European agencies and risk governance in EU financial market law / Paul Weismann.
2016
KJE2188 .W453 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
European agencies and risk governance in EU financial market law / Paul Weismann.
Published
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2016.
Call Number
KJE2188 .W453 2016
ISBN
9781138899995 (hbk)
1138899992 (hbk)
9781315707549 (ebk)
1138899992 (hbk)
9781315707549 (ebk)
Description
xix, 237 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)919480679
Summary
The phenomenon of 'agencification' describes the EU legislator's increasing establishment of European agencies to fulfil tasks in a variety of EU policies. The creation of these decentralised administrative entities raises a number of questions; for example, on the limits to such delegation of powers, on the agencies' institutional development and possible classification, and on the role of comitology committees as an institutional alternative.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 204-235) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
x
Abbreviations
xi
Tables
xv
List of cases
xvi
Introduction
1
1.
Preliminaries
5
I.
term `agency' in general and in the context of EU law in particular
5
1.
Introduction
5
2.
Different meanings of the term `agency'
6
2.1.
In a general context
6
2.2.
In the context of EU administration
7
II.
Risk governance as a generic term of a certain set of policies
9
1.
Terminology
9
2.
Excursus: objective science and subjective politics -- a fallacy?
11
2.1.
theory of the interplay between science and politics
11
2.2.
Five assumptions on the practice of science and politics
13
III.
Administrative output and its legal quality
16
1.
Introduction
16
2.
output of European agencies in the light of EU primary law
18
2.
Core questions of the `agencification' of risk governance
21
I.
Delegation of powers and the Meroni judgement
21
1.
background of the case
21
2.
parties' submissions and the Opinion of AG Roemer
22
2.1.
parties' submissions
22
2.2.
Opinion of the Advocate General
22
3.
decision of the Court
23
4.
Some remarks on the judgement
25
5.
Post-Meroni case law on delegation
28
6.
Meroni doctrine and the rise of European agencies
30
7.
Meroni doctrine revisited: the ESMA case
32
II.
Comitology -- a foreshadowing of agencification?
35
1.
development of comitology over time
35
2.
procedures
40
2.1.
Advisory procedure
40
2.2.
Examination procedure
41
3.
Delegated and implementing acts -- the new regime
42
4.
Comitology today
46
III.
EU's `agencification' -- institutionalisation, classification and continuation
47
1.
`Four waves' of the EU's agencification?
47
2.
Common characteristics of European agencies
53
3.
Distinguishing European agencies -- different approaches
54
4.
Has the European agency exceeded its zenith? An assessment
58
IV.
Comitology and agencies -- a brief comparison
62
1.
Legal foundation
62
2.
Rationale
65
3.
Independence
68
4.
Excursus: the legal status of expert opinions
71
V.
crisis: alternative ways of risk governance
75
1.
EFSM/EFSF/ESM and the Troika
75
2.
Single Supervisory Mechanism: empowering the ECB
77
3.
Fiscal Compact
78
3.
European System of Financial Supervisors
81
I.
development of a financial market supervisory system
81
1.
Committee of Wise Men and its reports
81
1.1.
Genesis and main ideas
81
1.2.
From theory to practice -- the implementation of the Lamfalussy Report
83
2.
committees within the Lamfalussy framework
84
2.1.
level 2 committees: ESC, EBC, EIOPC
84
2.2.
level 3 committees: CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS
86
2.3.
Lamfalussy process: its rationale and the role of committees
91
3.
2009 reform
93
3.1.
Room for improvement
93
3.2.
Extension of competences
94
4.
de Larosiere Report
97
4.1.
Overview
97
4.2.
reform of microprudential supervision
100
4.3.
reform of macroprudential supervision
104
4.4.
resonance of the de Larosiere Report in scholarship and in politics
105
II.
European System of Financial Supervisors
106
1.
Introduction
106
2.
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
107
2.1.
Tasks
107
2.1.1.
Collection and exchange of information (Article 15)
108
2.1.2.
Warnings and recommendations and their follow-up (Articles 16 to 18)
109
2.2.
Organisation
110
3.
European Financial Market Supervisory Authorities
112
3.1.
Legal basis
112
3.2.
Seat, legal status, scope and objectives
114
3.3.
ESAs' tasks -- an overview
119
3.3.1.
Unification of regulatory and supervisory practices (including the application of Union law; Article 8 para 1)
119
3.3.2.
Provision of a sound information flow (Article 8 para 1)
120
3.3.3.
Long-term monitoring of the market with a view to systemic risks (Article 8 para 1)
120
3.3.4.
Protection of stakeholders (Articles 8 and 9 para 1)
120
3.3.5.
Tasks related to financial activities (Article 9)
121
3.4.
ESAs' powers
121
3.4.1.
Regulatory technical standards (RTS)
121
3.4.1.1.
General remarks
121
3.4.1.2.
Genesis: cooperation between the Commission and the ESAs
122
3.4.1.3.
Delegation of power and its revocation
124
3.4.1.4.
Objections by the EP and/or the Council
125
3.4.1.5.
ESAs' role in the making of RTS -- an appraisal
126
3.4.2.
Implementing technical standards (ITS)
128
3.4.3.
Binding decisions
132
3.4.3.1.
Breach of Union law (Article 17)
133
3.4.3.2.
Action in emergency situations (Article 18)
138
3.4.3.3.
Settlement of disagreements between competent authorities in cross-border situations (Article 19)
142
3.4.3.4.
relationship between the regimes laid down in Articles 17, 18 and 19
144
3.4.4.
Guidelines and recommendations
146
3.4.5.
Legal protection against ESA-output
149
3.5.
Organisation: tasks and composition of the ESAs' organs
152
3.5.1.
Chairperson
153
3.5.1.1.
Tasks
153
3.5.1.2.
Appointment and dismissal
153
3.5.2.
Executive Director
154
3.5.2.1.
Tasks
154
3.5.2.2.
Appointment and dismissal
155
3.5.3.
Board of Supervisors
155
3.5.3.1.
Tasks
155
3.5.3.2.
Composition and decision-making
156
3.5.3.3.
Internal committees and panels
159
3.5.4.
Management Board
160
3.5.4.1.
Tasks
160
3.5.4.2.
Composition and decision-making
160
3.5.5.
Joint Committee of the ESAs
162
3.5.6.
Board of Appeal
163
3.6.
Information, networks and budget
166
3.6.1.
Preliminary remarks
166
3.6.2.
Risk assessment and risk management
166
3.6.3.
Relations with competent authorities
168
3.6.3.1.
General remarks
168
3.6.3.2.
Delegation
169
3.6.3.3.
Peer reviews
170
3.6.3.4.
Colleges of supervisors
171
3.6.4.
Reaction to ESRB warnings and recommendations
172
3.6.5.
ESAs' budget
173
4.
Resume
176
4.
Institutional change through the Banking Union
180
I.
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM): development, legal basis and scope
180
II.
ECB under the SSM
184
1.
Tasks and powers
184
2.
Organisation
186
III.
SRB under the SRM
189
1.
Tasks and powers
189
2.
Organisation
193
3.
Single Resolution Fund (SRF)
194
IV.
Consequences for the ESFS and Appraisal
194
Conclusion
199
List of references
204
Index
236