The regulatory aftermath of the global financial crisis / Eilís Ferran [and others], with a foreword by Ethiopis Tafara.
2012
K1066 .R433 2012 (Map It)
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Title
The regulatory aftermath of the global financial crisis / Eilís Ferran [and others], with a foreword by Ethiopis Tafara.
Published
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Call Number
K1066 .R433 2012
ISBN
9781107024595 (hbk.)
1107024595 (hbk.)
1107024595 (hbk.)
Description
xxxix, 391 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)793379357
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Added Author
Table of Contents
Foreword
xi
Notes on contributors
xxvii
Acknowledgements
xxviii
Table of cases
xxix
Table of legislation
xxx
1.
Crisis-driven regulatory reform: where in the world is the EU going? / Eilis Ferran
1
I.
Introduction
1
Never waste several good crises
1
Defining the scope of the chapter and explaining the approach
6
A note on the chronology of the global financial crisis
11
A note on the euro area sovereign debt crisis
12
II.
Intergovernmentalism - the crises and the Member States
17
Insights from theory
17
From theory to practice: Member States' views on EU financial regulation in the years leading up to the global financial crisis
23
Member States and post-crisis reforms: meeting in the middle?
29
Still battling and even starting to move further apart?
36
Market infrastructure/short selling
37
"Too-big-to-fail"
39
Corporate governance
44
Financial services supervision
45
Evaluation
52
III.
Supranationalism - the crises and the Commission
54
Introduction
54
The Commission in the pre-crisis era
55
The impact of the global financial crisis: the first phase of the response
57
Phase two of the response: the Commission's role in concretizing the financial services reform agenda
63
Overall process management of the legislative program
63
"Too-big-to-fail"
65
Supervision
71
Evaluation
78
IV.
Supranationalism - the crises and the European Parliament
83
Introduction
83
Finding the Parliament's imprint on crises-related reforms
84
Playing a waiting game?
85
Financial transactions tax
86
Implications for the future
88
V.
External relations
89
Introduction
89
Exerting influence over international financial regulation as new economic powers challenge the established order - new opportunities for EU regulatory leadership?
92
"Speaking with a single voice"
96
Exporting key EU regulatory ideas: issues of suitability
99
The prospects for building global influence through a more equal transatlantic relationship
100
VI.
Conclusion
107
2.
The legacy effects of the financial crisis on regulatory design in the EU / Niamh Moloney
111
I.
Examining regulatory change
111
Introduction
111
Charting innovation and change
112
The market regulation and consumer protection case studies
117
II.
The legacy effects for market and consumer protection regulation
127
Financial market intensity and innovation
127
The implications
137
Policy innovation and rule innovation
140
De-intensification and simplification in the EU
145
III.
The legacy impact of the crisis on market regulation
152
A re-orientation of the reform program?
152
The EU market regulation agenda
154
Reshaping market regulation
160
Reshaping trading venue regulation
160
Reshaping the regulation of trading practices
166
Reshaping financial market disclosure
170
The equity markets
174
IV.
The legacy effects of the crisis on consumer protection regulation
182
Refocusing on the consumer markets
182
The rise of product intervention
186
Has distrust of innovation led to a productive consumer market reform?
194
V.
Conclusion
201
3.
Why did Australia fare so well in the global financial crisis? / Jennifer G. Hill
203
I.
Introduction
203
II.
The Australian economy and the impact of the global financial crisis on Australia's financial markets
208
III.
Regulatory structure and the global financial crisis
215
A snapshot of Australia's corporate and financial services regulatory structure
215
The Australian "twin peaks" model compared to US and UK regulatory structures prior to the global financial crisis
221
IV.
Regulatory cooperation in the era of financial market integration and the US-Australian mutual recognition arrangement
225
V.
Some Australian financial policy and regulatory responses to the global financial crisis
232
The Australian government's economic stimulus program
233
Emergency-style reforms - the Deposit and Wholesale Funding Guarantee Scheme and the RMBS Initiative
238
The deposit guarantee
240
The wholesale funding guarantee
244
The residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) initiative
247
Covered bonds
251
ASIC's ban on short selling
256
Executive remuneration reforms
262
Retail investor protection and the Future of Financial Advice reforms
270
VI.
Why did Australia fare so well during the global financial crisis?
276
China and Australia's resources boom
277
The Reserve Bank's monetary policy and the economic stimulus program
281
Australia's regulatory structure, APRA and the HIH Royal Commission
285
The Australian banking system
289
Australia's superannuation system
295
VII.
Conclusion
299
4.
The political economy of Dodd-Frank: Why financial reform tends to be frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated / John C. Coffee, Jr.
301
I.
Introduction
301
II.
The Regulatory Sine Curve and statutory correction
312
III.
SOX revisited: the downsizing of reform
321
Section 404 and internal control reports
321
Executive loans and Section 402
325
Attorneys as whistle blowers and Section 307
328
An evaluation
331
IV.
The Dodd-Frank Act: premises and policy options
332
Three credible scenarios
332
Moral hazard: "Executive compensation caused the crash"
332
Responses
334
Executive compensation and shareholder pressure
336
Systemic risk and the "too big to fail" problem
342
Higher equity capital requirements
344
A private, industry-funded insurance system
344
Reducing risk through prophylactic rules
345
The OTC derivatives market
349
V.
The implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act
351
Curbing executive compensation: the road not taken
352
Proxy access and corporate governance
352
Section 956
355
The TBTF problem
360
Resolution authority
361
The Volcker Rule
361
Contingent capital
363
The legislative counterattack
364
VI.
Conclusion
367
Index
373