedure and Incentives to Engage in Negotiations
6
1.2.3.
Making the Link with Electricity Markets
10
1.2.4.
What's at Stake? The EU Internal Market for Electricity
17
1.2.4.1.
Early Legislative Reforms: the 1st and the 2nd Energy Package
19
1.2.4.2.
The Use of Competition Toolbox: the Energy Sector Inquiry and the Follow-Up Actions
21
1.2.4.3.
Where Do We Stand Now? The 3rd Energy Package
24
1.2.4.4.
Actions for Non-Compliance
25
1.2.4.5.
On the Home Straight?
26
1.3.
Energy Policy and Competition Policy: Definitions
27
1.4.
Dealing with Gap Cases: Some Comments on the Greek Lignite Case
29
1.4.1.
The Case
30
1.4.2.
Discussion
33
1.5.
Literature Review
34
1.5.1.
Debate on Commitments
36
1.5.1.1.
Optimal Use of Commitment Decisions
38
1.5.1.2.
Suboptimal Use of Commitment Decisions
42
1.5.2.
Debate on the Use of Commitments for Regulatory Purposes: Instrumentalisation
43
1.5.2.1.
Suboptimal Outcomes and the Risks of Instrumentalisation
44
1.5.2.2.
Formlessness of Article 9 and the Opportunities It Creates
48
1.5.2.3.
Some Final Remarks
55
1.5.3.
Research Justification
57
1.6.
Research Question and Methodology
59
1.6.1.
Why Electricity Markets?
60
1.6.2.
Why the E. ON and SvK Cases?
61
1.7.
Chapter Overview
63
1.7.1.
Chapter 2
64
1.7.2.
Chapter 3
66
1.7.3.
Chapter 4
70
1.7.4.
Chapter 5
74
ch. 2
Energy Liberalisation: Excessive Pricing Actions Dusted Off?
79
2.1.
Chapter Summary
79
2.2.
Introduction
79
2.3.
The Paradox
81
2.4.
Invalidating the Criticism
82
2.4.1.
Intervention might be Superfluous or Even Harmful
82
2.4.2.
Assessment Problems
84
2.4.2.1.
Sector Inquiry Opens the Case
84
2.4.2.2.
... And a Commitment Decision Closes It
87
2.4.3.
Price Regulation
89
2.4.3.1.
... With a Structural Solution
89
2.5.
Conclusions
90
ch. 3
Energy Liberalisation in an Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far?
93
3.1.
Chapter Summary
93
3.2.
Introduction
93
3.3.
Far-Fetched Concerns
96
3.3.1.
Dominance
98
3.3.2.
Abuse
100
3.4.
Far-Reaching Remedies
103
3.4.1.
Step 1: Alternative Behavioural Commitments?
107
3.4.2.
Step 2: Appropriate and Necessary Structural Commitments?
108
3.4.3.
Commitments and Exploitative Concerns
111
3.4.4.
Commitments and Exclusionary Concerns
115
3.5.
Conclusions
116
3.6.
Annex 1
117
3.7.
Annex 2
122
3.7.1.
Spain
122
3.7.2.
Denmark
123
3.7.3.
Germany
125
3.7.4.
The UK
126
3.7.5.
Italy
128
3.7.6.
Belgium
129
3.7.7.
Discussion
130
ch. 4
Market Integration and Economic Efficiency in Conflict? Commitments in the Swedish Interconnectors Case
135
4.1.
Chapter Summary
135
4.2.
Introduction
136
4.3.
Model
138
4.3.1.
Set-Up
138
4.3.2.
First-Best
140
4.3.3.
Scenarios
143
4.4.
Results
146
4.4.1.
Counter-Trading with Full Congestion Shifting (Alleged Abuse)
146
4.4.2.
Counter-Trading without Congestion Shifting (Interim Remedy as Implemented)
151
4.4.3.
Counter-Trading with Partial Congestion Shifting (Optimal Interim Remedy)
154
4.4.4.
Market Splitting (Final Remedy)
157
4.4.5.
Comparison of Four Scenarios
160
4.5.
Conclusions
163
ch. 5
Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust
169
5.1.
Chapter Summary
169
5.2.
Introduction
169
5.3.
The Case and Its Context
171
5.4.
Internal Market Objective Reached with Competition Policy
174
5.4.1.
Political Climate and Legal Concerns Likely Delayed the Case
175
5.4.1.1.
Political Climate
175
5.4.1.2.
Legal Concerns
177
5.4.2.
Commitment Procedure Simplifies the Case
179
5.4.3.
Promotion of Market Integration as a Key Objective in the SvK Case
180
5.4.4.
Neglecting Objective Justification
183
5.4.4.1.
Objective Justification and Commitment Procedure
183
5.4.4.2.
Objective Justification Based on Efficiencies
186
5.4.4.3.
Objective Justification Based on Public Interest
187
5.4.5.
Proportionality of the Final Remedy
189
5.5.
SVK's Commitments in the Light of the Nordic Debate
191
5.6.
European Rules on Congestion Management
197
5.6.1.
Existing EU Rules on Congestion Shifting
198
5.6.2.
Existing EU Rules on Congestion Shifting: What Do They Mean for the TSOs?
200
5.6.3.
The New CACM Network Code and Its Impact on Congestion Shifting
203
5.6.4.
Limits of the EU Regulation
207
5.7.
Conclusions
209
ch. 6
Conclusions
213
6.1.
Energy Policy Dimension
213
6.1.1.
Regulatory Objectives Pursued by the Commission
213
6.1.2.
Overcoming the Limits of Sector-Specific Regulation
214
6.1.3.
Overcoming Political Opposition
216
6.1.4.
The Commission's Bigger Toolbox for Regulatory Purposes
217
6.2.
Competition Policy Dimension
218
6.2.1.
Suboptimal Case Selection and Prioritisation (1a)
219
6.2.2.
Suboptimal Antitrust Response (1b)
221
6.2.3.
Pro-Article 9 Bias (2)
222
6.2.4.
The Commission's Smaller Toolbox for Regulatory Purposes
222
6.3.
Addressing the Research Question
223
6.4.
Scope for Further Research
224
ch. 7
Summary
227
References
231