The rationality of dictators : towards a more effective implementation of the responsibility to protect / Maartje Weerdesteijn.
2017
KZ4082 .W44 2017 (Map It)
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Title
The rationality of dictators : towards a more effective implementation of the responsibility to protect / Maartje Weerdesteijn.
Published
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; Antwerp ; Portland : Intersentia, [2017]
Copyright
©2017
Call Number
KZ4082 .W44 2017
ISBN
9781780684437 (paperback)
1780684436 (paperback)
9781780384437
1780684436 (paperback)
9781780384437
Description
xii, 399 pages ; 24 cm.
Other Standard Identifiers
9781780684437
System Control No.
(OCoLC)965195450
Summary
A non-democratic system of government is an important risk factor for the perpetration of atrocity crimes, meaning genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. At the 2005 World Summit the international community accepted the responsibility to protect populations from these crimes when the domestic state is failing to do so. The implementation of the responsibility to protect, however, leaves much to be desired. This book studies the role dictators play in orchestrating mass atrocities and analyses their decision-making process when the international community tries to stop or mitigate the perpetration of these crimes. 0Through a comparative case study of Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic it argues that the role ideology plays in the decision-making process of the dictator is an important determinant of their responsiveness. In doing so, it challenges the common notion that all dictators are primarily motivated by retaining their position of power and argues that while dictators are frequently characterised as raging mad men, this is not necessarily always the case. It rather argues in favour of a more nuanced approach to rationality, that uses the work of Max Weber to acknowledge that different types of rationality exist, when analysing the decision-making process of dictators. The book is therefore an indispensable resource for scholars who are interested in the role of dictators in bringing forth and stopping mass atrocities and for anyone who wants more insight into the rationality of dictators --Back cover.
Note
Previously issued as author's dissertation, Tilburg University --Acknowledgements.
A non-democratic system of government is an important risk factor for the perpetration of atrocity crimes, meaning genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. At the 2005 World Summit the international community accepted the responsibility to protect populations from these crimes when the domestic state is failing to do so. The implementation of the responsibility to protect, however, leaves much to be desired. This book studies the role dictators play in orchestrating mass atrocities and analyses their decision-making process when the international community tries to stop or mitigate the perpetration of these crimes. 0Through a comparative case study of Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic it argues that the role ideology plays in the decision-making process of the dictator is an important determinant of their responsiveness. In doing so, it challenges the common notion that all dictators are primarily motivated by retaining their position of power and argues that while dictators are frequently characterised as raging mad men, this is not necessarily always the case. It rather argues in favour of a more nuanced approach to rationality, that uses the work of Max Weber to acknowledge that different types of rationality exist, when analysing the decision-making process of dictators. The book is therefore an indispensable resource for scholars who are interested in the role of dictators in bringing forth and stopping mass atrocities and for anyone who wants more insight into the rationality of dictators --Back cover.
A non-democratic system of government is an important risk factor for the perpetration of atrocity crimes, meaning genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. At the 2005 World Summit the international community accepted the responsibility to protect populations from these crimes when the domestic state is failing to do so. The implementation of the responsibility to protect, however, leaves much to be desired. This book studies the role dictators play in orchestrating mass atrocities and analyses their decision-making process when the international community tries to stop or mitigate the perpetration of these crimes. 0Through a comparative case study of Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic it argues that the role ideology plays in the decision-making process of the dictator is an important determinant of their responsiveness. In doing so, it challenges the common notion that all dictators are primarily motivated by retaining their position of power and argues that while dictators are frequently characterised as raging mad men, this is not necessarily always the case. It rather argues in favour of a more nuanced approach to rationality, that uses the work of Max Weber to acknowledge that different types of rationality exist, when analysing the decision-making process of dictators. The book is therefore an indispensable resource for scholars who are interested in the role of dictators in bringing forth and stopping mass atrocities and for anyone who wants more insight into the rationality of dictators --Back cover.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 375-399).
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
v
ch. 1
Introduction
1
1.1.
Introduction and research question
1
1.2.
rational dictator as a decision maker
4
1.3.
Methodology and scope of the research
6
1.3.1.
Ideal type typology based on the work of Max Weber
7
1.3.2.
Most similar case study design
8
1.3.3.
Generalizability
10
1.4.
Terminology
11
1.5.
Towards a more effective implementation of the responsibility to protect
12
1.6.
Conclusion: outline of the book
12
pt. I
THEORY
ch. 2
World of the Dictator
17
2.1.
Introduction
17
2.2.
Terminology and types
18
2.2.1.
Conceptual confusion: dictators and dictatorships
19
2.2.2.
Typologies of dictatorships
26
2.2.3.
Typologies of dictators
33
2.3.
Their domestic policy: how they maintain power
35
2.3.1.
facade of legitimacy
37
2.3.2.
Co-optation and buying loyalty
39
2.3.3.
Repression and violence
41
2.4.
Their foreign policy: dictators in the world
43
2.4.1.
Diplomacy
44
2.4.2.
Economic sanctions
46
2.4.3.
Military intervention and war
48
2.4.4.
Positive engagement
49
2.5.
Pitfalls of policy
51
2.6.
Conclusion
52
ch. 3
Mass Atrocities and the Role of the Dictator
55
3.1.
Introduction
55
3.2.
Causes of mass atrocities
56
3.2.1.
non-democratic system of government
57
3.2.2.
Cultural enemies: having a history of violence
60
3.2.3.
Difficult life conditions: economic or political crises and war
61
3.3.
role of the dictator: manipulating the preconditions
63
3.3.1.
Transforming history: creating enemies
64
3.3.2.
Seizing the moment: difficult life conditions
68
3.4.
role of the dictator: setting up the institutions
69
3.4.1.
Mass movements
70
3.4.2.
Creating specialized killing units
71
3.5.
Conclusion
73
ch. 4
Preventing and Stopping Mass Atrocities: the Responsibility to Protect
75
4.1.
Introduction
75
4.2.
Sovereignty
77
4.3.
Atrocity crimes and the United Nations
83
4.4.
Evolving duties to protect human rights
86
4.5.
responsibility to protect
89
4.5.1.
ICISS Report
90
4.5.2.
Development of R2P
93
4.5.3.
Legal status
99
4.5.4.
Challenges for implementation
109
4.6.
Conclusion
113
ch. 5
Interaction between States and Heads of State: the Role of Rationality
115
5.1.
Introduction
115
5.2.
International relations and foreign policy analysis
117
5.3.
Rational choice
121
5.4.
bounds and limitations of the rational unitary actor model
126
5.4.1.
Domestic factors and foreign policy
126
5.4.2.
influence of organizations and groups on decision-making
128
5.4.3.
Simplifying a complex world
129
5.4.4.
Perceptions of losses and gains
133
5.4.5.
Emotions and irrationality
134
5.5.
dictator as a rational unitary actor?
138
5.6.
Leadership and personality of autocratic and democratic leaders
141
5.7.
Conclusion
143
ch. 6
Different Kinds of Rationality: The Work of Max Weber
145
6.1.
Introduction
145
6.2.
Rationality in the work of Weber
146
6.2.1.
Rational social action: instrumental rationality and value rationality
149
6.2.2.
Weber and rational choice
155
6.2.3.
Non-rational and irrational social action: affective and traditional action
159
6.2.4.
Weber and psychology
161
6.3.
ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility
162
6.4.
Value and instrumental rationality in foreign policy
163
6.5.
Value rationality, instrumental rationality and mass atrocities
165
6.6.
Assessing the type of rationality and predictive value
166
6.6.1.
Looking at the life of the decision maker
167
6.6.2.
Expectations of behaviour on the basis of the type of rationality
168
6.7.
Conclusion
169
pt. II
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
ch. 7
Pol Pot and the Destruction of Cambodia
173
7.1.
Introduction
173
7.2.
Explanations for the genocide
175
7.3.
History and myth
178
7.3.1.
Ankor
179
7.3.2.
French colonial rule
180
7.3.3.
World War II
182
7.3.4.
Independence
183
7.4.
Prelude to the genocide
187
7.4.1.
Vietnam War and the civil war inside Cambodia
187
7.4.2.
Economic downturn
190
7.5.
Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge and the crimes
191
7.5.1.
ideology
191
7.5.2.
Using the ideology to legitimize its crimes
196
7.5.3.
Pol Pot's hold over the revolution and resistance
198
7.5.4.
Institutions and perpetrators
200
7.6.
international community and Cambodia
201
7.7.
Conclusion
203
ch. 8
Milosevic and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
207
8.1.
Introduction
207
8.2.
Explanations for the war
209
8.2.1.
Ancient hatreds and elite manipulation
210
8.2.2.
Other factors
212
8.3.
History and myths
213
8.3.1.
Ottoman Empire
215
8.3.2.
First Yugoslavia, 1918-1941
217
8.3.3.
World War II and the Civil War, 1941-1945
218
8.3.4.
Tito's Yugoslavia
219
8.4.
Prelude to war
222
8.4.1.
Economic breakdown
223
8.4.2.
End of the Cold War
224
8.4.3.
Serbian society after Tito: Reinterpreting history
225
8.5.
Milosevic and public opinion: inciting and legitimizing atrocities
228
8.5.1.
Authoritarian nature of Milosevic's regime
229
8.5.2.
Propaganda and the legitimization of the crimes
231
8.6.
Institutions and perpetrators
233
8.7.
Role of the international community
235
8.7.1.
Broken promises and failed efforts for peace
236
8.7.2.
Too little, too late
238
8.8.
Conclusion
239
ch. 9
Rationality of Pol Pot
241
9.1.
Introduction
241
9.2.
Younger years
243
9.3.
Rise to power
248
9.3.1.
Returning to Cambodia
249
9.3.2.
Against all odds
251
9.3.3.
Tensions with the Vietnamese
254
9.4.
His reign
260
9.5.
Inner circle
266
9.6.
Conclusion
271
ch. 10
Rationality of Milosevic
275
10.1.
Introduction
275
10.2.
Younger years
276
10.3.
Rise to power
280
10.4.
His reign
286
10.4.1.
Waging war
287
10.4.2.
Making peace
290
10.5.
After Dayton
293
10.6.
influence of Mira Markovic
295
10.7.
Conclusion
298
ch. 11
Military Intervention: Lessons Learned from the Wars with NATO and Vietnam
303
11.1.
Introduction
303
11.2.
Most similar comparative case study
305
11.2.1.
Similarities
306
11.2.2.
Differences
308
11.3.
Before the wars
310
11.3.1.
dispute with Vietnam
310
11.3.2.
dispute over Kosovo
313
11.4.
atrocities and the international response
316
11.4.1.
atrocities in Vietnam and the international response
316
11.4.2.
first atrocities in Kosovo and the international response
322
11.5.
Peace negotiations
327
11.5.1.
final futile peace plan and the preparations for war
327
11.5.2.
peace negotiations at Rambouillet
329
11.6.
intervention
333
11.6.1.
final Vietnamese offensive
333
11.6.2.
Kosovo War
335
11.7.
responsiveness of Pol Pot and Milosevic
340
11.7.1.
Why Pol Pot continued to fight
340
11.7.2.
Why Milosevic struck a deal
343
11.8.
Conclusion
347
ch. 12
Lessons Learned for the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect
349
12.1.
Introduction
349
12.2.
Rationality and responsiveness
350
12.3.
rationality of the decision and the decision maker: mistakes and misperceptions
351
12.4.
Military intervention and the responsibility to protect
353
12.5.
intervention in Kosovo and Cambodia: success stories?
359
12.6.
Conclusion
362
ch. 13
Conclusion: A Piece of the Puzzle
365
13.1.
Introduction: times have changed
365
13.2.
role of the dictator in mass atrocities
366
13.3.
dictator as a rational actor
367
13.4.
Rationality and the decision-making process of Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic
368
13.5.
Implications for theory and the responsibility to protect
371
13.6.
Conclusion
373
References
375