Perils of judicial self-government in transitional societies : holding the least accountable branch to account / David Kosař.
2016
K3367 .K67 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Perils of judicial self-government in transitional societies : holding the least accountable branch to account / David Kosař.
Published
Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Call Number
K3367 .K67 2016
ISBN
9781107112124 (hardback)
1107112125 (hardback)
1107112125 (hardback)
Description
xv, 470 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)916684964
Summary
Judicial councils and other judicial self-government bodies have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to insulate the judiciary from the daily politics, to enhance independence and ensure judicial accountability. This book investigates the different forms of accountability and the taxonomy of mechanisms of control to determine a best practice methodology.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 439-463) and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Soll Fund
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Soll Fund
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
xiii
Caveats
xv
Introduction
1
I.
Puzzle
9
II.
Approach
14
III.
Overview of the Argument
16
IV.
Plan of the Book
19
pt. One
Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework
1.
Concept of Judicial Accountability
25
I.
Unpacking the Notion of Accountability
30
II.
Specifics of Judicial Accountability
36
III.
Concept of Judicial Accountability
40
IV.
Why Judicial Accountability Matters?
59
V.
De Jure versus De Facto Judicial Accountability
65
VI.
Accountability Perversions
68
2.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability
73
I.
What Do Judges Maximize?
74
II.
What Is "In": Taxonomy of Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability
75
III.
What Is "Out": Contingent Circumstances of Judicial Accountability
92
IV.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Recognition and Career Judiciaries
113
3.
Judicial Accountability and Judicial Councils
121
I.
Rise of Judicial Councils and Their Effects
121
II.
Judicial Council Euro-model of Court Administration
126
III.
Impact of the Judicial Council Euro-model on Judicial Accountability
136
pt. Two
Holding Czech and Slovak Judges Accountable
4.
Prologue to the Case Studies: Methodology and Data Reporting
145
I.
Research Design of My Case Studies
145
II.
What Is Measured
149
III.
Data Collection
150
IV.
Method and Evaluation
152
V.
Potential Inaccuracies
155
5.
Czech Republic
158
I.
Czech Judiciary in Context
158
II.
Court Administration after the Split (1993--2010): Two Decades of Calibrating the Ministry of Justice Model
181
III.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002
187
IV.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010
215
V.
Overall Conclusion on the Czech Case Study
235
6.
Slovakia
236
I.
Slovak Judiciary in Context
236
II.
Court Administration after the Split (1993--2010): The Road from the Ministry of Justice Model to the Judicial Council Euro-model
254
III.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002
264
IV.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010
299
V.
Overall Conclusion on the Slovak Case Study
333
7.
Evaluation: The Czech Republic and Slovakia Compared
334
I.
Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2002
334
II.
Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 2003 and 2010
347
III.
Effects of the Judicial Council Euro-model in Slovakia
361
IV.
Alternative Explanations
372
pt. Three
Conclusions and Implications
8.
Perils of Judicial Self-Government
389
I.
Court Presidents: Invisible Masters of Central and Eastern European Judiciaries
390
II.
Judicial Leadership Theory of Judicial Councils
398
III.
Judicial Council Euro-model: Toward the System of Dependent Judges within an Independent Judiciary?
406
IV.
Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Transitional Societies
411
V.
Oversight of Judges: Why Fire Alarms Do Not Work?
422
VI.
Judicial Virtues Matter
428
Annex A
Court System of the Czech Republic
433
Annex B
Court System of Slovakia
435
Annex C
Number of Judges in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993--2010)
437
Bibliography
439
Index
465