The continent of international law : explaining agreement design / Barbara Koremenos, University of Michigan.
2016
KZ1301 .K668 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
The continent of international law : explaining agreement design / Barbara Koremenos, University of Michigan.
Published
Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Call Number
KZ1301 .K668 2016
ISBN
9781107124233 (Hardback)
1107124239 (Hardback)
9781107561441 (Paperback)
1107561442 (Paperback)
1107124239 (Hardback)
9781107561441 (Paperback)
1107561442 (Paperback)
Description
xviii, 437 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)927192550
Summary
"Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. In 2013, 500 separate agreements officially entered into force; an additional 248 agreements were modified. All told, a substantial body of international law was enacted or changed to adapt to the evolving needs of international cooperation. Adding these new pieces of international law to the body of already existing agreements, the total number of international agreements and agreement updates now in force approaches 200,000"-- Provided by publisher.
"Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter." -- Publisher's description
"Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter." -- Publisher's description
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 407-425) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of figures
ix
List of tables
x
Acknowledgments
xiii
1.
(Re)discovering the continent
1
pt. I
COIL's building blocks: theory and data
23
Introduction to Part I
23
2.
Theoretical framework
25
3.
COIL sample
64
pt. II
Flexibility provisions in the design of international law
99
Introduction to Part II
99
4.
Duration provisions
103
5.
Escape clauses and withdrawal clauses
124
6.
(Im)precision and reservations
158
pt. III
Centralization, scope, and control provisions in the design of international law
193
Introduction to Part III
193
7.
Dispute resolution provisions
199
8.
Punishment provisions
226
9.
Monitoring provisions
261
10.
Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power
293
11.
Conclusion
320
Appendix 1
List of agreements in COIL sample
346
Appendix 2
Coding rules
371
Appendix 3
Selection issues in international cooperation data sets
377
References
407
Index
426