Independent agencies in the United States : law, structure, and politics / Marshall J. Breger, Gary J. Edles.
2015
KF5407 .B725 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Independent agencies in the United States : law, structure, and politics / Marshall J. Breger, Gary J. Edles.
Published
New York : Oxford University Press, [2015]
Copyright
©2015
Call Number
KF5407 .B725 2015
ISBN
9780199812127 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
0199812128 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
0199812128 ((hardback) : alk. paper)
Description
xii, 562 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)843785550
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 501-543) and index.
Record Appears in
Added Author
Table of Contents
Preface
xi
1.
Introduction
1
2.
How the Independent Agency Developed: The Search For Expertise
19
A.
The Interstate Commerce Commission
19
1.
Regulation in Britain
23
2.
State Regulation in the United States
26
3.
Place in the Executive Branch
31
B.
The Federal Trade Commission
37
C.
The Federal Power Commission
41
D.
The National Labor Relations Board
43
E.
Federal Reserve Board: Independence as Needed
49
F.
Observations
56
3.
Theories of Agency Independence
59
A.
Theory of the Unitary Executive
59
B.
Other Efforts to Centralize Executive Power
67
C.
The Functionalist Response to the Unitary Executive Theory
71
D.
Political Will and Independence
75
E.
Presidential Directive Authority
80
F.
Observations
84
4.
The Modern Agency: Structure and Appointments
87
A.
Historical Characteristics of Independence
87
1.
Modern Definitions of Independence
88
2.
Organizational Structure
93
B.
Appointments
95
1.
Principal and Inferior Officers of the United States
100
2.
Changing Character of an Appointment
108
3.
Free Enterprise Fund in the Lower Courts
109
4.
Free Enterprise Fund in the Supreme Court
112
5.
Recess Appointments
119
a.
What Counts as a Recess?
120
b.
What Counts as a Vacancy?
124
c.
Legislative Efforts to Restrict the President's Recess Appointment Power
126
6.
Concerns over Length of Appointment of United States Attorneys
128
7.
"Packaging" Appointments
129
C.
Observations
131
5.
The Modern Agency: Removal Protection as an Indicator of Independence
133
A.
Introduction
133
B.
Early Congressional and Judicial Attacks on Removal by the President
135
C.
The Historic Removal Trilogy: Myers, Humphreys Executor, and Wiener
140
D.
The Morrison "Twist"
143
E.
Grounds for Removal
144
F.
Procedures for Removal
151
G.
End of Service
157
H.
An International Twist on the Removal Issue
158
I.
Observations
160
6.
The Modern Agency: Other Indicia of Independence
163
A.
Control of Agency Submissions to Congress
163
B.
Control of Litigation
167
C.
Independent Funding Authority
172
D.
Freedom from Centralized Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Review
176
1.
The Evolution of Centralized Review
176
2.
The Application of Centralized Regulatory Review Authority to the Independent Agencies
180
E.
Selection of Agency Vice Chairs
191
F.
Observations
192
7.
Institutional Design: The Tension Between Autonomy and Accountability
195
A.
Introduction
195
B.
The Staying Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies
196
C.
Unsuccessful Shift to the Single Member Option
199
1.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
199
2.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
202
D.
A Preference for the Single Member Option
205
1.
Social Security Administration
205
2.
Federal Housing Finance Agency
209
3.
The Continuing Saga of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Birth of the Idea
213
a.
Freestanding Independent Agency
214
b.
Elizabeth Warren, Czar
216
c.
Interim Authority of the Treasury
217
d.
Housed in the Federal Reserve
217
e.
A Multimember Board?
218
f.
A Director Is Nominated
220
g.
Accountability and Independence
221
E.
Successful Closures
222
1.
Civil Aeronautics Board
222
2.
Trucking Deregulation: Closing the Interstate Commerce Commission
223
F.
Independent Oversight Agencies
224
G.
Independent Agencies Squarely in the Executive Branch
226
H.
Promoting Executive Branch Autonomy and Accountability to Congress
231
I.
Split Enforcement Model
232
J.
Divided Accountability: The Separation of Policy and Adversarial Functions Within Agencies
233
K.
Shared Regulatory Space: An Assessment
236
L.
Inspectors General
243
M.
Observations
246
8.
Further Along on the Continuum: Government Functions and Private Enterprise
249
A.
Public Corporations
250
1.
Historical Foundations
250
2.
Organization of the Public Corporation
255
3.
Recent Development of Public Corporations
258
B.
Government Constraints and Constitutional Obligations on Public Corporations
259
1.
General Obligations
259
2.
Statutory Obligations
260
3.
State Action Doctrine
261
C.
Government Sponsored Enterprises
264
D.
Private Action by Federal Agencies
269
E.
Privatization
271
1.
The Challenge of Delegating Government Functions to Private Parties
272
2.
Department of Defense Privatization
277
3.
Private Standard Setting Organizations
279
4.
Self-Audits and Third Party Audit Regimes
281
5.
Supervised Self-Regulation of the Securities Industry
282
F.
Observations
287
9.
Internal Agency Operations
289
A.
Role of the Chair
289
1.
Salary and Status
294
2.
The Need for Centralized Administration
295
B.
Institutional Decision-Making
314
1.
Collegial Decision-Making and Dissenting Opinions
314
2.
The Government in the Sunshine Act and the Dilemma of Collegiality
316