The more economic approach to EU antitrust law / Anne C Witt.
2016
KJE6456 .W58 2016 (Map It)
Available at Cellar
Formats
| Format | |
|---|---|
| BibTeX | |
| MARCXML | |
| TextMARC | |
| MARC | |
| DublinCore | |
| EndNote | |
| NLM | |
| RefWorks | |
| RIS |
Items
Details
Author
Title
The more economic approach to EU antitrust law / Anne C Witt.
Published
Oxford [UK] ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 2016.
Call Number
KJE6456 .W58 2016
ISBN
9781849466967 (hardback ; alk. paper)
1849466963 (hardback ; alk. paper)
9781509909230 (ePDF)
9781509909223 (ePub)
1849466963 (hardback ; alk. paper)
9781509909230 (ePDF)
9781509909223 (ePub)
Description
xxxvii, 340 pages ; 24 cm.
System Control No.
(OCoLC)946968108
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 318-331) and index.
Available in Other Form
Online version: Witt, Anne C. More economic approach to EU antitrust law. Oxford [UK] ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 2016 9781509909223 (DLC) 2016029331
Record Appears in
Variant Title
More economic approach to European Union antitrust law
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
v
Table of Cases
xv
Table of Legislation
xxix
Introduction
1
Part I
1.
Triggers and Catalysts
7
I.
Introduction
7
II.
Completion of the Internal Market
7
III.
Academic Criticism
10
IV.
Transatlantic Conflict
11
A.
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Crisis (1997)
11
B.
GE and Honeywell Run Afoul of Nineteenth-Century Thinking (2001)
14
i.
US Investigation
15
ii.
EU Investigation
15
iii.
Controversy
16
C.
Microsoft (2004)
18
i.
US Investigation
19
ii.
EU Investigation
21
iii.
Controversy
24
D.
Conclusion
25
V.
DG Competition's annus horribilis
27
A.
Scope of Judicial Review
27
B.
Airtours
28
C.
Schneider Electric
29
D.
Tetra Laval
30
E.
Consequences
32
VI.
Great Reformer
34
VII.
Increased International Cooperation
36
VIII.
Conclusion
39
2.
Process
40
I.
Introduction
40
II.
One Pillar at a Time
40
A.
Article 101
40
B.
EU Merger Law
41
C.
Article 102
42
III.
`Soft' Reform
43
A.
Article 101
43
B.
EU Merger Law
45
C.
Article 102
46
IV.
Changes in the Professional Composition of DG Competition
47
V.
Public Consultations
49
VI.
Conclusion
52
3.
Agenda
54
I.
Introduction
54
II.
Speeches, Interviews and Publications by the Commissioner for Competition Policy
54
III.
Official Commission Acts
57
IV.
Broader Context
60
A.
Comparison with US Antitrust Law
60
i.
Key Substantive Provisions of US Antitrust Law
61
ii.
Objectives of US Antitrust Law
62
iii.
Concept of Harm
65
iv.
Per se Rules v Rules of Reason
65
v.
Conclusion
68
B.
Academic Debate
69
V.
Conclusions and Consequences for the Structure of Part II
73
Part II
4.
More Economic Objective
77
I.
Introduction
77
II.
Importance of Identifying a Provision's Legal Objective
77
III.
Few of the Usual Suspects
79
A.
Economic Welfare
80
B.
Fundamental Constitutional Values: Individual Freedom, Equality of Opportunity, Fairness and Democracy
83
C.
Other Aims
86
D.
One Aim or Several Aims?
88
IV.
Commission's Understanding of the EU Antitrust Rules' Legal Objective Prior to the More Economic Approach
88
A.
Legal Provisions
89
B.
Commission's Understanding
91
i.
Legally Binding Commission Acts
91
ii.
Commission Notices
92
iii.
Annual Reports on Competition Policy
93
a.
Internal Market
94
b.
Preventing the Concentration of Economic Power
95
c.
Economic Growth
96
d.
Industrial Adaptability
96
e.
Fighting Inflation
97
f.
`Competitiveness' of the European Economy
97
g.
Consumer Interests
97
h.
Interests of Society as a Whole
98
i.
Fairness
98
j.
Individual Commercial Freedom and other Democratic Values
99
k.
Employment
99
l.
Innovation
100
m.
Efficiency
100
n.
Fundamental Union Objectives
101
o.
Conclusion
102
iv.
Conclusions on the Commission's Early Position
102
V.
Legal Objectives according to the More Economic Approach
103
A.
Legal Provisions
103
B.
Commission's Revised Understanding of the Objectives of EU Antitrust Law
104
C.
Other Commission Publications
107
VI.
Conclusion
108
5.
More Economic Concept of Competitive Harm
110
I.
Introduction
110
II.
Article 101
111
A.
Commission's Concept of Harm Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
111
i.
Interpretative Notices and other Soft Law
111
ii.
Commission's Decision Practice
114
iii.
Conclusion
118
B.
Commission's Concept of Harm after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
118
i.
Commission Notices and other Soft Law
118
ii.
Commission's Decision Practice
121
iii.
Conclusion
125
C.
Conclusion
125
III.
Merger Control
126
A.
Commission's Concept of Harm Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
127
i.
Legal Basis: Council Regulation 4064/89
127
ii.
Commission Notices and other Soft Law
127
iii.
Commission's Decision Practice
128
iv.
Conclusion
132
B.
Commission's Concept of Harm after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
132
i.
New Legal Basis: Council Regulation 139/2004
133
ii.
Commission Notices and other Soft Law
135
iii.
Commission's Decision Practice
137
C.
Conclusion
140
IV.
Article 102
141
A.
Commission's Concept of Harm Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
142
i.
Commission Soft Law
142
ii.
Commission's Decision Practice
142
iii.
Conclusion
146
B.
Commission's Concept of Harm after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
146
i.
Commission Notices and other Soft Law
146
ii.
Commission's Decision Practice
149
iii.
Conclusion
155
V.
Conclusion
156
6.
More Economic Concept of Countervailing Effects
159
I.
Introduction
159
II.
Article 101
159
A.
Legal Basis: Article 101(3)
159
B.
Commission's Understanding Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
160
i.
Commission's Block Exemption Regulations
160
ii.
Commission's Decision Practice
162
iii.
Conclusion
165
C.
Commission's Understanding after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
165
i.
Soft Law
165
ii.
Commission's Block Exemption Regulations
166
iii.
Commission's Decision Practice
167
iv.
Conclusion
173
D.
Conclusion
173
III.
EU Merger Law
174
A.
Commission's Understanding Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
174
i.
Legal Basis
174
ii.
Decision Practice
175
iii.
Conclusion
176
B.
Commission's Understanding after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
177
i.
Legal Basis
177
ii.
Soft Law
177
iii.
Decision Practice
178
iv.
Conclusion
179
C.
Conclusion
179
IV.
Article 102
181
A.
Legal Basis
181
B.
Commission's Understanding Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
181
C.
Commission's Understanding after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
183
i.
Soft Law
184
ii.
Decision Practice
186
iii.
Conclusion
188
D.
Conclusion
188
V.
Conclusion
190
7.
More Economic Test
193
I.
Introduction
193
II.
Few Preliminary Considerations
194
III.
Article 101
196
A.
Legal Basis
196
B.
Commission's Approach Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
198
i.
Decision Practice
199
ii.
Block Exemption Regulations
202
iii.
Conclusion
203
C.
Commission's Approach after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
204
i.
Soft Law
204
ii.
Decision Practice
207
iii.
Block Exemption Regulations
209
iv.
Conclusion
211
D.
Conclusion on the Changes under Article 101
211
IV.
EU Merger Law
213
V.
Article 102
214
A.
Commission's Approach Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
215
B.
Commission's Approach after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
219
i.
Soft Law
219
ii.
Decision Practice
221
iii.
Conclusion
226
C.
Conclusion on the Changes under Article 102
227
VI.
Conclusion
228
8.
More Economic Methodology
231
I.
Introduction
231
II.
Use of Economic Theory
231
A.
Commission's Approach Prior to the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
232
i.
Articles 101 and 102
232
ii.
Merger Control
234
B.
Commission's Approach after the Introduction of the More Economic Approach
236
III.
Use of Quantitative Analysis
239
A.
Use of Quantitative Analysis in the Commission's Decision Practice
240
B.
Significance of Quantitative Analysis in the Commission's Decision Practice
242
IV.
More Empirical Evidence
244
V.
Length of Decisions
245
VI.
Conclusion
245
Conclusions on Part II
246
Part III
9.
Advantages
253
I.
Introduction
253
II.
Logic and Internal Consistency
253
III.
Accuracy
254
IV.
More Empirical Evidence
256
V.
Reduction in the Number of Cases Caught by the Antitrust Provisions
256
VI.
Approximation with US Antitrust Law
258
VII.
Conclusion
260
10.
Compatibility with the Case Law
261
I.
Introduction
261
II.
Aims of EU Antitrust Law in the Case Law
262
III.
Concept of Harm in the Case Law
266
A.
Court's Concept of Harm under Article 101
266
B.
Court's Concept of Harm under EU Merger Law
271
C.
Court's Concept of Harm under Article 102
274
D.
Conclusions on the Court's Concept of Harm
281
IV.
Relevance of Non-economic Policy Goals in the Case Law
281
V.
Form- v Effects-based Tests in the Case Law
286
VI.
Compatibility of the Commission's More Economic Approach with the Case Law and Consequences
289
A.
Points of Divergence
289
B.
Consequences
290
VII.
Conclusion
294
11.
Other Concerns
296
I.
Introduction
296
II.
Consistency
296
III.
Clarity
297
IV.
Difficulty of Application
298
A.
Manageability for Courts
298
B.
Manageability for Undertakings
300
C.
Cost
301
D.
Conclusion
301
V.
Consumer Welfare as the Only Relevant Value
302
VI.
Conclusion
304
Conclusion
305
Annex: Tables on Decision Length
310
Bibliography
318
Index
333