Privacy as virtue : moving beyond the individual in the age of Big Data / Bart van der Sloot.
2017
K3264.C65 S56 2017 (Map It)
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Author
Title
Privacy as virtue : moving beyond the individual in the age of Big Data / Bart van der Sloot.
Published
Cambridge : Intersentia, 2017.
Copyright
©2017
Call Number
K3264.C65 S56 2017
ISBN
178068505X
9781780685052
9781780685052
Description
vi, 227 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)989105369
Summary
Privacy as Virtue' discusses whether a rights-based approach to privacy regulation still suffices to address the challenges triggered by new data processing techniques such as Big Data and mass surveillance. A rights-based approach generally grants subjective rights to individuals to protect their personal interests. However, large-scale data processing techniques often transcend the individual and their interests. Virtue ethics is used to reflect on this problem and open up new ways of thinking. A virtuous agent not only respects the rights and interests of others, but also has a broader duty to act in the most careful, just and temperate way. This applies to citizens, to companies such as Apple, Google and Facebook and to governmental organizations that are involved with large scale data processing alike. The author develops a three-layered model for privacy regulation in the Big Data era. The first layer consists of minimum obligations that are independent of individual interests and rights. Virtuous agents have to respect the procedural pre-conditions for the exercise of power. The second layer echoes the current paradigm, the respect for individual rights and interests. While the third layer is the obligation of aspiration: a virtuous agent designs the data process in such a way that human flourishing, equality and individual freedom are promoted.
Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-227).
Privacy as Virtue' discusses whether a rights-based approach to privacy regulation still suffices to address the challenges triggered by new data processing techniques such as Big Data and mass surveillance. A rights-based approach generally grants subjective rights to individuals to protect their personal interests. However, large-scale data processing techniques often transcend the individual and their interests. Virtue ethics is used to reflect on this problem and open up new ways of thinking. A virtuous agent not only respects the rights and interests of others, but also has a broader duty to act in the most careful, just and temperate way. This applies to citizens, to companies such as Apple, Google and Facebook and to governmental organizations that are involved with large scale data processing alike. The author develops a three-layered model for privacy regulation in the Big Data era. The first layer consists of minimum obligations that are independent of individual interests and rights. Virtuous agents have to respect the procedural pre-conditions for the exercise of power. The second layer echoes the current paradigm, the respect for individual rights and interests. While the third layer is the obligation of aspiration: a virtuous agent designs the data process in such a way that human flourishing, equality and individual freedom are promoted.
Privacy as Virtue' discusses whether a rights-based approach to privacy regulation still suffices to address the challenges triggered by new data processing techniques such as Big Data and mass surveillance. A rights-based approach generally grants subjective rights to individuals to protect their personal interests. However, large-scale data processing techniques often transcend the individual and their interests. Virtue ethics is used to reflect on this problem and open up new ways of thinking. A virtuous agent not only respects the rights and interests of others, but also has a broader duty to act in the most careful, just and temperate way. This applies to citizens, to companies such as Apple, Google and Facebook and to governmental organizations that are involved with large scale data processing alike. The author develops a three-layered model for privacy regulation in the Big Data era. The first layer consists of minimum obligations that are independent of individual interests and rights. Virtuous agents have to respect the procedural pre-conditions for the exercise of power. The second layer echoes the current paradigm, the respect for individual rights and interests. While the third layer is the obligation of aspiration: a virtuous agent designs the data process in such a way that human flourishing, equality and individual freedom are promoted.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
ch. I
Introduction
1
ch. II
Transformation of the Right to Privacy and the Right to Data Protection
11
1.
Introduction
11
2.
right to privacy
13
2.1.
Right to complain
17
2.2.
Interests
23
2.3.
Assessments
29
2.4.
Enforcement
35
3.
Data Protection
39
3.1.
Obligations of the data processor
48
3.2.
Rights of the data subject
52
3.3.
Assessments
55
3.4.
Enforcement
65
4.
Conclusion
69
ch. III
Challenges for and Alternatives to the Current Privacy Paradigm
71
1.
Introduction
71
2.
challenges Big Data poses to the current legal paradigm
71
2.1.
Big Data and Data Protection
72
2.2.
Focus on the individual
75
2.3.
Regulation through legal means
76
3.
How the ECtHR is gradually moving beyond the individualized privacy paradigm
81
3.1.
Reasonable likelihood (hypothetical harm)
82
3.2.
Chilling effect (future harm)
85
3.3.
In abstracto claims (no individual harm)
88
3.4.
Conventionality
92
4.
Alternatives for the current privacy paradigm in the scholarly literature
96
4.1.
Constitutive interests
97
4.2.
Group and collective interests
99
4.3.
Potential harm
101
4.4.
Agent-based theories
103
5.
Analysis
105
ch. IV
Developing an Alternative Privacy Paradigm through Virtue Ethics
107
1.
Introduction
107
2.
Virtue ethics and legal regulation
108
2.1.
Virtue ethics
108
2.2.
Virtue ethical approach to the legal realm
114
2.3.
Building blocks for an alternative privacy paradigm
127
3.
Counterarguments against adopting a virtue ethical approach to privacy
129
3.1.
correlation of rights and duties
130
3.2.
Is-ought fallacy
135
3.3.
Action guidance
140
4.
Conclusion
143
ch. V
Embedding a Virtue-based Approach in Privacy Regulation
145
1.
Introduction
145
2.
Minimum requirements
147
2.1.
Regulating `data'
148
2.2.
Applying the rule of law test in abstracto
156
2.3.
Regulating the analysis phase
160
3.
Aspirations
167
3.1.
limits of aspirations overriding privacy interests
168
3.2.
Aspirations directed at promoting human freedom
172
3.3.
How to embed aspirations in a juridical framework
177
4.
Analysis
181
ch. VI
Conclusion
187
1.
Main argument
187
2.
Outline of this book
192
3.
Conclusions
196
Bibliography
201