EU renewable electricity law and policy : from national targets to a common market / Tim Maxian Rusche.
2015
KJE6852 .R87 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
EU renewable electricity law and policy : from national targets to a common market / Tim Maxian Rusche.
Published
Cambrdige, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Call Number
KJE6852 .R87 2015
ISBN
9781107112933 (hardback)
1107112931 (hardback)
1107112931 (hardback)
Description
xvii, 272 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)905759358
Summary
There are two basic policy tools for promoting renewable electricity: price regulation (feed-in tariffs) and quantity regulation (green certificates). In economic theory, they are equally efficient. Contrary to conventional thinking, the author demonstrates that under real-world conditions, price regulation is more efficient. EU law obliges Member States to put support schemes in place, but leaves their design to national authorities. They need, however, to comply with EU state aid and internal market rules, and their financing may not result in import duties and discriminatory taxation. This book provides a detailed analysis of the decisions practice adopted by the Commission and the case law of the Union Courts. As support schemes mature, has time not come for putting an end to regulatory competition? With huge efficiency gains to be expected, the author expertly examines the political obstacles and sets out three different pathways to achieve EU-wide harmonization.-- Provided by Publisher.
Note
Based on the author's thesis (doctoral) in the framework of the joined French-German doctoral programme of the Ecole de Droit de la Sorbonne and the Law Faculty of the University of Cologne.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 237-261) and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Beinecke Fund
Gift

The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Beinecke Fund
Table of Contents
Series editors' preface
xv
Acknowledgments
xvi
Introduction
1
Part I Twenty-Eight National Support Schemes In Regulatory Competition
7
1.
Regulation of renewable electricity in the internal electricity market: (still) a preserve of Member States
9
1.1.
concept of regulation in the USA and the EU
9
1.1.1.
Definition of regulation
9
1.1.2.
Market-based instruments of regulation
12
1.1.3.
Practice of regulation and academic debate
14
1.2.
Regulation of electricity markets in the EU: from national monopolies to a common market
19
1.3.
Regulation of renewable electricity: regulatory competition in how to reach national targets
22
1.3.1.
Regulation of renewable electricity in times of national monopolies
22
1.3.2.
First attempt at regulation of renewable electricity in a liberalized market: indicative targets and guarantees of origin under the First RES Directive
26
1.3.3.
regulatory status quo: mandatory national targets under the Second RES Directive
33
2.
regulatory options from an economic point of view: superiority of prices over quantities under real-world conditions
39
2.1.
distinction between price-based and quantity-based support schemes
39
2.2.
(European ignorance of the) equal efficiency of price-based and quantity-based instruments under ideal conditions
41
2.3.
Efficiency of price-based and quantity-based instruments under real-world conditions
45
2.3.1.
Imperfect information and uncertainty
45
2.3.2.
Access to capital and investment risk
47
2.3.3.
Administrative and transaction costs
50
2.3.4.
Dynamic effects
51
2.3.5.
Market power
53
2.3.6.
Strategic behavior of firms
54
2.3.7.
Windfall gains and price discrimination
56
2.3.8.
Regulatory stability
57
2.3.9.
Theoretical conclusion
57
2.3.10.
Empirical confirmation
58
3.
times they are a-changin'? The evolution of support schemes in Member States over time
62
3.1.
first generation of support schemes: from the late 1970s until the First RES Directive
62
3.2.
second generation of support schemes: emergence of TGC in the context of market opening and increasing sophistication of FIT
65
3.3.
Overview of the evolution in time of support schemes in the different Member States
68
Part II Regulatory Competition And Union Law Protecting The Internal Market
77
4.
Union law on State aid: down for the count, but not knocked out by PreussenElektra
79
4.1.
fine line that separates "State resources" from "no State resources"
79
4.1.1.
1990s: Member States notify their support schemes, and the Commission approves them without hesitation
81
4.1.2.
starting point for a complex decision- making practice: PreussenElektra
82
4.1.3.
"Damage control" by the Commission (and the Court?): the art of threading the fine line between State resources and no State resources
85
4.1.3.1.
Support schemes involving a compensation mechanism based on a levy
89
4.1.3.2.
Support schemes involving the use of resources of public undertakings
92
4.1.3.3.
Green certificate schemes
98
4.1.4.
After Essent, Commission v. Netherlands ("Dutch NOx trading"), Vent de colere and Elcogaz: What scope remains for PreussenElektra?
103
4.1.4.1.
Clear legal assessment
108
4.1.4.2.
Small doubts with regard to legal assessment
108
4.1.4.3.
Major uncertainties with regard to legal assessment
110
4.1.5.
Should regulatory measures be subject to State aid control?
111
4.1.5.1.
importance of PreussenElektra: A clear confirmation of Van Tiggelen and Sloman Neptun as to whether only measures financed from State resources are covered by Article 107 (1) TFEU
112
4.1.5.2.
Arguments on the relationship between regulation and State aid
113
4.1.5.3.
status quo: a partial overlap
115
4.2.
Under which conditions does a national support scheme confer an advantage?
117
4.3.
Compatibility of State aid for renewable electricity with the internal market
121
4.3.1.
Assessment under the Environmental Guidelines
121
4.3.1.1.
Content and evolution of the Environmental Guidelines
121
4.3.1.2.
Commission decision practice
125
4.3.2.
Assessment as a public service compensation
132
4.3.3.
Main differences between the Environmental Guidelines and public service compensations
135
4.3.4.
Assessment of compliance with other treaty provisions in the context of the State aid assessment
136
5.
Union law on free movement of goods: the protection of the environment justifies (nearly) everything, except for "Buy European" clauses for equipment
138
6.
Prohibition of internal customs duties and discriminatory taxation: the sometimes forgotten straightjacket
146
6.1.
relevant case law: Outokumpu Oy, AEM and AEM Torino, Essent, Van Calster and Streekgewest
146
6.2.
Commission's control of violations of Articles 30 and 110 TFEU by support schemes and remedies
150
6.2.1.
Parafiscal levies financing stranded costs, FIT and PTS
150
6.2.2.
TGC and compliance with Articles 30 and 110 TFEU
155
brief aside I: WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing measures
159
brief aside II: investor-State arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty
164
Part III Toward A Common Market For Renewable Electricity?
173
7.
2013 to 2015 - Years of upheaval?
175
7.1.
economic case for a common market: efficiency gains
175
7.2.
repeated political failure of proposals for a common market: it's the jobs, stupid (and maybe also legislative capture?)!
176
7.3.
2013 to 2015 - A tale of regulatory activism and judicial self-restraint
180
7.3.1.
Foreplay: the Commission's 2012 communication "Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy market"
181
7.3.2.
Regulatory activism: Commission attempts at harmonization through communications and State aid guidelines from 2013 to 2015
186
7.3.2.1.
Commission guidance for the design of renewables support schemes for the period until 2020
186
7.3.2.2.
2030 framework for climate and energy policies
190
7.3.2.3.
2014 Environmental Guidelines: the bell tolls for FIT
193
7.3.2.4.
Renewable energy in the Energy Union Package of 2015
196
7.3.3.
Judicial self-restraint in Alands vindkraft and Essent Belgium
197
8.
Regulatory options for the creation of a common market
201
8.1.
Preliminary considerations on legal basis and interaction with other regulatory policies
202
8.1.1.
Legal basis
202
8.1.1.1.
Treaty of Rome: absence of a common energy policy from the text
202
8.1.1.2.
Energy in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht: first attempts by Member States to put brakes on EU action
205
8.1.1.3.
dedicated legal basis for energy that comes at the price of a partial re-nationalization of energy policy
206
8.1.2.
Interaction with other regulatory policies
213
8.1.2.1.
Is there any additional impact in terms of CO2 reduction from support schemes for renewable electricity in the presence of the EU ETS?
215
8.1.2.2.
Are overlapping layers of regulation necessarily a problem in the light of the Tinbergen rule?
216
8.1.2.3.
different levels of interaction between EU ETS and support schemes for renewable electricity
218
8.2.
Bottom-up: regulatory convergence
220
8.3.
Top-down, the regulatory way: State aid guidelines as tool of regulatory policy
221
8.4.
Top-down, the legislative way: an EU-wide support scheme
227
8.4.1.
regulatory technique (price-based; quantity-based; national choice of the system combined with trading between systems)
227
8.4.2.
Market risk
229
9.
Regulatory cross-fertilization across the Atlantic
231
9.1.
Transplanting feed-in tariffs and green certificates: intended and unintended effects
231
9.2.
federal versus the State: parallels and differences in constraints imposed by federal law on regulatory competition and the emergence of a federal market
233
9.3.
common transatlantic market for renewable electricity?
235
References
237
Index
262