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Items
Details
Author
Title
Game theory in jurisprudence / Wojciech Załuski.
Published
Kraków : Copernicus Center Press, [2013]
Copyright
©2013
Call Number
K212 .Z35 2013
ISBN
9788378860358 (hbk.)
8378860353 (hbk.)
8378860353 (hbk.)
Description
353 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)859749629
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages [341]-349) and name index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Cardozo Fund
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
13
Preface
15
Part I Introduction to game theory
ch. 1
The basics of game theory
19
1.
Twelve questions about game theory
19
2.
What is game theory?
19
3.
What are the branches of game theory?
21
4.
What are the functions of game theory?
23
5.
What is a game?
24
6.
What assumptions does game theory make regarding players?
25
6.1.
Instrumental rationality
25
6.2.
Common knowledge of rationality
29
7.
What does game theory assume about players' knowledge?
31
8.
How can games be presented?
33
9.
What are the main types of games?
34
10.
What are the basic solution concepts of non-cooperative game theory?
35
10.1.
Dominance
35
10.2.
Nash equilibrium
39
10.3.
Rollback equilibrium
43
10.4.
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
45
10.5.
Sequential equilibrium
49
10.6.
Other refinements
50
10.7.
The Minimax Theorem
52
11.
What is cooperative game theory?
56
11.1.
The core
58
11.2.
The theory of stable sets - the NM-solution
60
12.
What is bargaining theory?
63
12.1.
The bargaining problem
63
12.2.
The Nash solution
68
12.3.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
71
13.
What is evolutionary game theory?
74
Part II: Game theory and general issues in jurisprudence
ch. 2
The nature of law
81
1.
Law as a means for solving collective action problems
81
2.
A game-theoretic account of collective action problems
86
2.1.
Non-iterated games
87
2.1.1.
The first pure type of collective action problems: egoism as an obstacle for a collective action
87
2.1.1.1.
The Prisoner's Dilemma
87
2.1.1.2.
The Chicken
98
2.1.2.
The second pure type of collective action problems: coordination difficulties as the main obstacle for collective action
105
2.1.3.
Mixed type of collective action problems
116
2.2.
Iterated games
119
2.3.
Contributions of evolutionary game theory to understanding collective action problems
128
3.
Three interpretations of the account of law as a means for solving collective action problems
133
3.1.
Three types of legal norms
133
3.2.
Three interpretations of the phrase 'Law is a means for solving collective action problems'
152
4.
The problem of legal normativity
162
5.
Concluding remarks
175
ch. 3
Game theory and legal interpretation
177
1.
The notion of legal interpretation
177
2.
The semantic limits of legal interpretation
180
3.
The criteria for selecting a proper meaning
185
3.1.
Intentionalism
187
3.2.
Non-intentionalism
193
4.
The strategic reasons for failing to select a proper meaning
198
5.
Concluding remarks
201
ch. 4
Legal rights
203
1.
Six questions about legal rights
203
2.
Two ways of justifying rights
203
3.
The nature of rights
204
4.
The function of rights
207
5.
The types of rights
208
6.
The justification of inalienable right
209
7.
The emergence of fundamental rights
209
8.
Concluding remarks
212
ch. 5
Justice
213
1.
Game theory and the philosophical problems related to the concept of justice
213
2.
The circumstances of justice
213
3.
Justice as mutual advantage or justice as impartiality?
216
3.1.
Game theory as a tool for explicating the distributive rule of justice as mutual advantage
222
3.2.
Game theory as a tool for criticising justice as mutual advantage
224
3.3.
Game theory as a tool for justifying justice as mutual advantage
231
3.4.
An evaluation of justice as mutual advantage
232
4.
Justice as impartiality: the utilitarian justice or the Rawlsian justice?
235
5.
Concluding remarks
240
Part III Game theory and specific issues in jurisprudence
ch. 6
Contract law
243
1.
The main problems of contract law
243
2.
Contractual relationships between homines oeconomici
245
3.
Contractual relationships between homines oeconomici and homines morales
256
4.
Contractual relationships modelled by repeated games
260
5.
Contract law and cooperative game theory
263
6.
Concluding remarks
264
ch. 7
Tort law
267
1.
Two theories of tort law
267
2.
In search of a cost-effective regime of liability
268
3.
Concluding remarks
276
ch. 8
Property law
277
1.
Two questions about property law
277
2.
The origins of the institution of private property
277
3.
The justification of the institution of private property
284
4.
Concluding remarks
287
Epilogue: Law and Economics and the projects of the naturalization of law
289
1.
Naturalization sensu stricto and naturalization sensu largo
289
2.
A critique of strong naturalization
295
3.
Naturalization sensu largo: American legal realism and psychological legal realism
307
4.
Law and Economics and the naturalization of law
313
5.
Summary
315
6.
Case study: reductionist accounts of justice
316
6.1.
Introductory remarks
316
6.2.
The conceptual reduction
318
6.3.
The genealogical reduction
319
6.4.
The psychological reduction
323
6.5.
Reductionist accounts of justice in Law and Economics
324
6.6.
Concluding remarks
325
Appendix: Rationality and emotions
327
1.
The vagueness of the concept of the 'rationality of emotions'
327
2.
Intrinsic rationality of emotions
328
2.1.
Token emotions
328
2.2.
Types of emotions
330
3.
Instrumental rationality of emotions
332
4.
Adaptive rationality of emotions
335
5.
Summary
339
References
341
Index of names
351