Law, psychology, and morality : the role of loss aversion / Eyal Zamir.
2015
K487.E3 Z39 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Law, psychology, and morality : the role of loss aversion / Eyal Zamir.
Published
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2015]
Copyright
©2015
Call Number
K487.E3 Z39 2015
ISBN
9780199972050 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
0199972052 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
0199972052 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
Description
xviii, 258 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)878224962
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
xiii
I.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOSS AVERSION
1.
Loss Aversion: An Overview
3
A.
Introduction
3
B.
A Brief History
4
C.
Prospect Theory
5
D.
Reference Points
7
1.
General
7
2.
Multiple Reference Points
9
3.
Goals
10
4.
Generality of Reference-Dependence
11
E.
Alternative Theories, Limitations, and Critique
11
F.
Empirical Studies
13
G.
Loss Aversion and Emotions
15
H.
Related Phenomena
16
1.
Status Quo and Omission Biases
17
2.
Endowment Effect
21
3.
Sunk Costs and Escalation of Commitment
29
4.
Bounded Ethicality
31
I.
Professional Decision-Making
33
J.
Group Decision-Making
37
K.
Debiasing Loss Aversion?
38
L.
Evolutionary Roots and Neural Basis
42
1.
Evolutionary Roots
42
2.
Neural Basis
45
M.
Impact on Other Disciplines
46
N.
Conclusion
48
II.
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN LEGAL CONTEXTS
2.
Consumer Behavior
55
A.
Introduction
55
B.
Framing Prices and Other Attributes
56
C.
Limited Availability
59
D.
Escalation of Commitment
61
E.
Lenient Return Policies and the Endowment Effect
63
F.
Status Quo and Omission Biases
65
G.
Conclusion
66
3.
The Market for Legal Services: Contingent Fees
67
A.
Introduction
67
B.
The Puzzle
70
C.
Loss Aversion and Plaintiffs' Preferences
72
D.
Loss Aversion and Defendants' Preferences
78
E.
Conclusion
81
4.
Litigation and Settlement
83
A.
Introduction
83
B.
Standard Economic Analysis
84
C.
Framing Litigation Outcomes and Risk Attitude
85
D.
Settlement, Regret, and Loss Aversion
87
E.
Default Effect and Alternative Dispute Resolution
90
F.
A Note on Plea Bargains
92
G.
Conclusion
96
III.
FRAMING BY THE LAW
5.
Legally Induced Reference Points
99
A.
Introduction
99
B.
Default Rules
101
C.
Burden of Persuasion
109
D.
Legal Reforms and Temporary Legislation
112
E.
Conclusion
115
IV.
LOSS AVERSION AND BASIC FEATURES OF THE LAW
6.
Correspondence between Loss Aversion and the Law
119
A.
Introduction
119
B.
Private Law: Tort versus Unjust Enrichment
120
C.
Contract Remedies: Expectation versus Disgorgement
125
D.
Constitutional Property Law: Takings versus Givings
133
E.
Criminal Law: Necessity and Bad Samaritan Laws
137
1.
Necessity
137
2.
Bad Samaritan Laws
139
F.
Human Rights: Civil and Political versus Social and Economic
140
G.
Civil Rights: Affirmative Action
144
H.
Refugee and Immigration Law: Denying Entrance versus Expelling
149
I.
Tax Law: Tax Exemptions and Tax Withholding
153
1.
Tax Exemptions versus Spending
154
2.
Tax Withholding
156
J.
Evidence Law: Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation
157
K.
Civil Procedure: Preliminary Injunctions
162
L.
Conclusion
165
7.
Evolutionary Theories
167
A.
Introduction
167
B.
Efficiency-of-the-Common-Law Theories
168
C.
Loss Aversion and the Plaintiffs' Role
171
D.
Assessment and Conclusion
174
8.
Cognitive Psychology, Commonsense Morality, and the Law
177
A.
Introduction
177
B.
Deontology
178
C.
Moderate Deontology and Commonsense Morality
182
D.
Deontology, Commonsense Morality, and Loss Aversion
189
E.
Commonsense Morality and Law
193
F.
Moral and Evolutionary Psychology
195
G.
Conclusion
199
V.
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
9.
Loss Aversion: Normative Implications
203
A.
Introduction
203
B.
Preliminary Issues
205
1.
Loss Aversion Is Not Irrational Per Se
205
2.
The Limited Manipulability of Reference Points
207
C.
Justifying Basic Features of Extant Law
212
D.
Legal Policymaking
215
1.
Preventing Exploitation
216
2.
Reframing Choices
219
3.
Legal Reforms
224
E.
Legal Decision-Makers' Loss Aversion
226
F.
Conclusion
229
Conclusion
231
Author Index
235
Index
247